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WHEN DID CAESAR WRITE HIS COMMENTARIES ON THE CIVIL WAR?

BY W. WARDE FOWLER

As the question stands in this heading, I confess I cannot answer it with complete confidence. But I propose to give in this short paper a reason, and to me a convincing one, for believing that Caesar's account of the campaign of Curio in Africa, which occupies the last twenty-one chapters of Book ii, could not have been written until after his return from his own campaign in that province, viz., until after the beginning of June, 46 B. C. And if my argument has any weight, it will carry with it a presumption that the rest of the work was composed at the same time. It was Caesar's habit to go through with anything he had undertaken; and that he wrote easily and quickly we know from the testimony of his friend Hirtius, in his preface to Book viii of the *Commentaries on the Gallic War*.

When lecturing, as I did for some years, on the history and strategy of the civil wars, I used to tell my pupils that in my view Caesar could not well have written of Curio's campaign until he had himself been on the ground in the spring of 46. So far as we know he had never been in the African province before that year; if he had, it must have been in early life and as a private individual. But there is no trace of any such journey, nor any known reason why he should have taken it. We may in fact assume that he had never been there; and I wish to show that

there is more than one passage in the latter part of Book ii which could not well have been written by anyone who had not been there. I am not aware that this has ever been pointed out, and I have never seen a serious attempt to fix the date of the *writing* of these books. Nipperdey long ago (Praef. 4 of his edition) argued that they could not have been *published* before 46, but that is another matter; and his argument, drawn from Cicero's famous eulogy of the *Commentaries* in his *Brutus* (written in 46), which, as Nipperdey thinks, could not have included those on the Civil War, does not seem to me a very strong one.

The question is of some historical interest in view of the attacks made of recent years in Germany, by O. E. Schmidt and other less weighty critics, on the good faith of Caesar in his narrative of events, especially in Book i. If Caesar did not write these books till 46, three years had elapsed since the events narrated in Book i, and his mind had been fully occupied with other matters since then; so that slips of memory would be natural and unavoidable. That his memory should sometimes deceive him in the way of self-justification was psychologically inevitable; and it does not follow that a man who in 46 had nothing to fear from popular opinion was deliberately trying to put himself right by telling lies which thousands of people then living would know to be such. The German critics, as so often in Roman history, have argued rather as critics than as students of human nature in activity. And the new Italian historian, Ferrero, has gone to such extravagant lengths in his depreciation both of Caesar's motives and actions, that students and teachers of Caesar should be on their guard in reading him.

But to return to my theme. Let me point out in the first place how difficult it is to suppose that Caesar could have found leisure to put his story into literary shape at any time during the three years following on the outbreak of civil war in January, 49. After the Pharsalian campaign he was in Egypt, sore beset until the end of March, 47. True, he did not leave Egypt until the beginning of July (Fischer, *Zeittafeln*, p. 283), but when after eleven years of continuous hard work he fell a victim to the charms of Cleopatra, and with her made an expedition up the

Nile (App. *B. C.* 2. 90), it is difficult to believe—though nothing indeed seems to have been impossible to Caesar—that he should have taken pen in hand for literary work. At the end of that year, after his work in the East and Asia Minor, he was in Rome for about two months, and must have been extremely busy the whole time. But when the African war (December, 47 to June, 46) was over, he left for Sardinia on June 13 (*Bell. Afr.* 98), was detained by storms, and did not reach Rome till July 26. There he stayed till at least November 26, when we hear of him in a letter of Cicero (*Fam.* 6. 14), dated A. D. 5, Kal. intercalares priores, which may remind us that between November and December of that year there were inserted 67 days divided into two intercalary months. He was apparently in Spain before January 1, 45; and we may reckon that he did not stay long in Rome after Cicero met him on November 26. But from June 13 to (say) the middle of the first intercalary month would be a period of about 180 days of comparative leisure. Much indeed was done in that time: but Caesar's time was then more at his own disposal than it had been since he first went to Gaul. If I may hazard a guess, it would be that enforced leisure during the stormy weather which detained him in, or on the coast of, Sardinia was the opportunity which he seized for composition.

Let us now see what was the course of Caesar's travel in Africa, and where it covered the ground of the operations of Curio. He sailed past Clupea, on the eastern side of the peninsula which stands out toward Sicily, and which was evacuated by the Pompeians as soon as Curio appeared on the coast (*B. C.* 2. 23). So far as we know he never was actually there, or at Anquillaria where Curio landed. Of these two places he says very little; he gives the distance between them accurately, and describes Anquillaria in somewhat general terms: "habet non incommodam aestate stationem, et duobus eminentibus promontorii continetur"—that is all, and it is no doubt what had been told him about a place in which he was not greatly interested. We may compare it with the brief description of the Rhone Valley at Martigny at the beginning of *B. G.* iii, which he seems never to have visited himself after the narrow escape of Servius Galba there narrated. He

writes of the valley as lying between steep mountains, with the river running through it, just as Galba might have described it to him, but without mentioning any other features of the ground, e. g., the sudden turn of the Rhone to the northwest, almost at a right angle, at this point.

Caesar then sailed on to the south of Hadrumetum, and the campaign practically began and ended there; but after the battle of Thapsus he marched direct to Utica, and would come upon the footsteps of Curio at about a day's march from that town. Here he stayed apparently some days (*Bell. Afr.* 89 ff.), then went by the valley of the Bagradas to Zama, and when he had done his work there returned to Utica and embarked for Sardinia. It is here then that we must look for the evidence we want, and here indeed we find it.

He was always deeply interested in the success or failure of his subordinates, and while at Utica he must have been continually thinking of those fatal blunders of Curio which led to the loss of the African province, and to the necessity of a second campaign there. It is clear that what particularly attracted his attention was the position of the so-called Castra Cornelia, which Scipio the Elder had occupied in the Second Punic War. He saw its great advantages to an invading and inferior force, and approved of Curio's retreat to this position on the first news of the approach of King Juba. "Castra erant *ad bellum ducendum* aptissima natura loci et munitione et maris propinquitate, et aquae et salis copia, cuius magna vis iam ex proximis erat salinis eo congesta. Non materia multitudine arborum, non frumentum, cuius erant plenissimi agri, deficere poterat." So Curio rightly decided to remain there and "ducere bellum;" and it was only by yielding to false information and to his own impulsiveness and self-confidence, that he abandoned the position and brought himself and his army to destruction (chaps. 36, 37).

This alone might be strong evidence that Caesar had been on the ground and seen with his own eyes the strength of the position, and pondered with keen regret the folly and the ruin of a man whom he seems to have loved (see the words he puts into Curio's mouth in 32. 2). But in a previous chapter he had

already accurately described this position; and this chapter (24) leaves no doubt in my mind that he is describing it from personal observation. On his arrival at Utica Curio went himself with a cavalry force to survey the Castra Cornelia,

quod is locus peridoneus castris habebatur. Id autem est iugum derectum eminem in mare, utraque ex parte praeruptum atque asperum, sed tamen paulo leniore fastigio ab ea parte quae ad Uticam vergit. Abest derecto itinere ab Utica paulo amplius passus mille. Sed hoc itinere est fons, quo mare succedit longius, lateque is locus restagnat: quem si qui vitare voluerit, sex milium circuitu in oppidum pervenit.

Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre civile I*, 309), after examining the ground himself, pronounced this description to be accurate in every point of detail except one;¹ and Caesar must indeed have cross-examined his witnesses importunately if he was writing here on information given by survivors from Curio's army, or others who had been there. And the one point on which Caesar is not accurate is exactly that one point in the whole scene as to which a mistake might easily be made, viz., the distance from the Castra to the town of Utica. It is really, says Colonel Stoffel, not one mile, but three. But looking over the flat and marshy plain between the hill on the east and the town on rising ground to the west, the eye might easily be deceived, as it so often is on level ground without any break, or in guessing at distance at sea. It must be added, as Stoffel suggests, that the reading of the passage may be at fault. I see by Mr. Hirzel's critical note on these words, that the sentence "Abest . . . mille" is absent in the MS known as D (*prima manu*), which is perhaps the best of all the MSS of these books.

It is interesting to compare this description, written by a man who was deeply interested in the story he was telling and the ground he was describing, with another by a historian who had not been on the spot. Livy (29. 35), in writing of the use made of it by Scipio, merely says "Castra hiberna in promontorio, quod tenui iugo continentis adhaerens in aliquantum maris spatium extenditur, communis." There is no picture in these words, such

¹I. e., as the coast was then. The sea has now retreated a long way, but the "lugum" remains as it was.

as rises in the mind's eye on reading Caesar's graphic description, which reminds us of the famous account of the rocky slope at Ilerda (Book i. 45), but is even more intelligible to the unassisted reader.

Caesar, like other ancient writers, is not as a rule careful in describing topographical details; they had not what we may call the lecturing or explanatory habit. The account of the *Castra Cornelia* is an exception to the rule, not so much, I think, because he wished to impress the features of the ground on his readers, as because he himself had observed them with such lively and regretful interest. And I may here remark that I believe it will be found on examination that he is more explicit in describing the scene of a disaster or peril which he had incurred than that of a victory; for example, the nature of the ground at Gergovia is more carefully explained than that of any of his Gallic victories, the rocky slope at Ilerda, than the country to the west of the Segres where the campaign was won, and the operations near Dyrrhachium, where he ventured too much and had to regret it, far more clearly than the the battlefield of Pharsalus, where, if we had no account but his own to help us, we should hardly know within fifty miles where the battle took place.

Then why, it may be asked, has he not given us an accurate description of the scene of the catastrophe in the valley of Bagradas (chaps. 38-42) which brought the campaign to such a miserable conclusion? He must have passed over it on his way to Zama; but here he has given us no picture. The reason is, I take it, that there was no picture to draw. His account makes it clear that the ground was all open and level, suited for the operation of cavalry, which could proceed even by night without difficulty, as we see in chaps. 38. 4 and 39. 6. There was no salient feature in the landscape, or none at least which had any bearing on the result.¹ Low hills or rising ground (*colles*) are mentioned in 42, to which the panic-stricken troops finally tried to make their way;

¹A friend who has traveled in the valley of the Mejerda confirms the impression I had gained from Caesar as to the nature of the ground. Though the river has changed its course near the sea, it is quite clear that it flowed then as it flows now, a few miles inland, through a flat alluvial plain, without salient features. Stoffel writes (p. 109) of some "collines" which approach the river about ten kilometers from the *Castra Cornelia*, which are no doubt the "loca superiora" of chap. 40 *ad fin.*, and the "colles" of 42. 1. Apart from these there seems to be nothing but the the level plain.

but these seem to have been some distance away, for the enemy's cavalry was easily able to prevent this attempt at escape.

One other point may be mentioned before I leave these reflections, set down at the suggestion of Professor F. W. Kelsey, to the judgment of critics. Varus, the Pompeian commander at Utica, had pitched his camp in a strong position under the walls of the town. This position Caesar describes with unusual care, perhaps to make it plain that it was impossible to make any serious attack on either camp or city, and that the wise course for Curio to take, seeing that he had no siege-train, was "ducere bellum" by occupying the *Castra Cornelia*. He writes as follows (chap. 25, *init.*): "*Hoc explorato loco Curio castra Vari conspicit muro oppidoque coniuncta ad portam quae appellatur bellica, admodum munita natura loci, una ex parte ipso oppido Utica, altera a theatro, quod est ante oppidum, substructionibus eius operis maximis, aditu ad castra difficult et angusto.*" I think that any reader would naturally conclude that these lines were written by one who knew Utica well, and not from second-hand information. Such a conclusion is in my view made certain by the mention of the "substructiones" on which, as it seems, the structure of the theatre had to be erected, no doubt on account of the sandy nature of the soil. These solid foundations formed a strong flanking defense for the camp, and made the access to it extremely difficult. I can well imagine an informant mentioning the theatre to Caesar; but I find it hard to believe that the "substructiones" would have found their way into his story if he had not seen them with his own eyes.

It might be argued that in this same book (chaps. 9, 10), Caesar has very minutely described the construction of a tower and a "musculus" used during the siege of Massilia, which he could not have seen himself, as they had been destroyed by the Massiliots by fire before he returned from Spain (chap. 14). If he could at second hand describe such a complicated piece of engineering as the tower (the "musculus" may be left out of account as being neither new nor complicated in the method of its construction), why should he not be able to describe also at second hand, the position of the ground before Utica?

To this I would reply: (1) That plans and directions for an ingenious bit of engineering, an invention for protecting the builders of a tower within range of an ingenious enemy's powerful missiles, were undoubtedly preserved for future use, and were accessible to Caesar at any time; (2) That this tower was solidly constructed of brick, not of wood like the rest of the siege machinery, and that therefore the shell of it at least would probably have remained standing until Caesar's arrival, when the construction could be explained to him on the spot by his engineers; (3) That a piece of machinery is a very different thing from a strategical position. The former can be explained with the help of plans; the engineer's own description may be incorporated in one's work, as was perhaps the case both here and in the account of the Rhine bridge. But the description of the *Castra Cornelia* and the position before Utica is the work of a general, accustomed for many years to examine the lie of the ground in military operations: it is the pivot on which Caesar's criticism of Curio's movements turns; and I cannot believe that he would have ventured to criticise them as he did, even if he had enjoyed the modern advantage of photography to help him, without having been himself on the spot.

If then (1) Caesar had never been at Utica before the spring of 46, and (2) if we have convincing indications in these chapters that he had been on the spot when he wrote them, we get a *terminus ex quo* for the composition of the second half of Book ii of the *Civil War*, and a strong presumption that the whole work was written after the campaign of Thapsus. As I have already said, the most natural and convenient time for their composition would be immediately after he left Africa (June 13), or any time between that date and the end of the following November.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD

THE *εἰ γάρ* WISHES

BY GENEVA MISENER

Three formulae for introducing wishes, *εἰ*, *εἴθε*, and *εἰ γάρ*, are usually given in every discussion of the Greek wish-optative, but no attempt has been made to distinguish meaning or usage except in a few special treatises on particles where some explanations of the *γάρ* in the *εἰ γάρ* formula have been suggested. The definition of the force of the particle offered by Hoogeveen, who is one of the earliest authors of such treatises, is in part incorrect and in part inadequate; *γάρ* causam significat optandi, vel ad precedentem orationem pertinet: Schutz (ed. Hoog.) develops the latter part of the definition by giving some examples in which he has rightly discerned the meaning of *γάρ*. His investigation, however, was not thorough enough to justify any general theory.

After the above-named scholars we find an entirely new method introduced by Baumlein and his adherents, who would interpret *γάρ* in the light of the etymology (*γε* and *ἀπα*), and make the *γάρ* in wish a relic of an original asseverative *γάρ*. Thus the distinction between the wish formula with *γάρ* and that without *γάρ* is one of emphasis. Plausible as such an hypothesis may seem in explanation of some of the later instances of *γάρ* in wish, more is required for its proof than the citation of a few examples where the *γάρ* may be disregarded in translation. The logical relation of the wish sentence to the context must be analyzed and shown to be neither the causal nor derivative from the causal. For this analysis the testimony of the earlier authors should have most weight as most likely to exemplify the earliest usage of words uncorrupted by later influences. Finally, as collateral proof, indisputable evidence of the original asseverative *γάρ* in other classes of sentences should be sought. The possibility of obtaining such evidence I have discussed in a previous paper, where I have pointed out that in the other important fields claimed for asseverative *γάρ* traces of an original causal force can always be found. The present article will be confined to an analysis of the wish sentence alone.

As a preliminary to the discussion proper I may recall to the reader a few general facts about the character of wishes. First, as the most evident, the wish belongs to dialogue, i. e., to colloquial speech, and is subject to the various influences operative in this field. By its very nature, moreover, it is likely to be occasioned by deep feeling and to be couched in emotional language which tends to omit links in reasoning and leave them to be suggested by the tone and import of the thought articulately expressed. Finally, we must remember that the motive of the wish clause is not always to declare an actual desire, but as often to attest a feeling or attitude bearing on the preceding or following thought.

In analyzing wishes in Homer, where the majority of the instances occur, an initial difficulty is encountered in distinguishing the conditional wish sentences from the stereotyped conditions. The *ei γάρ* sentences with the past indicative are the most perplexing. Ameis, who has treated the question at some length in his edition of Homer, would make them conditional wishes because he believes that in no other way can the *γάρ* be explained. Such a solution begs the question. Whether the sentence be considered a wish plus a conclusion, or a conditional protasis and apodosis, the *γάρ* in either case must be explained in the same way, since it introduces the whole sentence and not the *ei* clause. In this paper, then, I shall include all *ei γάρ*'s that might in any way be classified as wishes, disregarding the question of their grammatical relation to their conclusion or apodosis, whichever it may be called.

The purely causal and explanatory meanings of *γάρ* are naturally not found in wishes, as emotional speech is not given to formal reasoning, and the wish which is of an attesting or asseverative character is more suited to confirming or motivating some expression of feeling—approval, objection, or the like. Moreover, in this subtle sphere of the emotions, we may expect great variety of logical relations passing from the direct and evident to the elusive and vaguely suggested.

Among the more easily discerned are the confirming *ei γάρ* sentences in which an assertion—promise or threat it may be—

is supported by a wish that something dear to the heart of the speaker, though often unrealizable, might as surely happen, e. g. *Il.* xviii. 464. *θάρσει.*

μή τοι ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆσι μελόντων.
αὐτὸς μηδὲν θανάτου δυσπέπτος ὁδεῖς δυναίμην
νόσφιν ἀποκρύψαι, ὅτε μηδεὶς αὖτος ἴκανος,
ὡς οἱ τείχεα καλὰ παρέσσεται, οἵα τις αὐτεῖ
ἀνθρώπων πολέων θαυμάσσεται, ὃς κεν ἰδηται.¹

γάρ does not introduce the wish idea alone; in fact, the wish is subordinate in thought to the clause *ὡς οἱ . . . παρέσσεται*. Hephaestus has in mind, not the fulfilment of his wish, for which he cannot hope, but the confirming of his encouraging words to Thetis by assuring her that he wishes he might be as certain of rescuing Achilles from death as he is of the forthcoming of the arms.

An *ἐπεὶ* clause serves a like purpose in Demosth. xix. 172:

ἰδίᾳ δ', ἔξομοσάμενον, οὕτ' αὐτὸν οὔτ' ἀσφαλὲς ἦν ἐκεῖσε πλανᾶσθαι. ἐπεὶ
εἰ μὴ δὰ τὸ τούτους βούλεσθαι σῶσαι, ἔξωλης ἀπολούμην καὶ προώλης εἰ προσλα-
βών γ' ἄν ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ, μετὰ τούτων ἐπρέσβευσα. Since except for
wishing to save these, may I perish utterly if I would have taken any
amount of money and gone on the embassy with them.

The logical bond is not always, it must be admitted, so distinct in wishes at the beginning of a speech—a tendency shown also in questions and other forms of sentences in the same position. In such instances the attitude toward the speaker² preceding must frequently be inferred from an exclamation of scorn or surprise, or even less directly from the tone of the *γάρ* clause itself. The former is illustrated in *Il.* xiii. 825, where Hector answers the taunts and threats of Ajax by an exclamation of disbelief and scorn which he proceeds to substantiate by the *γάρ* clause: *Ἄλαν* ἀμαρτοεπές, *Βουγαλέ*, *ποίον* ἔειπες | *εἰ γὰρ* ἐγών οὕτω γε Διὸς παῖς
αἴγιοχοιο | *εἶην* ἡματα πάντα . . . ὡς νῦν ἡμέρη ἥδε κακὸν φέρει
Ἀργείοισιν . . .³ The thought is practically this: “Ajax, you

¹ Cf. *Od.* xv. 156 (a promise), xviii. 235 (assertion), xxi. 372 (assertion); *Il.* xxii. 346 (resolve), viii. 538 (prediction). *Od.* iii. 218 confirms the hope suggested in the question by a real wish with a *ὡς* clause containing the important thought, as is shown by the speech of Telemachus and Athena's answer which follow. When the wish is repeated, l. 223, it is introduced by a simple *εἰ*, proving that the *γάρ* belongs to the whole period and not to the first wish alone.

² Cf. *Meaning of γάρ*, p. 37.

³ Cf. *Od.* ix. 523, xvii. 251.

are talking idly, for we (and not you) shall surely (I wish I might be as certainly the son of Zeus) conquer today."

The wish in all these instances is not complete without the determinative clause with *ώς*. *γάρ* introduces not the wish alone but the whole sentence, which is purely asseverative. The nature of the reply in *Od.* ix. 523 is indicated only by the content of the wish sentence, but the *γάρ* clause has the same function as in the above (520): *αὐτὸς δ' αἰ κ' ἔθέλησι, ίῆσεται, οὐδέ τις ἄλλος | Ως ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον, | αἰ γάρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰώνος σε δυναίμην | εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον "Αἰδος εἴσω | ώς οὐκ ὄφθαλμόν γ' ίῆσεται οὐδὲ 'Ενοσίχθων.¹* A rough translation would be, "Nay, not so, for surely (I would I could as surely send you to Hades) not even Poseidon will heal your eye." The weight of the confirmation here rests on the conclusion, while the *γάρ* clause merely emphasizes the certainty of the speaker. The process is, however, at times reversed. The wish may bear the more important part in confirming, and the conclusion which may follow or not, strengthen the wish by deducing the results therefrom. Although the two clauses are not as closely connected as in the former cases, they are, still, both logically introduced by the *γάρ*. E. g. *Il.* ii. 371: *τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κρείων 'Αγαμέμνων. | "ἢ μὰν αὐτ' ἀγορῆ νικᾶς, γέρον, υἱας 'Αχαιῶν. | αἰ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ 'Αθηναῖη καὶ 'Απολλον, | τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἰν 'Αχαιῶν, | τῷ κε τάχ' ἡμύσεις πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος* Agamemnon assures Nestor of the sincerity of his praise thus: "For I would I might have ten like you; then would Troy surely fall."

As in the other confirmatory wishes, it is not always necessary that the assent be given in so many words, for the wish is in itself an indisputable indication of the attitude which it confirms. Odysseus, for instance, in *Od.* xxi. 200, needs no other assurance of the loyalty which he asks of Eumeus than the wish of the swineherd that Odysseus might return and give him an opportunity to prove himself: *Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἰ γάρ τοῦτο τελευτήσεις ἔέλδωρ, | ώς ἔλθοι μὲν κείνος ἀνήρ, ἀγάγοι δέ ἐ δαίμων· | γνοίης χ' οἶη ἐμὴ δύναμις καὶ χεῖρες ἔπονται.²*

¹ Cf. *Od.* xxi. 402.

² Cf. *Od.* xv. 545 (assent), viii. 333 (assent), xix. 22, xxiv. 376, xx. 169, xviii. 366; *Aesch.* *Prom.* 152; *Xen. Cyr.* xi. 1. 38.

This use of *γάρ* in confirming direct assent is extended to replies where there is only approval or acceptance of a previous speaker's prediction or assertion, e. g. *Od.* xvii. 496. Penelope (494) says, "Αιθ' οὔτως αὐτόν σε βάλοι κλυτότοξος Ἀπόλλων, and Eurynome answers: τὴν δ' αὖτ' Εύρυνόμη ταμῆ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν· | Εἰ γάρ εἶπ' ἀρῆσιν τέλος ἡμετέρησι γένοιτο· | οὐκ ἄν τις τούτων γε ἐνθρονοῦ ἥῶ ἴκοιτο. A comparison of the wish¹ of the house-keeper (496) with that of Penelope (494) which is introduced by *aἴθ'* proves without doubt that the distinction made in the formulae results from the difference in the relations which the wishes bear to the preceding narrative. The first is a simple wish devoutly desired, an outburst of indignation at what she has seen, not an answer to a previous speech. The second is a conditional wish clause expressing, through the wish and its conclusion, an assurance of the speaker's sympathy with the words of Penelope.

In regard to a similar wish with *γάρ* in Herodotus i. 27, Broschman (p. 9) remarks that, although Herodotus did not think of the origin of the formula, a causal relation can still be traced for the *γάρ*—to quote—quamquam si plena esset oratio et ante optationem comprobandi vel exsultandi notionem quandam exspectaremus ad quam *γάρ* referretur, et post optationem quae deest apodosin.

The passage in question is: Κροῖσον δὲ ἐλπίσαντα λέγειν ἐκεῖνον ἀληθέα εἰπεῖν. Αἱ γάρ τοῦτο θεοὶ ποιήσειν ἐπὶ νοῦν νησιώτησι, ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Λυδῶν παῖδας σὺν ἵπποισι. The wish clause confirms Croesus' approval of the good news brought by the other speaker, whether we believe that this feeling was betrayed by a gesture or look, or was simply to be inferred from the tone of the *γάρ* sentence. That Herodotus did not use the *γάρ* with a consciousness of its evident force cannot be taken for granted until instances of a similar wish without *γάρ* have been found, proving that *aī γάρ*, *aἴθε*, and *aἴ* were interchangeable formulae at that time. The retention of the *γάρ* force in writers following Herodotus² lends probability to the opposite theory, since as soon as the meaning

¹Cf. *Od.* xvii. 513, xx. 236.

²Cf. Arist. *Peace* 346; Eur. *Elect.* 663, *Ion*. 410, *Orest.* 1209, *Suppl.* 1145. The *γάρ* in the wish Pindar *Pyth.* i. 46 is a narrative *γάρ* introducing the praise which Pindar stated he is about to give. It cannot then be counted as an instance of the wish formula.

of *ei γάρ* became indistinguishable from the simple *ei*, as was its tendency later in replies, the latter formula supplanted the former.

It may be well at this point to call attention to the infrequency of *γάρ* in wishes after Homer, although the apparent decrease is in part due to a difference in interpretation resulting from the further development of the *ei* clause. All the conditions¹ which still have in Homer the wish form became in classical Greek clearly recognized conditions, and the *ei γάρ* can consequently be no longer claimed as wish formula. There is, however, a real decline in the use, and the reason is to be found in the vagueness of the *γάρ* in the wish formulae of assent and approval and their opposites, where the *ei* clause performed its function almost as completely without the *γάρ* as with. The subtle link of reasoning indicated by *γάρ* was more and more disregarded until the simple form almost completely supplanted the fuller. This last stage is not reached until late in classical times, although instances occur even in Homer where the two forms of replies are so similar in content that the force of the *γάρ* might be easily overlooked. E. g., *Od.* xix. 309: *αἱ γὰρ τοῦτο, ξεῖνε, ἔπος τετελεσμένον εἴη· | τῷ κε τάχα γνοίης φιλότητά τε πολλά τε δῶρα . . .*² and *Od.* vii. 331: *εὐχόμενος δ' ἄρα εἰπεν ἔπος τ' ἔφατ'* . . . *Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἱθ' ὅσα εἰπε τελευτήσειν ἀπαντα | Ἀλκίνοος· τοῦ μέν κεν ἐπὶ ζειδωρον ἄρουραν | ἀσβεστον κλέος εἴη, ἐγὼ δέ κε πατρίδ' ικούμην.* In the first Penelope confirms her gratitude—expressed probably by gesture or tone—for the kindly intention of the stranger in predicting Odysseus' return by wishing that his words may come true, which she, however, doubts, and by promising the stranger a reward if this should be the outcome. In the second the thought uppermost is that of independent prayer, as is shown by the formal invocation and by *εὐχόμενος*. It is inspired by and in accord with what Alcinous said, but its primary purpose is to reveal Odysseus' eagerness for the fulfilment of the promise of the king. Up to this point only confirmative wish sentences have been discussed; but there is no lack of evidence of the conscious use of

¹ Cf. Eur. *Ale.* 91, 1072; Theocrit. xvi. 82; Eur. *Rhes.* 464.

² Cf. *Od.* xv. 536, xx. 236, xvii. 163; Eur. *Cyclops.* 261 *ἔγώ; κακῶς γάρ ἔξολοιο* must be classified with the confirming wishes, though different from the preceding examples where the feeling is favorable. Here the imprecation substantiates the indignation voiced in the *ἔγώ*, by a more emphatic expression of it.

γάρ in wishes, as in other forms of sentences, to motivate, also, or to justify, a feeling or an attitude. E. g.¹ *Il.* vii. 132 (124): (124) ὁ πόποι, ἡ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιΐδα γαῖαν ικάνει, | ἡ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε γέρων (129) εἰ πτώσσοντας ὥφ' Ἔκτορι πάντας ἀκούσαι | αὐτὸν γάρ Ζεῦ ἡβῶμ' ὡς ὅτ' (157) εἰθ' ὁς ἡβώσιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη· | τῷ κε τάχ' ἀντήσειε μάχης κοριθαίολος Ἐκτώρ.² The train of reasoning might be thus expressed: "Verily, you are disgracing Greece by thus crouching before Hector (and I rightly censure you, i. e., I am not censuring you for not fighting, while I myself at the same time would not fight), for would that I might be (or, if I might only be) as young and strong as I was once, then would Hector not lack an opponent." *γάρ* introduces the whole series of sentences and includes the resumption of the wish, l. 157, where the speaker consequently uses only *εἰθ'*, and not *εἰ γάρ*, as in the first.

The absence of *γάρ* in a conditional wish of like content, *Od.* xiv. 468, can be readily explained: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέκραγον, οὐκ ἐπικεύσω | εἴθ' ὁς ἡβώσιμι βίη τε μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη | ὡς ὅτε ὑπὸ Τροίην (No conclusion follows.) Unlike the wish introduced by *εἰ γάρ*, it is without any close logical or grammatical connection with the previous words, but is a simple exclamation not developed beyond the bare expression of the feigned wish that serves by analogy to convey a hint to the hearers of that which is really desired. Hayman³ says a suppressed apodosis may be supplied as easily here as in *Od.* xix. 22 or *Od.* xx. 169, where *εἰ γάρ* is read. But it is not on this basis that the distinction between the two formulae must be drawn. *γάρ* is a causal particle which shows the relation between main clauses and is not concerned with the connection between the main sentence to which it belongs and subordinate clauses.

In motivating by anticipation a following sentence, a somewhat unusual use of the wish with *γάρ* developed in Homer, *γάρ* paves the way for an objection to a previous speaker's suggestion, or for

¹ Cf. *Meaning of γάρ*, pp. 18, 31, 43.

² Cf. *Il.* xvi. 722 without *γάρ* where the content of the wish clause is similar, but there is no strong feeling expressed for the wish to motivate. Cf. also *Od.* xvi. 99; *Il.* xvii. 156, *Od.* iv. 732; Aesch. *Choeph.* 345 (justification of grief), *Suppl.* 867; *Od.* xvi. 148 (justification of refusal to follow the suggestion of another—a conditional wish).

³ Edit. of *Od.*

the disappointment of the wishes or expectations of the hearers, by introducing an assurance of good wishes and sympathy for those whose hopes are to be disappointed, e. g., *Od.* iii. 205: *καὶ λίην κεῖνος μὲν ἐτίσατο αἱ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοσσήρδε θεοὶ δύναμιν περιθέειν | τίσασθαι μνηστῆρας ἀλλ’ οὐ μοι τοιοῦτον ἐπέκλωσαν θεοὶ ὅλοι.*¹ Telemachus assents to Nestor's praise of Orestes, but distrusts his ability to follow Orestes' example. Before, however, he rejects Nestor's advice he apologizes for his seeming inertia by assuring him that there is no lack of desire on his part if the gods would but grant him the power. An *ἐπεὶ* wish clause, *Plat. Prot.* 335 C, performs the same function as the *γάρ* wish above, but follows, instead of preceding, the objection: *ἔγώ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οὖς τι εἶναι.* The readiness of will expressed in the *ἐπεὶ* clause softens the refusal and, at the same time, moderates the use of the word *ἀδύνατος*. A still nearer parallel to the *ἐπεὶ* sentence is found in another wish, *Arist. Eccles.* 380, where the thought is virtually equivalent to *ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν ΒΔΕ. τὸ τριώβολον δῆτ' ἔλαβες; ΧΡΕ. εἰ γὰρ ὥφελον· ἀλλ’ ὑστερος νῦν ἡλθον, ὥστ’ αἰσχύνομαι* The *ἀλλά* that usually accompanies the *γάρ* points to a close relation in function to the *ἀλλά γάρ* introducing objections in other forms of sentences.²

This apologetic use of *γάρ* throws some light on an obscure *γάρ* in *Aesch. Agam.* 217: *τί τῶν δ’ ἄνευ κακῶν; | πῶς λιπόναυς γένωμαι | συμμαχίας ἀμαρτών; | πανσανέμον γάρ θυσίας | παρθενίου θ’ αἴματος ὁρ | γάρ περιοργῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν | θέμις· εὖ γάρ εἴη.* The wish is at once a modification and justification of the reluctant acquiescence indicated by the clause ending with *θέμις*. It is this last word which inspires the *εὖ*. Agamemnon cannot quite convince himself that the sacrifice is *θέμις*, but his hope that it may be for the best prompts him to utter the wish justifying the virtual consent which he had given. The consequences will vindicate the deed. As the other instances quoted above apologize for an objection, this may be said to apologize for acquiescence.

BERLIN, October 25, 1907

¹ Cf. *Od.* iv. 197; *Il.* iv. 189, x. 536, xiii. 485, xvii. 561, xxii. 454; *Arist. Eccles.* 380; *Plato Crito* 44 D, *Rep.* 432 C.

² Cf. *Meaning of γάρ*, p. 66.

THE MISSION OF AGRIPPA TO THE ORIENT IN 23 B. C.

BY DAVID MAGIE, JR.

Of all the idle rumors which attached themselves to illustrious men of Rome, and which have been carefully recorded by the historians of antiquity, none perhaps has been more generally and unhesitatingly accredited in modern times than that which was occasioned by the departure of Marcus Agrippa for the Orient in 23 b. c. Agrippa, who was then in his fortieth year,¹ had been for over twenty years the close friend and associate of Augustus. He had fought for him at Perusia,² at Naulochus,³ and at Actium.⁴ He had quelled revolts of the Gauls⁵ and the Dalmatians.⁶ He had been his colleague in the consulship,⁷ had held with him the censorial power,⁸ had in his absence given Julia in marriage to Marcellus,⁹ and, last of all, had received the surest token of his confidence and esteem in the gift of his signet ring, when the Princeps lay on what he thought would prove his death-bed.¹⁰ Then he departed suddenly for the East, and men said in Rome that the cause of his journey was his dislike and jealousy of Marcellus, then nineteen years old and holding his first public office, the curule aedileship.¹¹

The earliest version of the story is found in the history of Velleius Paterculus,¹² and reads as follows: *post cuius (Marcelli) obitum Agrippa, qui sub specie ministeriorum principalium prefectus in Asiam, ut fama loquitur, ob tacitas cum Marcelllo offensiones praesenti se subduxerat tempori, reversus inde filiam Caesaris Iuliam . . . duxit uxorem.* It was then officially given out that Agrippa went to Asia on business for the Princeps, but

¹ He died (in 12 b. c.) in his fifty-first year: Plin. *N. H.* vii. 46.

² Appian. *B. C.* v. 31-33, 35.

³ Liv. *Per.* 129; Appian. *B. C.* v. 116-21.

⁴ Vell. Pat. ii. 85; Dio l. 14.

⁵ Dio xlvi. 49.

⁶ Dio xlix. 38.

⁷ In 28 b. c.

⁸ Mon. *Anc.* ii. 2.

⁹ Dio liii. 27.

¹⁰ Dio liii. 30, 31.

¹¹ He died (in 23 b. c.) in his twentieth year: Propert. iii (iv). 18. 15.

¹² ii. 93. 2.

rumor had it that he withdrew as a result of a quarrel with the nephew of Augustus. And it was as a voluntary withdrawal that this journey was known to the writers of the early second century, to Tacitus,¹ and to Suetonius, that prince of gossips, who attributes it in one place² to pique on Agrippa's part due to the feeling that Marcellus was given precedence over him, and in another³ to his desire not to stand in the young man's way in his advancement in public life. Thus there is a slight inconsistency in the details of the story as known to Suetonius, but great is the difference between this version of a voluntary withdrawal, and the more malicious report of an enforced retirement known to Pliny the Elder⁴ and Cassius Dio.⁵ The former, in a passage containing a long list of disappointments and disasters suffered by Augustus, many of which, untrue or maliciously interpreted, seem to have been drawn from hostile political pamphlets, includes the *pudenda Agrippae allegatio*, while the later historian tells us in all seriousness that Augustus, seeing that Marcellus was not on friendly terms with Agrippa, and fearing that angry words and a quarrel might arise between his nephew and his old friend, immediately sent the latter to Syria. Dio adds, moreover, that Agrippa departed at once, but did not proceed to Syria, sending only his legates thither, and tarrying himself at Lesbos.

This then is the explanation, inconsistent, ill-founded and incredible, of the mysterious mission to the East of Augustus' ablest general and closest associate, which was bruited about in Rome, snatched at with avidity by all those whose taste for such rare morsels of gossip had been diligently cultivated, and has been repeated without question by our latter-day historians, whether, like Gardthausen,⁶ they would have us believe that Augustus sent his right-hand man into retirement to put an end to the bickerings between him and the youthful Marcellus, or, like Ferrero,⁷ they accept the other version, and, believing that Agrippa withdrew from motives of personal pique, draw an elaborate picture of the

¹ *Ann.* xiv. 53, where Seneca, urging Nero to allow him to retire, is made to plead as a precedent the *Mytilenense secretum* of Agrippa.

² *Aug.* 66.

³ *Tib.* 10.

⁴ *N. H.* vii. 149.

⁵ *Ili.* 32.

⁶ *Augustus u. seine Zeit* I, pp. 732, 733.

⁷ *Grandezza e Decadenza di Roma* IV, p. 172.

mighty general sulking in Lesbos, like Achilles in his tent, while Syria was left ungoverned.

The story is inconsistent in detail, and its authority is poor. Expressly characterized by Velleius as a mere rumor, it is mentioned by Suetonius only to exemplify the chief fault of Agrippa, or to cite a precedent for Tiberius' retirement to Rhodes, while Tacitus knows only of the fact that Agrippa withdrew for a season to Mytilene. Pliny evidently drew from sources hostile to Augustus, whose enemies would not be slow to make capital out of such a story, and Dio, writing nearly two hundred and fifty years afterward, might easily have been misled by the prevailing rumors, especially if the true reason for this secret mission had never been made public.

Nor is it credible that the careful and far-seeing Augustus at a critical time in his principate sent his ablest associate into banishment, honorable though it might have purported to be, merely because he feared a quarrel between him and his boyish nephew, or that Agrippa, the hero of so many wars, who had refused a triumph,¹ and had twice been consul, was piqued because the young man had been admitted to the aedileship, and the pontificate, and had received from the Senate permission to stand for the consulship ten years before the legal age.² These explanations of his departure would seem questionable, were they backed by the best authorities. As it is, they are worthy of no man's belief.

That Agrippa's mission was a real one we know from Josephus, who, ignorant of the gossip of Rome, but well acquainted with the history and politics of the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, says nothing of any quarrel between Marcellus and Agrippa, but records expressly³ that the latter was sent to the Orient as the διάδοχος Καίσαρι τὰν πέραν τοῦ Ἰονίου. And this was no ornamental title, nor was Agrippa a mere imperial legate of one or more eastern provinces, but, as Mommsen has shown,⁴ the *collega minor* of Augustus, vested with proconsular power extending over

¹ Dio xlvi. 49.

² Dio liii. 28.

³ Ant. Iud. xv. 10. 2.

⁴ Res gestae divi Aug.², pp. 163-65; Röm. Staatsrecht II³, p. 1151, n. 5.

the whole empire, and subordinate only to the Princeps.¹ But Agrippa, Josephus adds, proceeded no farther than Mytilene, where he wintered, receiving there with much cordiality King Herod the Great, who journeyed thither for the express purpose of meeting him, and afterward cementing the friendship thus formed by sending to the Jewish king unanswered and in chains some Gadarenes who had come to Mytilene to prefer charges against him.

But why did Augustus thus send his right-hand man to be his vicegerent in the Orient, and why did the usually energetic Agrippa, apparently leaving his mission unfulfilled, linger at Mytilene, and so lend color to the rumor of an *ablegatio*?

Grief and rage at the capture by the Parthians of the "spoils and standards of three Roman armies,"² had long rankled in the minds of all patriotic Romans, and ever since the battle of Actium and the apparently secure establishment of Augustus' power, there had been a general expectation that this new hero, the conqueror of the loathed Egyptian queen, would take vengeance on those hated enemies, and restore Roman prestige in the East.³ But the Princeps had been in no position to carry on an extensive war with those formidable barbarians to whom Crassus and Antony had succumbed. His power was too insecure to risk a campaign across the seas with possible, even probable, defeat as its result—a defeat which would be fatal to all his aspirations—and there was also a more pressing demand at home, for the empty treasury must be filled. And so the expedition against the Cantabrians and Asturians was undertaken⁴ in the hope of filling the public coffers with the gold of the Spanish mines,⁵ while an invasion of Britain was hinted at,⁶ that men's desire for the winning of the laurels of war might be satisfied. But the troops in Spain, even under the leadership of Augustus himself, achieved but slight success,⁷ and after the return of the Princeps to Rome in 24 the

¹This same power he afterward held as regent of Rome in 21 b. c. (Dio liv. 6), and as general commander of the West in 20 b. c. (Dio liv. 11).

²Mon. Anc. v. 40, 41.

³Cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 5. 62; C. i. 2. 22, 51; 12, 53, 54; 35. 31, 40; iii. 5. Verg. Aen. vi. 794; vii. 605 (perhaps written after 20 b. c.).

⁴In 26 b. c.

⁵Ferrero *op. cit.* IV, p. 28, n. 1. ⁶Dio liii. 22. ⁷Dio liii. 25.

unconquerable Spaniards revolted anew.¹ Nor did the expedition sent under Aelius Gallus to Arabia for the purpose of seizing the long-accumulated treasures of the Sabaeans accomplish greater results.² The time seemed critical, and it needed more than liberal largesses to the people³ to enable the emperor to hold his own against the malcontents. Discouraged by his illness early in 23, or, more probably, making use of an old ruse to strengthen his position,⁴ he announced his intention of resigning his extraordinary powers⁵—a resignation impossible with an aristocracy indifferent to the common weal and eager for the lucrative positions and for the gifts or advantageous leases of lands, by which the shrewd Augustus was binding them to his cause, and with a plebs mindful of recent donatives and hopeful for more. Thus all united to persuade the Princeps to continue to watch over the state. But the sudden popularity thus arising would not last of itself, nor would the games given with unwonted magnificence in the name of Marcellus⁶ satisfy the Roman's desire for great and glorious achievements. The Parthians still held the standards of Crassus and Antony, and until, by the recovery of these, national disgrace should be removed and national honor retrieved, the position of the Princeps would remain insecure.

But it appeared that the Fortune of the Roman people had afforded a safer and surer way of effecting this greatly desired triumph than the invasion of Parthia by the insufficient force of 40,000 men constituting the Syrian Army. Two years before,⁷ Tiridates, whom a revolution had placed upon the Parthian throne, and who had been expelled therefrom by the rightful king Phraates with the help of the Scythians, had come to Augustus in the hope of enlisting his sympathy and help in his cause, bringing with him as a valuable hostage the youngest son of his rival, whom amid the general confusion he had managed to abduct.⁸ Here lay the opportunity, which Augustus, as soon as

¹ Dio liii. 29.

² Dio liii. 29.

³ Mon. Anc. iii. 9; Dio liii. 28.

⁴ Ferrero IV, pp. 165 ff.

⁵ Suet. Aug. 28 and Ferrero IV, p. 164, n. 1.

⁶ Plin. N. H. xix. 24; Dio liii. 31.

⁷ Augustus was at the time in Spain,

⁸ Justin. xlii. 5. 6; cf. Dio li. 18.

there was quiet in Spain, and he had strengthened his hold upon his power by offering to resign it, was not slow to seize. Was not the Great King's own son worth more to him than some standards captured by his predecessors? At any rate, the attempt to find out should be made. But the offer could not come from Rome, lest national vanity should be wounded, nor could Augustus seem to be ready to buy his success. Some one must quietly suggest to the Parthian monarch that by offering acceptable terms he could secure his son, and the man obviously best qualified to negotiate the bargain was he who stood next to the Princeps. Was not this then the reason why Agrippa went to the Orient as the vicegerent of Augustus, and this the object of his mission? In Rome men wondered why he set forth, vested with extraordinary powers, and provided with legates, and they hinted at a rupture between the emperor and his friend and at an honorable dismissal of the latter. But Agrippa, with his record of victory and triumph, was willing to let the gossips talk, and to allow the real reason for his departure to remain a secret, as it must, were not the dignity of Augustus to suffer. And his actions in the East seemed to confirm the rumors, for he lay inactive in the pleasant town of Mytilene, while only his legates went to Syria¹—and thence to Parthia. But Lesbos was a convenient place in which he might await the return of these legates, and whence he might conduct further negotiations with the Great King. It was but a short trip across the strait to the terminus of the great road which ran up the valley of the Hermus, and thence through Phrygia, Lycaonia, and Cilicia to Zeugma, Carrhae and Ctesiphon,² and while Antioch might have seemed more convenient for communications with Phraates, the purpose of his mission could hardly have been concealed, had messengers kept coming and going between the Parthian king and the Roman governor residing in the Syrian capital. Also at either Tarsus or Ephesus there would have been danger of publicity. Furthermore, if Agrippa was

¹ Dio liii. 32.

²The distance by this route from Sardes to Ctesiphon is approximately 1,200 (Roman) miles, and could readily be covered in three weeks. The government post averaged 120 miles per day (Friedländer *S. G. II*⁶, p. 22), but the envoys would hardly travel so fast.

willing to conceal the object of his journey under the cover of a retirement from court, Mytilene, where illustrious Romans had ere this lived in exile,¹ would seem a natural place in which to spend the years of an *ablegatio*, and was, moreover, a charming spot² in which to tarry until the transaction should be completed. How much negotiating was necessary to persuade Phraates to send an embassy to Rome and to offer to submit to the form of a surrender in order to recover his kidnapped son, we do not know, but the efforts of Agrippa were finally successful, for in the late summer or the early autumn of 23,³ envoys from the Great King arrived in Rome asking for the surrender of Tiridates and the return of the young prince.⁴ Augustus refused to deliver Tiridates to his rival—he might yet prove serviceable, and his promises to make Parthia a vassal-state of Rome might still be made use of, should Phraates fail to deliver the standards—but he graciously consented to give up the prince upon the condition that the standards and captive soldiers of the armies of Crassus and Antony should be returned.⁵ Thus the great triumph was achieved without loss of blood or honor, and the man who had been instrumental in bringing it to pass stayed on in Mytilene, quietly watching over the interests of the eastern provinces, securing for the government of Augustus the friendship and support of the Jewish king,⁶ and in general preparing the way for the projected journey of the Princeps through the Orient. For the Emperor himself was to go to the Euphrates to receive the submission of the Parthian monarch,⁷ and in connection with it to make an elaborate tour of inspection through all the provinces of the East. But before he could leave the West, his colleague must return to take his place, and so in the

¹E. g., P. Rutilius Rufus; Cic. *Pro Rab. Post.* 10. 27.

²Hor. *C. i. 7. 1; Epp. i. 11. 17.*

³The embassy was received by Augustus after he had resigned the consulship, and the senate had conferred on him the annual tribunician power, i. e., after July 1 (Mommsen *Röm. Staatsrecht II*⁸, p. 797, n. 3).

⁴Iustin. *xlii. 5. 7-9; Dio liii. 33.*

⁵Justinus says (xlii. 5. 9) *filium sine pretio remisit*, but the terms of the bargain were undoubtedly kept secret, although by Dio's time they were generally known.

⁶Cf. Josephus *Ant. Iud.* xv. 10. 3.

⁷Cf. the representations on coins of the kneeling Parthian giving back the standards; e. g., Cohen I², pp. 70 and 113.

winter of 22–21 Agrippa was summoned to Sicily,¹ where Augustus had begun his reforms, and received supreme command of Rome and of the West,² and, as an especial mark of honor, the hand of Julia, left a widow by the death of Marcellus in the end of the year 23.³ Such we may feel sure, would not have been the reception of Agrippa had he left Rome in a fit of jealousy, or had he been relegated to an island.

Agrippa at once betook himself to his new charge, putting down disorder in the city and rebellion in Spain with the strong hand,⁴ while Augustus, confident of the fidelity of his colleague and of his ability to govern the West, journeyed through the Orient, strengthening his hold upon one province after another, and, a year later, upon the loyalty of all patriotic citizens by receiving from the Parthian king the standards and prisoners captured so many years before. He brought them home in triumph, as though the Parthians had been conquered in battle,⁵ and ascending the Capitoline, solemnly placed them in a shrine dedicated to Mars Ultor,⁶ even as victorious generals had dedicated their spolia opima to Jupiter Feretrius in the brave days of old.

It may seem to us a farce, but it was none the less a great triumph and fraught with results to the eastern policy of the early principate. The diplomacy of Agrippa had proved mightier than the swords of Crassus and Antony, and Augustus and his conservative successor profited thereby, and throughout their lives maintained a policy of peace and friendliness with the great empire which lay to the east of the Roman world.

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¹ Dio liv. 6. ² Dio liv. 11. ³ Suet. *Aug.* 63; Dio liv. 6. ⁴ Dio liv. 6. 11.

⁵ Cf. *Mon. Ane.* Gr. xvi. 4: Πάρθοις . . . σκῦλα καὶ σημέας ἀποδοῦνται ἔμοι . . . ήγάγκασα.

⁶ *Mon. Ane.* v. 42, 43; Dio liv. 8. This was of course the building erected in 20 b. c., not the temple in the Forum Augusti which was dedicated in 2 b. c. (Mommsen *Res gestae divi Aug.*, p. 126.)

NOTES ON LATIN SYNIZESIS

BY ROBERT S. RADFORD

I. THE RELATION OF OLD LATIN SYNIZESIS TO THE SENTENCE-ACCENT

There is no more familiar phenomenon in the verse of the early Latin dramatists than the quantitative reduction of words which show a vowel in hiatus, e. g., *eos*, *eorum*, *deos*, *deorum*, *fui*, *fuisti*, yet the precise manner in which this reduction has taken place is still a matter of discussion among philologists. According to some critics, iambic shortening is the real influence at work here, and we should pronounce *éos*, *éorum*, *déorum*, etc.; according to others, a slurring of the first of the two vowels has taken place, and we have to recognize in the treatment of such cases that procedure which is commonly termed by the ancient metrists *synizesis* and by Romance scholars diphthongalization.¹ The latter explanation, which finds strong support in the synizesis phenomena of many other Indo-European languages,² has always commended itself to the majority of Plautine students, but, in becoming its exponents, the latter have usually been content to employ the term 'synizesis' in too vague and indefinite a sense. This word has, in fact, a somewhat variable meaning, and the three great periods of the Roman language, viz., the Old Latin, the Classical, and the Romance, show, upon the whole, three fairly distinct types of the synizesis process. For although all synizesis

¹ Diphthongalization is not precisely the same process as Old Latin synizesis (*Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.* XXXVI, pp. 170 ff., 179), but the two processes have many points of similarity, and are often identified (cf. Schuchardt *Vokalismus des Vulgarlateins* II, p. 510).

² For example, the Romance possessives are derived as a rule from disyllabic *meum*, *tuum*, etc., but they often develop independently a diphthongal pronunciation very similar to that of Old Latin. Thus, in O. Span., *mío*, *mía* are almost invariably monosyllabic in the proclitic position (*Cornu Romaniae* XIII, pp. 307 ff.; cf. *Trans.* XXXVI, p. 195, n. 1), and a similar treatment existed in Provençal, as the following lines from Appel's *Provençal. Chrestomathie* will serve to illustrate; No. 108 (p. 159), 144 (*La nobla leyzzon*): *dicent: vene vos en, li beneit del mío payre*; No. 74 (p. 111), 29 (*Raimon Gaucelm*) *de la mía mort, per so siatz a mal mes.*

rests upon the tendency of the short vowels *i* (*e*) and *u* in hiatus to assume a semi-vocalic character, and no thoroughgoing distinction can consequently be made between Greek and Roman usage (Zander *Vers. Ital.*, p. cxxvii), yet it is true that the type which is usual in Greek and Classical Latin is chiefly employed as a convenient and an artistic device for the purpose of introducing difficult word-forms into the stately and sonorous movement of the verse (*Trans.*, p. 167).¹ The synizesis of Old Latin dialogue verse, on the other hand, is entirely free from poetic artifice and wholly spontaneous in its character. Finally, the extensive synizesis of the Late Latin period often causes the semi-vowel *i* to merge itself in a preceding consonant, to which it gives a palatal character, as seen in Fr. *singe* from **simya*, *bras* from **bracyum*, etc. (Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, pp. 81, 144, 263).

It is not sufficient then to speak of synizesis in general terms, but it is necessary to inquire specifically into the extent, the cause and the real character of the Old Latin variety. Hence I have sought to show at some length in an article published in the *Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* XXXVI (1905), pp. 158 ff., that precisely that sequence of syllables and that position of the accent which causes iambic shortening in the case of vowels separated by a consonant, has produced synizesis in the case of the half-vowels *i* (*e*) and *u* in hiatus. Thus we find the difficult quantitative sequence - - - alike in *dōmī frātrem* and in *mēūm frātrem*, but the method which is employed in escaping from the difficulty is different in the two examples. In cases like the first, the Romans naturally tended, as they hastened to pronounce the following accented syllable, to shorten the second syllable of iambic words and word-beginnings, thus giving rise to the phenomena of Brevis Brevians, e. g., *dōmī frātrem*, *vōlūptātem*; in cases like the second, however, the language offers a simpler and an easier method of removing the difficulty in question through the slurring of the initial syllable of the iambic word or word-beginning, and thus exhibits the varied phenomena of Brevis Coalescens, e. g., (*e*)ōrūndem, *l(i)ēnōsus*, *m(e)ūm frātrem*. With the weakening

¹This is also the character of the synizesis which is admitted in Old Latin anapaestic verse, if synizesis be the true explanation of such phenomena, e. g., *aur(e)ās*; cf. Zander *Vers. Ital.*, pp. cxxvi ff.

of *meūm* in the last example, we may well compare, as Professor Fay kindly suggests to me, the unemphatic and colloquial English possessive which is heard in 'mī Lord,' 'mī brother,' 'mī friend,' and the like.

Although many points of similarity, as has just been indicated, exist between iambic shortening and synizesis, there are also important points of difference, and the numerous cases like *deōrum*, *ēamus*, *quiēto*, *tuām-rem*, *meō-quidem* show us plainly that we cannot possibly read all iambic words and word-beginnings with shortening (e. g., *dēōrum*, *ēamus*, *tuām-rem*, etc.), and so remove synizesis entirely from the dramatic poets, as C. F. W. Müller, Skutsch, and Havet have proposed to do. In addition, the vulgar Latin forms of a later period should be closely compared with the early Latin phenomena. These have been most fully collected from late inscriptions and from MSS by Schuchardt, *Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins II*, pp. 441–519; III, pp. 295–311, and are referred by him to various subdivisions.¹ The following citations are especially noteworthy: *des* (*zes*), *debus* (*zebus*), *de* for *dies*,

¹Schuchardt's treatment of this whole subject is a valuable and suggestive one. He points out (II, p. 443) that three phenomena are comprehended as final results under the term synizesis: (1) Consonantization, 'Konsonantirung,' e. g., *genuā* Verg. *A.* v. 432; (2) Elision, e. g., *sem(i)animes* Verg. *A.* x. 396; (3) Contraction, 'Kontraktion,' 'Zusammenziehung,' e. g., *reice* Verg. *E.* iii. 96. To the consonantization of the semi-vowels (II, pp. 442, 502) he does not assign an especially important rôle, but classifies his material chiefly under the phenomena of 'elision' (II, pp. 441 ff.) and 'contraction' (II, pp. 505 ff., 510 ff.). While admitting the extreme difficulty of distinguishing sharply between the two last-named processes, Schuchardt adopts the criterion that 'elision' preserves the quality of the second vowel, as in *Thedorus*, *debus*, *quescit*, while 'improper contraction' preserves that of the first vowel, as in *Thedorus*, *dibus*, *quiscit* (II, p. 442). The proposed criterion is, in my judgment, far from being always a conclusive or a satisfactory one, and leads to a frequent separation of examples which properly belong together. Thus the forms *debus* and *dibus*, *quescit* and *quiscit*, which Schuchardt is compelled to treat separately (II, pp. 445 ff. and III, pp. 295 ff.; II, pp. 513 ff. and III, pp. 310 ff.) may very possibly all alike be the result of contraction, and the variant spelling in these cases probably points only to a pronunciation of the vowel which is intermediate between ē and ī. It seems safe then to adopt Schuchardt's first form of statement (II, p. 442) and to conclude simply that in all the cases in question the two vowels form a syllabic unity and thus produce 'diphthongalization,' the latter term being here used in a sufficiently broad sense to include combinations like *āi* as well as those like *āi*. Schuchardt is clearly correct, however, when he maintains further that the word-accent affords no certain criterion between the two processes: "through inversion of the accent a contraction-diphthong may arise out of an elision-diphthong, and vice versa. Beside *nōfītus* = *nēfītus* = *nefītus* stands *nefītus* = *nēfītus*; so *sos* = *suōs* = *sūos* = *súos* (II, p. 443; III, p. 333); *des* = *diēs* = *dīēs* = *dīēs* (II, p. 445); *caprēbla* = *caprēola* = *caprēola* = *caprēola* (I, p. 427)."

diebus, die (II, p. 445; III, p. 295; I, p. 67 ff.; cf. Seelmann, *Ausspr. d. Lat.*, pp. 239, 323); *dis, di(s), dibus* for *dies*, etc. (II, p. 513 f.; III, p. 310); *dae, do* for *deae, deo* (II, p. 463; III, p. 298); *dende* for *deinde* (II, p. 513); *andem* for *eandem* (II, p. 463); *sa, so, su* (abl.) for *sua*, etc. (II, pp. 464 ff.); *dos* for *duos* (II, p. 467);¹ *dodeci* for *duodecim* (II, p. 467);² *quescit, Quetus, quiscit, Quitus* for *quiescit, Quietus* (II, pp. 448 ff., 514 f.; III, p. 296); *pulla, pullae* for *puella, puellae* (II, p. 518; *fustis*,³ *fut* for *fuistis, fuit* (II, p. 519).⁴

Schuchardt makes no mistake, I think, in repeatedly comparing these late and vulgar spellings with the Old Latin phenomena (*Vokalismus* II, pp. 444, 464, 511, etc.).⁵ The early and the late Latin forms alike give evidence of the weakness of the semi-vowel in hiatus, and it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the Old Latin dissyllabic pronunciations of *quiescit, puella, fuistis, eandem, deinde* (*Trans.*, p. 182) were always largely pre-

¹Cf. the Umbr. contracted form *dur* 'duo,' from **duūr*, **duōs*, Buck *Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, §§ 54, 82; cf. also Span. *dos*, Pg. *dois*, Fr. *deux*, Wal. *doi*.

²Cf. Ital. *dodici*, Span. *doce*, Pg. Pr. *doze*.

³Cf. Ital. *foste*, Pg. *festes*, Pr. *fotz*, Fr. *fêtes*.

⁴On the early popular form *fut* (cf. Ital. *fu*, Pg. *foi*, Pr. *fo*, Fr. *fat*), see also W. Meyer, *K. Z.* XXX, p. 341. The precise manner in which the synesis forms *fustis* and *pulla* have arisen is not quite clear. The vulgar *pálla* might perhaps be explained as derived from the original form **púerula* (Vanicek *Etymol. Wörterbuch*, p. 550) through the intermediate stages **pú(e)rula*, *pú'r'la*, but Schuchardt's explanation (II, p. 511) of a contraction-diphthong due to inversion of the accent, i. e., a shift of the accent from the first to the second element of the diphthongal sound, is also an attractive one (see also above, p. 155, n. 1): "Der Wortakzent ist hierbei zunächst indifferent. Aus *puélla*, *fúisse* wurden allerdings zunächst *púélla*, *fúisse*, dann aber (wie sp. *réinte* = *reinte*, fr. *empereur* = *emperéor* = *empereór*) *púella*, *fúisse*, wie aus den Schreibungen *pulla*, *fusse* hervorgeht. Daher scheint die Corssen'sche Annahme der Betonung *púélla*, *fúisse* (II, 212 fg.) für die Messungen *puélla*, *fúisse* bei Plautus eine unsichere zu sein." Other probable examples of such diphthongs and long vowels as the result of contraction in Latin are *coepi* from *co-épi* (Stolz *Hist. Gramm.* I, p. 155) and *cocfas* (Varro *R. R.* iii. 16; 28; cf. Caper *Gramm. Lat.* VII 94, 16) from *codetas* (Stolz *loc. cit.*, p. 219). Analogy may have exerted an influence upon some of these forms, but Victor Henry's assumption (*Comp. Gramm.*, Eng. transl., § 73, p. 84) that the contraction which is seen in *coepi* has first arisen in forms like *cœpisti* seems, upon the whole, unnecessary.

⁵The monosyllabic pronunciation of *cuius, huis* does not belong to Old Latin synesis in the sense in which the term is here employed, but is 'probably due to the loss of *j* between two like vowels' (Birt *Rhein. Mus.* LI, p. 247, n.); compare also the shortened pronunciation of *illius, istius*. Schuchardt (*Vok.* II, p. 508) quotes here the plebeian forms *cus* and *hus*, also *cuis* and *huis*; see also Corssen II², p. 182, and Luchs *Studem. Stud.* I, pp. 319 ff.

served in vulgar speech and were essentially identical with the late and vulgar *quescit*, *quiscit*, *pulla*, *fustis*, *andem*, *dende* just mentioned.¹ This latter supposition, though an extremely probable one, is, however, incapable of absolute proof, since a new and independent development might also have produced these forms in the later language. In any case the late synizesis is considerably more extended in its use than that of the early period. For if we except the few and somewhat uncertain examples like *evenat*, *augura*, *or(i)undi* (*Trans.*, p. 169), we find the Old Latin synizesis strictly limited to the quantitative sequence - -, in cases where this is initial;² the later type, however, is wholly unrestricted and depends solely upon the weakness of the semivowels in hiatus. Thus the Old Latin type shows in dialogue meters only *diē*, *ēat*, *quiescit* (*Trans.*, p. 174), but the late language employs also very freely *pride* (Schuchardt II, p. 445), *exalis*, *exuntes* (II, pp. 463 f.), *requevit* (II, p. 450), *facendum*, *adridat*, *Thodoro*, etc.

To return to the early Latin occurrence of these phenomena, the dramatists admit synizesis most frequently in proclitic and 'enclitic' words like the possessive or demonstrative pronouns and the substantive verb, which have little appreciable accent of their own (e. g. *m(e)um frātrem*, *(e)ām-rem*, *f(u)i liber*), but they also employ it freely in the case of many substantives and verbs like *diē*, *deō*, *sciō*, which have the ordinary intensity of tone. It is in the treatment of this last-named class of words that I fear my former discussion was not sufficiently clear, but requires some amplification and enlargement.³ Thus, in explaining the occurrence of synizesis formerly, I properly attached much importance

¹Cf. Schuchardt *Vok.* I, p. 59: "Oft ist die Aehnlichkeit zwischen der vulgären Sprache des 4., 5., 6. Jahrh. n. Chr. und dem alterthümlichen Latein betont worden. Unnöthigerweise; dies alterthümliche Latein ist weiter Nichts, als vulgäres."

²The species of *syncope* by which vowel *u* was converted into consonant *u* after *l*, *r*, *q*, *g* and *s*, e. g. in *larva*, *milvos*, *relicuos*, etc.—earlier *larua*, *miluos*, *relicuos*—is still unknown to Plautus and belongs to a somewhat later stage of the language (Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, p. 46; *Capt.*, p. 20). After other consonants vowel *u* is simply lost through this process, e. g. in *quatt(u)or*, *quatt(u)ordecim*, but these latter forms are scarcely attested for Plautus (*Trans.*, p. 174, n. 3), and are first clearly shown for Ennius, cf. Georges *Lex. Wortformen s. v.*; Gröber *ALL.* V, pp. 127 f.; Schuchardt II, p. 519; III, p. 311.

³Cf., however, *Trans.* XXXVI, p. 193, n. 1; p. 195, n. 2; p. 210.

in several cases to the weakened uses of some of these forms, e. g., to the trite or emotional use of *deō* and the parenthetical use of *scio* (*loc. cit.*, p. 181, n. 1; pp. 195 f.). No explanation can be really complete, however, which does not recognize the fact that the slurred forms of *deō*, *diē* and *sciō* occur not only in weak, but also in fairly emphatic uses of these words, which does not meet the very plausible arguments which the opponents of Old Latin synizesis advance at this point. For the latter claim that all iambic words like *dēō*, *diē*, *sciō*, etc., which have a distinct accent, have their final syllable shortened by the accent, and therefore cannot well have the first or accented syllable slurred in subordination to the second. Although this argument has been confidently employed against genuine synizesis from the time of Corsen (cf. II, pp. 761 f.) to the present, I believe that it will appear upon closer examination to be wholly fallacious. Thus—to consider first the cases of iambic shortening—although the accent of the single iambic word is undoubtedly one of the factors in this process, yet it is now generally recognized that it is far from being the only factor, or even the chief one. For in actual speech we are not concerned so much with individual words as with the phrase or the sentence. Hence it is not the iambic word as such that we usually find shortened, but the iambic word in certain sentence-phrases, e. g., *volō-scire*, *benē-factum*, *tibi-dico*, *dedi-dono*, *havē-frāter* (in verse also *dēdī-donō*, *hāvē-fratēr*, *vōlō-scir(e)z*). For it is clear that as the voice hastens here to pronounce the following accented syllable, it utters both syllables of the iambic word so hurriedly that the whole seems to the ear to have the value of two shorts; see especially Lindsay's admirable discussion of the Iambic Law, *Lat. Lang.*, pp. 210 ff.; *Capt.*, pp. 30 ff.¹ Hence, as Lindsay correctly observes, the words which were most completely shortened in the Old Latin period and to which the shortening process was first applied, are auxiliary adverbs like *bene* and *male*, auxiliary pronouns like *ego*, *mihi*, *tibi*, and subordinate adverbs like *modo*, *cito*, *ibi*, *ubi*, *nisi*. Similarly Skutsch (*Sat. Viadr.*, pp. 128 f.; *Γέπας*, p. 128) states the principle that "the first syllable of shortened iambic words was

¹Cf. also *Am. Jour. Phil.* XXVII, p. 434.

often unaccented," and cites as examples the frequent shortening of such proclitics and 'enclitics' as *apūd* (*mēnsam*),¹ *enīm* (*véro*), *tamēn* (*nēqueo*), *quidēm* (*praētor*), aptly comparing with these the shortening seen in *volūptātem*, *senēctūtem*, and the like. To these cases of weakening I should like to add the almost complete loss of final *s* which Leo (*Forsch.*, pp. 267 ff.) has pointed out in the subordinate adverbs *nimis*, *satis*, *magis*, and which Hauler (*Einl. z. Phor.*, p. 50) notes also in *prius*. Such examples show clearly that the principal factor in iambic shortening is not the accent of the individual iambic word, but the accent of the phrase or of the sentence in which the iambic word is placed. Hence, even in the case of those terminations which were finally shortened entirely, e. g., *o*, *or*, *at*, *it* and the like, we clearly have a right to assume that the shortening of such words as *homō*, *volō*, *dabō*, *vetōr*, *vetāt*, *dedit*, etc., began chiefly in sentence-phrases (cf. Lindsay *Capt.*, p. 33; *Lat. Lang.*, pp. 210 ff.), although it must be freely granted that the shortening process was here assisted by the accent of the individual word.

Important as the individual accent is, it is often profoundly modified in the sentence, and if we wish to obtain practical results in accentual study, our doctrine must not be one of individualism so much as one of collectivism and association. In questions of accent, we cannot, to be sure, neglect the study of the single word, but we must fix our attention still more upon the sentence, since it is the organism of which single words are but the parts and the instruments. Thus the substantive and the verb are universally admitted to be the most strongly accented parts of speech, but even their accent is often greatly weakened in the sentence in consequence of their association with other words, so that, in calling them strongly accented, we scarcely mean more than that they are pronounced with stress in the majority of their uses. We may profitably compare the accent of a simple English sentence such as 'I call the gods to aid'; if three distinct accents are

¹ Leo (*Forsch.*, pp. 226 f.) appears to go too far in maintaining that the usual pyrrhic scansion of *apūd* in Old Latin verse is due to a definite loss of the final *d*. The whole particle was greatly weakened in pronunciation, and as a consequence the final consonant was no doubt sometimes obscured; cf. *Corp. Gloss. Lat.* II, 21, 40: 'ape' *παρά*.

observed in such a sentence, we recognize that it is spoken with sharp distinctness, but in hurried colloquial speech it is much more likely that only two accents will be clearly heard, e. g., 'I call (the gods) to afid,' or '(I call) the gods to afid!', while the words which are inclosed in parentheses will be slurred or treated as subordinate. Similarly, whenever, in a Latin sentence like *deos quaeso ut sit supérstes* (*And.* 487), the chief accent of the sentence was thrown upon *quaeso*, the individual word *deos* was made subordinate to a certain extent, and consequently the accent of the first syllable was not left strong enough to resist slurring under the existing phonetic conditions.¹ In the case of such a sentence, no doubt there existed originally two forms of pronunciation differentiated by the place of the chief accent, viz. *d(e)o*s *quaeso* and *dēōs* *quaeso*, and we may say in general that during one period of Old Latin both *d(e)o*s and *dēōs* must have existed, and that one or the other of the two forms must have been used according to the accent scheme of the particular sentence. Owing to the fugitive nature of Latin *i* (*e*) in hiatus, however, the former pronunciation proved so much easier and more euphonious that, in the time of Plautus, it was almost exclusively in use.²

¹ So also, if Plautus has a few cases (chiefly in the first foot) of neglect of common word-accent, as in *Amph.* 761 *de-disse dōno hōdie* (cf. Ahlberg *Corrept. iamb.*, pp. 30 ff.), such a passage was probably not pronounced *dēdisse dōno hōdie*, but rather *dēdisse dōno hōdie*, the voice hastening over the whole word *dēdisse* and coming to rest, as it were, upon *dono*. For a somewhat similar view, which, however, needlessly suggests a *word-group dēdisse-dōno*, cf. Lindsay *Capt.*, p. 36.

² In the case of forms like *deo*, *die*, it may perhaps be remembered in addition that, in vulgar Latin, *di* (*de*) tended to pass into the sound of *y*, and at a later period into that of *z* or of simple *d*. This latter pronunciation gives rise to the vulgar spellings *do*, *dae*, *des*, *zes*, etc.; cf. above, pp. 155 f.; *Trans.* XXXVI. 200; Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, pp. 49, 84; Seelmann *Ausspr. d. Lat.*, p. 323. Thus Lindsay remarks that 'the assimilation showed itself even in the case of accented *di*, *ti*.' The trite use of *deus* in oaths and prayers, however, is probably the principal factor in producing in Old Latin the much-discussed contract forms *di*, *dis* from original **deē* (**diē*), **deēs* (**diēs*), but the fuller discussion of these contractions must be reserved for a separate paper (see *Am. Jour. Phil.* XXIX).—So far as regards the full spelling of the singular forms, examples of *dio* and *dia* are cited from the Inserr. by Seelmann *Ausspr.*, p. 187 (cf. *Trans.* XXXVI, p. 194, n. 3), and *dium* (= *deorum*) is read by Jordan in Cato 47. 16. It is not quite clear whether we have here weakened forms of *deo*, *deum* and *dea*, or case-forms derived from *dī(v)us*, but the former explanation is more probable. One has sometimes been tempted to assume also (cf. Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, p. 618) that we find *dīus* as the atonic form of *deus* in the locution *me Dīus Fidius*, but, in addition to other difficulties, very grave doubt exists as to the quantity of the *i* in *Dīus Fidius*,

One other point requires notice. We have seen that the slurred form *d(e)os* arises originally in such a sentence as *deos quaeso*; no sooner, however, is this form fully established here than it becomes possible to accent freely in verse *d(e)os quaeso ut vobis decet* (*Ad.* 491, 275), as well as to retain the original accent-scheme *deos quaeso*; cf. also *d(i)e quinti* and *d(i)e quinti*. To sum up: The objections which Skutsch, Ahlberg, and Gleditsch make against synizesis on the score of the accent of the single word *dēō* have weight only if *deo* be the sole word or the last word of the sentence,¹ in short, only if *deo* be completely isolated and cut off from the society of its fellows, and thus entirely removed from the normal play of the sentence-accent. Old Latin synizesis is produced as the voice is in rapid motion and is hastening to pronounce a following accented syllable; hence it is excluded from the end of the grammatical or metrical sentence, since, in this last position, we cannot say *sit dēo*, but, in order to produce synizesis, we must have the series continued, as in *sit dēo grātia*.²

especially if the reading of *Asin.* 23 is correct (*per Diūm Fidūm*, where *Diūm* is an almost necessary correction for MS *deum*). Stolz (*Indogerm. Forsch.* XVIII, pp. 453f.) suggests that the scansion *Diūs* in this passage is due to confusion with *dīus*, *dīvus*, and argues also for the existence of the form *Diūs*, which he derives from Ind.-Eur. *dīēus*.

¹On the similarity of sentence-close and verse-close, cf. Birt *Rhein. Mus.* LI, p. 266; L. Müller *Res Metr.*², pp. 266 ff.

²The exclusion of synizesis from the close of lines which end with an iambus (~ -) was explained in my former article (*Trans.* XXXVI, pp. 165, 179, 195, n. 1, 208) as due solely to the principle of metrical regularity, but since, in the close of a metrical sentence like *frātre mēō*, synizesis would be entirely dependent upon the metrical accent and could not occur in actual speech, it seems very possible that it is excluded from iambic verse-closes by the accentual conditions as well as by metrical convention. The metrical accent alone is probably capable of producing some changes in word-forms, but it by no means follows that its power is unrestricted like that of the word-accent; the statement of *Trans.* XXXVI, p. 176, probably goes beyond our knowledge here, and requires some modification. On the other hand, the non-occurrence of tetramoric *aureās* in full anap. verse-closes, which is pointed out by Skutsch (*Γέρας*, p. 131), does not seem to me to require any special explanation. In my judgment, no certainty has yet been reached for anap. verse respecting either the limits of shortening or the occurrence of synizesis except in the case of iambic words. I myself am inclined to accept, for every foot except the last, the anap. scensions *pērdidī*, *aūrēās*, since these latter seem to me to rest on plausible grounds of historical development, which I have briefly stated elsewhere (*Am. Jour. Phil.* XXVII, pp. 430 ff.). As regards the non-occurrence of *aūrēās* in anap. closes, and its occurrence in the dactylic closes of the Augustans (*Trans.* XXXVI, p. 168), though not in those of Ennius, it should be remembered that the Augustan hexameter has its own ictus, its own

II. SOME SPECIAL CASES OF SYNIZESIS

It remains to note briefly a few special problems and special developments of Latin synizesis. The first of these problems relates to the vocative of the possessive *meus*. It is important to remember here that this case of the possessive almost invariably occupies in prose the proclitic position immediately before the substantive, e. g., *mi fili*, *mi pater*, *mi fratres* (*Trans.* XXXVI, p. 197, n. 1), and it is clear that this position has influenced to some extent the case-form of the vocative plural. Thus, in the case of the nominative plural, *mei frātres* is only one of several possible word-orders; consequently nominative plural *m(e)i* shows perhaps only approximate syncope and is only quasi-monosyllabic. In the vocative plural, however, *mei fratres* is an almost invariable order, and here we find that *m(e)i* has been reduced to an absolute monosyllable in Old Latin, and may be fully elided before a following short syllable, e. g., *Ci.* 678 *m(i) hōminēs*, *mi spēctatōres* (anap. sept.); *Mi.* 1330 *o mi óculi*. In the latter passage, our editions (e. g., edd. min. and mai.) usually accept *o mei* from very inferior MSS, but the form *mi* is clearly implied in the reading *oh mihi* of BCD, and should unquestionably be placed in the text;¹ for the legitimate hiatus, cf. *Mi.* 1330 *o mi ámine*; *As.* 664 *mi ámine*; *Cas.* 134 *mi Olýmpio* (Skutsch *Philol.* LIX, p. 487; Maurenbrecher *Hiat.*, p. 162). Similarly, although many scholars question the contraction of Latin *iē* into *ī*, the ancient derivation of voc. sing. *mi* from **mie*, voc. of atonic *mius*, remains distinctly the most probable explanation of the form (cf. Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, p. 422), and the contraction may possibly have

artistic devices, and its own special conventions to facilitate the fitting of difficult words into the framework of the verse (*synizesis Graecanica*). Finally, the total suppression of vowel *i* and *u* suggested in *Trans.* XXXVI, pp. 169, 204, cannot be considered certain; it is perhaps admissible to reject as corrupt the half-dozen passages cited in the latter passage, and to retain with Skutsch (*Tépas*, p. 111) only *St.* 39 *pol.*, *m̄o ám̄o ómn̄is*, since feet like *malēvōlēnte*, *séguim̄i* seem to be also legitimate in Old Latin anapaests. Müller, who scans *áttinēnt* in anapaests, is inconsistent in accenting *malevōlēnte* (*Pl. Pr.*, p. 416).

¹The Pl. and Ter. MSS, as is well known, constantly read *mihi* for *mi*, *nihil* for *nil*; cf., for example, Ahlberg *Procel.* I, pp. 105 ff. Similarly, *mihi* is not infrequently written for voc. *mi*, as *As.* 689 *mihi patronē*, *Men.* 1125 *mihi germanē*, *Mer.* 947 *mihi sodalis* (*loc. cit.*, p. 107).

been facilitated by the almost invariable proclitic position which it occupies.¹

I may mention also the fact that Latin has assimilated the present 'subjunctive' (optative) forms of *esse*, viz. *siēm*, *siēs*, *siēt*, *siēnt* to the two plural forms *sīmus*, *sītis*. Thus the much more frequent and more numerous forms have followed the analogy of the less frequent and less numerous ones, and, in view of the fact that the fuller forms remained in use to so late a period, some further explanation of the final outcome here seems desirable (cf. Stolz *Indogerm. Forsch.* XVIII, p. 470). Zander's explanation (*Vers. Ital.*, p. cxx) that the *i* of *sīt* is not due to analogy, but is a Latin contraction of *-iē-*, is scarcely admissible, since the Old Latin form cannot well have been *siēt*, as he assumes, with iambic shortening, but was much more probably *siēt*;² even the hypothesis which is mentioned by Sommer (*Lat. Lautl.*, p. 577, n. 1) and by Stolz (*loc. cit.*), viz. that contraction of *-iē-* to *-ī-* may first have taken place in 'enclitic' combinations like *pōtisiēt* (shortened from *pōtisiēt*) is not free from difficulties. On the other hand, it does not seem possible, even in the initial iambic sequence, that *-iē-* should contract directly into *-ī-*, instead of into *-ē-*; for the occasional occurrence on late inscriptions of spellings like *dibus* (*CIL. VI* 25540), *Quita*, *inquitare*, etc.³ (as well as of *Quetus*, *quescere*, *requescere*), scarcely points to the production of a genuine *i*-sound in these cases. Hence I should suggest the fol-

¹Sommer *Lat. Lautlehre*, p. 446, also wishes to make use of the proclitic position of the vocative to explain the form, but the syncope of **mēiē* to **mei* is improbable in the extreme, and is not greatly helped out by comparison with hypothetical *ill(e)*, *ind(e)*, etc.; cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.* XXVII, pp. 418 ff. Of course the contraction seen in *mi*, *fili*, *Valeri* and the like is due primarily to the trite and emotional use of these everyday forms; compare what was said above upon the contractions *di*, *dis* (p. 160, n. 2).

²With respect to the orthography, however, the MSS of Cato give only the full form *sies* in the second person, much more usually *siet* in the third person singular and equally often *sient* in the third person plural, and they offer these full forms both in the middle and at the end of the sentence (Weise *Quæst. Caton.*, Göttingen, 1886, pp. 46 f.; Neue *Formenlehre* III³, pp. 598 f.). The earlier inscriptions also show only *siet* and *sient* in both the positions named. Hence Zander (*loc. cit.*, p. cxx) argues with much probability that in the middle of the verse or hemistich, where the Plautus MSS now show only the short forms *sim*, *sis*, *sit*, *sint*, this strict orthographical uniformity is due to the corrections of the later grammarians, and Plautus himself probably wrote indifferently *sim* or *siēm*, *sis* or *sies*, etc. Our Plautus MSS (P) retain dimorphic *siet* within the verse only in *Au.* 370 rapācidarum ubi tāntūm siēt in aēdibus.

³Schuchardt *Vok.* II, pp. 444 ff.

lowing explanation as possibly accounting for the influence of the plural forms: Weakly accented forms of the substantive verb like *siēm*, *siēt* are necessarily synizesis forms of an extreme type in Old Latin, and therefore very unstable in pronunciation. In other words, they were regularly pronounced within the sentence very nearly as **sēm*, **sēt*, e. g. *s(i)ēm liber*; only at the close of the sentence was the dissyllabic pronunciation *siēm* fully retained, as we may see from the usage of the dramatists (Brock *Quaest. gramm.*, pp. 84 f.; Hauler *Einl. zu Phor.*, p. 63, n. 2). If, then, before the beginning of the literary period, these forms sometimes became genuinely monosyllabic and were pronounced at times simply as **sēm*, **sēt*, the introduction, through analogy, of -ī- from the two plural forms could have easily occurred.¹ On the other hand, if the weakly accented forms **siēmus*, **siētis* were ever introduced in consequence of the analogy of the singular, they were quickly reduced to **sēmus*, **sētis* (cf. the reduction seen in (*e*)*ōsdem*), and then assimilated to the short forms.

I have stated in the first section of this paper that the effects of the expiratory accent are perceived most clearly in the case of weakly accented words, and I wish to illustrate this principle still further from the later Augustan usage. The poets of the classical age accomplished veritable marvels in checking the use of popular synizesis and in cultivating and developing a more precise quantitative pronunciation. Thus they restored *dēōs*, *sciō*, *dūō* and even *dūellum*, though this last form had definitely become *dvellum* or **dellum* in Old Latin (Birt *Rhein. Mus.* LI, p. 73); they rescued also very largely *meos* and *eos*, although they were compelled by the force of the expiratory accent freely to admit slurring (pre-tonic syncope) in (*e*)*ōsdem* and (*e*)*āsdem*. It is noteworthy also that they were unable to banish the slurred pronunciation in the case of subordinate particles which were uttered rapidly and with little emphasis like *prōinde*, *dēin*, *dēinceps*, *dēinde*;² cf. *quoad*

¹Cf. *int* (*Corp. Gloss.* II 75. 23) for *ēunt*, formed under similar conditions on the analogy of *imus*, *itis* (Stolz Müller's *Handb.* II^a, 2, p. 161). On the other hand, since *auditunt* is quite stable in pronunciation, we find no form **audint* to show the influence of *audimus* and *auditūs*.

²Cf. *dende CIL.* VI 30112; cf. also *quat CLE.* 470. 1; *qua ad*, *CLE.* 208, and Georges *Lex. Wortf.*; *quōd*, L. Müller *Res Metr.*², p. 324, and Brix-Niemeyer on *Cap.* 670.

(L. Müller *Res Metr.*², pp. 313 ff.). Vergil, it is true, had restored in part *dēhinc*,¹ and we find *prōīn* restored in Priap. lxxxiv. 16; on the other hand, many of the best poets were in doubt about the correct treatment of such particles, and it is for this reason that Horace, Lucan, and Martial avoided *dein*, *prōīn*, *prōinde* altogether (L. Müller *Res Metr.*², p. 317; Birt *loc. cit.*, p. 268). In general, however, the full forms *prōīn*, *prōinde*, *dēīn*, *dēīnde* were attempted only by the very late poets who ventured also on *cūi* and *hūic*; the synizesis forms *prōinde*, *dēīn*, *dēīnde* were here retained by the classical poets, and it is evident that this retention was closely connected with the subordination of the vocables in the sentence and their consequent weakening in pronunciation. Thus these particles belong, with *ego*, *mihi*, *bene*, *male*, and the like, among the more familiar words of common life, which the literary language, in spite of its earnest efforts to develop the quantitative pronunciation, was unable effectively to withdraw from the influence of the sentence accent.³

It is possible also that the Old Latin synizesis of initial iambic sequences is still preserved in *dūdum* from **diūdum*, although this derivation was too confidently assumed by me in *Trans. XXXVI*, pp. 182 (183), n. 3, and 201. The *dū-* of this particle is usually referred at present to Lat. *dūr-are*, Gk. δήν (*δέάν), δηθά (Walde *Etym. Wörterb.* s.v.; Osthoff *Indogerm. Forsch.* V, p. 280), but it is still quite possible to defend the earlier derivation from **dju-dum* (Fleckisen *Jahrb.* CI (1870), p. 71; Bréal and Bailly *Dictionn. étymol.*, p. 66; Vaniček *Etym. Wörterb.*, p. 359). The objection of Solmsen (*Stud.*, p. 196) that Latin loses the *d* rather than the *j* of the initial group *dj* is entitled to serious consideration, but it is not conclusive; for the combination *dj* might be variously treated in Latin under the influence of analogy or of dialectic variation. Compare the group *dj* which yields apparently both *b* and *d* in *bimus*, *dimus*, *biennium*, *diennium*, *Umbr.*

¹ See example in Johnston *Metrical Licenses of Vergil*, p. 16, n. 2.

² Latin popular poetry, on the other hand, always retained synizesis in a larger circle of words; see the examples in Hodgman *Harp. Stud.* IX, pp. 144, 152, 160, 162 f., 166. This later synizesis has much in common with that of O. Lat., but it is no longer restricted to iambic words and word-beginnings, and often resembles externally the so-called *synizesis Graecanica* (*Trans. XXXVI*, pp. 167 f.).

di-fue 'bifidum,' etc. (Stoltz *Hist. Gramm.* I, p. 304; Buck *Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, § 102. 3), and compare the late and vulgar double forms *des*, *zes* (Schuchardt II, p. 445; III, p. 295), and *ies* (e. g., *Fabr.* viii. 41, cited by Schuchardt I p. 69).¹

A second case in which Old Latin synizesis is perhaps to be recognized is that of the particle *jam*, which is most probably an acc. sing. fem. from the pronominal stem *i-* (Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, p. 570; Walde *Etym. Wörterb.*, p. 292; Bréal and Bailly *Dictionn. étymol.*, p. 140), as *quam* and *tam* are acc. sg. fem. from the pronominal stems *quo-* and *to-*; in its abverbial use, *jam* should be compared especially with Old Latin *em*, which is used both as an acc. sing. m. from the Ind.-Eur. pronominal stem **e/o* (Walde *loc. cit.*, s. v. 'em') and as an adverb with the meaning of 'tum' (Paul. *Fest.* 53. 37 Th.).² If we assume the usual derivation of *jam* from the pronominal stem *-i-*, the question arises whether the consonantization of the *i* belongs to the Italic or the pre-Italic period. Some arguments may be adduced for the former view, which would evidently involve the operation of Old Latin synizesis. Although the acc. sing. fem. is usually written *eam*, the spelling *iam*, which is at once phonetic and original, is found repeatedly in the MSS of Varro, and the spelling *ium* is found in a Luceria inscription (Neue II³, p. 381; Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, p. 437). On this hypothesis it is natural that the original initial vowel should be consonantized in the simple adverb, but, in agreement with the laws of Old Latin synizesis (*Trans.* XXXVI, pp. 173 ff., 183), that it should be fully retained wherever it ceases to be initial. Thus, in not admitting synizesis, the compounds *ētiām*, *quīspīam*, *ūspīam*, and the Old Latin quasi-compound *nūncīam* or *nūnc īam*³

¹With *ies* for *dies* compare *Aiutor* for *Adiutor*, *CIL*. VI 3, 20752. Schuchardt *Vok.* I, p. 68, and III, p. 24, cites also late plebeian occurrences of *aiecit*, *aiuncta* and the like.

²An adverb *im*, the acc. of *is* (cf. *inter-im*) and glossed expressly by Ηδη, λοιπόν, is still recognized by Lindsay *Lat. Lang.*, p. 438, and Walde *loc. cit.*, s. v. 'em,' but the *Corp. Gloss. Lat.* (II. 75, 36) now reads here *i<a>m*.

³Langen *Beiträge*, pp. 285 ff., seeks to show (1) that there is a trisyllabic *nunc-iam*, which in sense is a more emphatic *nunc*, and which is used with the impv. or subj. in commands, and with the future; (2) that there are two separate monosyllabic words *nunc iam*, which mean 'now at last' in contrast with a past action, and are used with the present tense. This distinction of Langen's has been accepted by several editors of Plautus, e. g., Götz and Schöll in edd. mai. and min., Lindsay (*Cap. vers.* 266 and

would correspond in all respects to *āntēa*, *pōstēa*, *exeat*, *pridie*, *idēo*, *pērēo*, *ab eo ad-eum* (*loc. cit.*, p. 173), while the development of *iam* would only have gone one stage further than that of the simple *ēā*, *ēāt*, *diē*, etc. (*loc. cit.*, p. 210, *Add. 1*). Again it would not be necessary on this hypothesis to explain the vocalization of medial *j* in *etiam* and *nunciam*, which the current derivation from *et+jam* and *nunc+jam* confidently assumes, but for which a parallel can scarcely be found in historical Latin under similar phonetic conditions, as Birt has fully pointed out (*Rhein. Mus.* LI, pp. 70 ff.).¹ The assumption of a dissyllabic or only quasi-monosyllabic form *iam* in the Italic period seems, however, opposed by the form of the compound *quoniam*, if the change from *m* to *n* in this particle is due, as is commonly assumed, to the influence of the consonantal spirant, i. e., *quoniam* for **quom-iam* as *venio* for **grem-io* (Stolz *Lat. Lautl.*², p. 87; Walde *loc. cit.*, s. v.). It is

772), Morris (*Tri. 3*), etc. On the other hand, Ussing (*Amph. prol.* 38) and Skutsch (*Forsch.*, p. 107) unhesitatingly reject this rule, and although Brix appears to accept Langen's distinction (*Cap. 266*), he disregards it in practice, introducing *nunc-iam* with the present by conjecture in *Cap. 772* *sūpplicare nānc <iām> certāmst mihi*. Any one who will turn to Langen's own discussion will find that he cites no less than six examples from Plautus of *nunc-iam* with the present tense; after explaining away five of these examples with considerable difficulty, he then bases his distinction upon *the one remaining example*, *Cap. 266*, while, according to his own admission, the proposed rule does not hold good for the usage of Terence (*Eu.* 561)! Since results obtained in this arbitrary fashion are of little value, it may be worth while to state the simple facts of Old Latin usage. There are in all fifty-three cases of trisyllabic *nunc-iam* in Plautus, twenty-eight of these being in verse-closes and twenty-five within the verse. On the other hand, the Plautus MSS offer a few cases also of dissyllabic *nunc-iam* within the verse, where the two parts are not separated by any intervening word. Thus the dissyllable occurs at least twice with the impv.: *Au.* 451 *ite sāne nānc-iam intro 6mnes* (where the ed. min. brackets *iam*); *Amph. prol.* 38 *nunc-iam hīc animum 6mnes quāf loquafr advōtūtē*; once with future: *Poe.* 374 *nānc-iam dehīc erit verax tibi* (less natural is the scansion of the ed. min.: *nānciām dehīc erit verāx*); once with the present indic.: *Cap. 266* *nānc-iam cāltros ádtinēt*. In short, the metrical treatment of *nunc-iam* like the metrical treatment of *a-suo* (*Trans. XXXVI*, p. 175, n.), is wholly independent of the precise meaning; thus we find trisyllabic *nunciam* in the sense of 'now at last' *Ep.* 135 *i'llam amībam 6lm:* *nānciam ālia cāra impēndet pēctori* (Langen: *olm:* *nunc iam*, but cf. Skutsch *Forsch.*, p. 107). It is true, of course, that *nunc-iam* is usually trisyllabic, that it is used chiefly with the impv. and that it is commonly equivalent to a strengthened *nunc*, but no other part of Langen's account appears to be established. Lindsay (*Bursian's Jahresbericht* XXXIV [1906], p. 208 n.) apparently still accepts Langen's distinction and seeks to explain away its difficulties, but his discussion shows that he is fully aware of its very dubious character.

¹ Birt *loc. cit.*, p. 79, states the rule that *j* regularly maintains itself in historical Latin in the interior of words, wherever it occurs between two non-i-vowels.

perhaps possible, however, that the change of *m* to *n* in *quoniam* may be otherwise explained. Maurenbrecher indeed (*Hiatus im alten Latein*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 39, n. 4, and p. 84) has boldly assumed that monosyllabic words in *m* had already developed in Old Latin and in Plautus a hiatus form in *n*, and he finds examples of this pronunciation in *quoniam*, *conauditus*, *cunere* (= *conheres*, *CIL*. VI 3282) and the like, as well as in Ital. *con amore*, Fr. *rien*, Span. *quien*. This view scarcely seems supported by sufficient evidence, and still another explanation of the change may be suggested as a possible one. It is well known that the final *m* of monosyllabic words was regularly assimilated to the initial consonant of a following word, and thus freely appeared as *n* in the proclitic forms *con*, *quon*, *cun*, *quen*, *tan* and the like; thus we find *con qua*, *tan durum*, *cun dies*, *cun bixi*, etc. (Schuchardt *Vok.* I, p. 117; Corssen I², p. 266). An especially notable example of the assimilation of a conjunction *quom* is that given by Cicero, *Fam.* ix. 22, 2, i.e., *quom (cum) nos* pronounced nearly as *cunnos* (cf. Birt *Rhein. Mus.* LI [1896], pp. 94 ff.). Hence in much the same way that an independent form *con* has been developed in proclitic use from the preposition *com* (*cum*), and is sometimes used instead of the latter even in hiatus,¹ we may perhaps conjecture that a proclitic form in *n* has arisen also in the case of the conjunction *quom*, and that it is this latter which appears in the compound *quon-iam*;² the chief difficulty which stands in the way of the assumption of an original Old Latin form **iam* would thus be removed.

ELMIRA COLLEGE

¹ E. g. *conire*, Quint. i. 6. 17 and i. 5. 69; *conivola*, Paul. *Fest.* 43. 8 Th.; *coninquerere*, *id.* 45. 11 Th.; although Thewrewk (Paul. *Fest.* 46. 7) now reads *comauditum* and *comangustatum* in place of *conauditum* and *conangustatum* (*id.* 65. 8 Müll.).

² Further examples of the manner in which the conjunction *quom* and the preposition *com* (*quom*) have influenced each other, are collected by Solmsen *Stud. z. lat. Lautgeschichte*, p. 79.

THE LEGAL SETTING OF PLATO'S APOLOGY

BY ROBERT J. BONNER

The appearance in 1893 of an edition of the *Apology* of Plato with an elaborate introduction by Schanz aroused new interest in the various questions connected with the trial of Socrates. But apart from the problems involved in the indictment and the alternative penalty proposed by the defendant, the strictly legal side of the *Apology* has nowhere received adequate treatment.¹ The purpose of this paper is to develop the legal setting of the defense and compare it from this standpoint with contemporary forensic speeches. It is immaterial whether the *Apology* is purely fictitious or is in part based on truth—"stilizirte Wahrheit," as Gomperz² neatly expresses it. In the *Apology* attributed to Xenophon we have, I believe, the nearest approach to an exact report of the real speech.³

The Platonic defense of Socrates consists of three distinct speeches. The first is his answer to the speeches of the prosecutors and deals with the question of guilt or innocence. The second, delivered after the verdict "guilty" had been rendered, is devoted to the presentation of the alternative penalty proposed by Socrates in accordance with Athenian practice. This is of special interest as being the only speech of this kind extant. The third is an informal address to the jurors after the conclusion of the trial. Socrates had been left in the courtroom for a brief period (*Apol.* 39e) while the officials were making preparations to convey him to prison, and he employed the interval by addressing first those who had voted for conviction and then those who had voted for acquittal. Official permission was probably not neces-

¹ Menzel in his admirable monograph "Untersuchungen zum Sokrates-Processe," *Sitzungsber. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Wien* CXLV(1903). II, pp. 1 ff., has done more along this line than any previous scholar. Owing to his legal training his conclusions regarding technical matters cannot be lightly rejected.

² *Gr. Denk.* II, p. 81. The view that it is practically a verbatim report of Socrates' speech is out of the question.

³ Schanz, pp. 76 ff.; Menzel *op. cit.*, pp. 5 ff.

sary. We have, so far as I am aware, no similar proceedings in any other case, though informal addresses to the jurymen delivered by strangers at the conclusion of a case are not unknown.¹

Modern legal procedure does not provide for the separate trial of the question of guilt and the question of penalty. Where the jury has discretion in the matter of penalty only one verdict is rendered. If, however, the jury determines the guilt and the judge fixes the penalty, the formal judgment need not be given when the verdict is announced. Before sentence is pronounced in a capital case the defendant is given an opportunity to say why sentence shall not be passed on him forthwith, but this is a mere form and nothing that he may say has any influence even in those jurisdictions in which he is not allowed to take the stand as a witness. The only modern parallel to the remarks of Socrates after the conclusion of the trial is the address that a condemned criminal sometimes makes to those assembled to witness his execution.

Indictments and statements of claim were always read in court by the clerk as part of the preliminary proceedings.² It occasionally happened that litigants had them read again during the course of the speech or themselves repeated them verbatim or in substance as Socrates chose to do.³ The relation between the general charge of impiety in the indictment and the specific charge of corrupting the youth has given rise to much discussion. Schanz⁴ regards the corruption of the youth as an overt act of impiety rather than a separate charge. Menzel (p. 25) believes that it is impossible to prove that the corruption of the youth was a special form of impiety owing to the paucity of evidence. In his opinion offenses against public morality could be joined to a charge of impiety, as in the case of Aspasia.⁵ This view is borne out by the fact that it was not contrary to Attic practice to include in a single indictment offenses that were really distinct.

¹ Menzel *op. cit.*, p. 50; cf. Antiph. 6. 21.

² Meier-Schömann-Lipsius *Att. Process*, p. 919.

³ Dem. 45. 46; Antiph. 1, 2; 6, 16; Plato *Apol.* 24b. Earlier in his speech (19b) Socrates gives the exact wording of a fictitious indictment in accordance, as he suggests, with the rules of the court.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 12; cf. *Att. Process*, pp. 367 ff.

⁵ Plut. *Pericles* 32.

It has not escaped notice that Socrates carefully avoids $\delta\acute{e}n\delta\rho\epsilon s\; \delta\acute{e}ika\sigmata\acute{l}$ in favor of $\delta\acute{e}\acute{a}n\delta\rho\epsilon s\; 'A\theta\eta\tauai\acute{o}i$ or $\delta\acute{e}\acute{a}n\delta\rho\epsilon s$. It is only in his speech to those who had voted for his acquittal that he employs the regular form of address, adding (40a) by way of explanation that they may rightly be called $\delta\acute{e}ika\sigmata\acute{l}\; \dot{\nu}ma\acute{s}\; \gamma\acute{a}p\; \delta\acute{e}ika\sigmata\acute{l}\; ka\lambda\acute{a}n\; \dot{\nu}r\beta\acute{a}w\; \dot{\alpha}n\; ka\lambda\acute{o}n\acute{v}r$. This remark has given rise to the view that Socrates avoided calling the jurymen $\delta\acute{e}ika\sigmata\acute{l}$ because, owing to their prejudice, they did not deserve the name. But Socrates could not have known in advance that the jurymen would prove unworthy of their name; for Xenophon has said expressly (*Mem.* iv. 4. 4) that he could easily have secured an acquittal had he been willing to adopt the usual method of persuasion. And the smallness of the majority against him¹ supports Xenophon's view. Moreover, on several occasions, in reminding them of their duty to consider only the justice of his pleas, he virtually calls them jurymen.²

Schanz (p. 75) holds that Plato is himself responsible for this feature of the defense. His intention was to indicate in advance his opinion of the verdict. But this theory will not bear close scrutiny. Doubtless the official title of the jurymen was $\delta\acute{e}ika\sigmata\acute{l}$ and it was customary to address them as $\delta\acute{e}\acute{a}n\delta\rho\epsilon s\; \delta\acute{e}ika\sigmata\acute{l}$. But in extant speeches there is the greatest possible diversity. Isocrates in some speeches refrained entirely from using any form of address. In Andocides' defense against a charge of impiety, preferred in the same year as Socrates' trial, the official title occurs but once; elsewhere with a single exception we find $\delta\acute{e}\acute{a}n\delta\rho\epsilon s$.³ We also find Andocides, Aeschines, and Deinarchus employing $\delta\acute{e}\acute{a}n\delta\rho\epsilon s\; 'A\theta\eta\tauai\acute{o}i$ in addressing the dicasts; nor is this strange, since no hard and fast line was drawn between deliberative and judicial bodies in Athens.⁴ The assembly occasionally exercised judicial functions and the jury was but a convenient committee of the assembly and might be addressed as $\delta\acute{e}\acute{a}n\delta\rho\epsilon s\; 'A\theta\eta\tauai\acute{o}i$ quite as properly as the $\acute{e}kkle\lambda\eta\sigmata\acute{l}$. Under these circumstances it is hard to

¹ But 281 out of 501 voted for his conviction: *Plato Apol.* 36A; *Diog. Laert.* ii. 41.

² αὐτὸ δὲ τούτῳ σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ή μή. δικαστοῦ μὲν γάρ αὕτη δρετή (18a); cf. 35c.

³ *And. Myst.* 136, 137.

⁴ *Lipsius Att. Recht*, p. 176.

believe that even the most critical of Socrates' hearers or of Plato's Athenian readers would attach any importance to the absence of the official title. The use of the official title in addressing part of the jury after the trial (40a) is on a different basis. Those who voted for acquittal are contrasted, not with the whole jury of which they formed so considerable a part, but with those who voted for conviction. The latter alone are prejudiced and unworthy of the name. A subsequent passage shows that he has the adverse jurymen only in mind: *εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς "Αἴδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς.*¹

Manifestly these pretended jurymen are those who voted for conviction and not the whole jury including those whom he had just called *δικαστάς*.

It is commonly² stated that there is but slight provision for the introduction of evidence in the *Apology*. But the lack of evidence is apparent rather than real. As a matter of fact all of Socrates' assertions are corroborated. It is true that no documentary, and but little testimonial, evidence is provided; but full use is made of other equally effective means of corroboration. On two occasions (20e, 32d) testimonial evidence is promised, though we are nowhere told that it was actually produced. Menzel, (p. 6), however, finds in Xenophon's *Apol.* 22³ an indication that Socrates did produce witnesses. Owing to the fact that the practice of reducing testimony to writing was not yet in vogue, it is easy to see how witnesses might properly give their evidence at the end of the address in the form of a more or less elaborate statement. Thus the distinction between a corroborative witness and an advocate (*συνήγορος*) might practically disappear. The absence from the text of the customary indication of the introduction of evidence, though unusual, is not without parallel in the

¹ *Apol.* 40e. In Xenophon's *Apology* Socrates uses *ω διδόπει*, and if the addition of *Αθηναῖοι* by Plato has any significance, it may be that he wishes his readers to feel that the justification of Socrates' career is addressed to the entire body of citizens; and this would be particularly fitting in view of the fact that to the general prejudice the unfavorable verdict was almost entirely due (*Apol.* 23e; 28a).

² Poehlmann *Sitzungsber. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss. zu München*, 1906, p. 97; Gomperz *op. cit.* II, p. 81; Schanz, p. 75.

³ *Ἐρρήθη μεν δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πλειω ὑπό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ.*

extant speeches.¹ Gomperz's explanation (p. 81) that Plato was anxious to avoid the appearance of conforming strictly to the regular practice in matters of detail is borne out by other considerations, as will appear.² Now, apart from these two cases involving the content of the oracle given to Chaerephon and the incident regarding Leon of Salamis, there were surprisingly few matters of fact involved in the case. Early in his speech (19 d) Socrates adverts to the assertions of his detractors that he had engaged in physical speculations, and in denying this charge he relies entirely upon the personal knowledge of the jury for corroboration. He asks those of the jurors who had listened to his conversations from time to time to inform the others that he had never used such language as that attributed to him in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. This means of corroboration was frequently resorted to in the Athenian courts, and according to the Orators a litigant could have no better witnesses than the men who sat on the jury.³ On more than one occasion⁴ Socrates denies that he taught for pay. Obviously he could not prove this in any practicable way, nor did he need to do so. The onus probandi was clearly on the other side and the fact (19 c) that they had not produced a single witness to prove that he ever solicited, or accepted, pay is ample corroboration of his denial. So also his assertion (33 a) that he never taught anyone privately required no support in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

In regard to the charge that he had corrupted the youth, he does not rest content with drawing attention to the failure of the prosecution to produce any of those he was alleged to have corrupted or any of their relatives, but he challenges his accusers (33 d ff.) to take part of his time to introduce such evidence if they had overlooked it. This challenge is less formal than those which appear in Demosthenes, but it has its counterpart in the

¹ Blass *Att. Bered.* III. i, p. 132.

² It may be objected that all evidence was required to be in writing. But Andocides (*Myst.* 14), who was tried for impiety in the same year as Socrates, examined one of his witnesses in court, and in *Wasps* 956 ff., in the mock trial of a dog for stealing a cheese, the cheese-scraper was produced as a witness and questioned in court. For a full statement of the arguments in favor of this view, see the writer's *Evidence in Athenian Courts* (1904), pp. 46 ff.; cf. Thalheim *Berl. phil. Woch.* XXV, p. 1575.

³ Dem. 21. 18; 34. 50; 44. 66; Ant. 6. 25.

⁴ *Apol.* 19 d; 31 e; 33 a.

numerous oral challenges in Antiphon and Andocides.¹ In the Orators (cf. Demos. 45, 59–61) considerable stress is laid upon the evidentiary value of challenges.

But there were some incidents in the career of Socrates that were so well known that it was superfluous to refer even to the personal knowledge of the jury for corroboration. For example, no one would call in question his distinguished military services at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, or his refusal to permit the assembly to proceed improperly with the case against the generals in command at Arginusae (28 e, 32 b). And it is worth while to note that Plato was careful to distinguish such incidents from the refusal of Socrates to arrest Leon (32 c ff.). This latter was not a public refusal and obviously required proof.

In this connection it must not be forgotten that Socrates would gladly have produced a number of other witnesses had he known their names.² Who can doubt that under his skilful questioning the slanderers who were responsible for the general prejudice against him would have proved excellent witnesses in his favor? Socrates' reference to these unknown slanderers has been entirely misunderstood. The fact that he virtually calls them *κατήγοροι* has created the impression that somehow or other he contemplated their being parties to the suit; but a later passage shows that he really regarded them as witnesses: *εἰ γάρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων, τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω . . . χρῆν δίπου . . . ννὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι*.—33 d.

καὶ (ἄλλους) πολλοὺς ἔγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὃν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα.—34 a. So long as oral evidence was allowed, the confusion between an adverse witness and an accuser was as natural as the confusion between a favorable witness and an advocate suggested above.

It thus appears that Plato has been by no means remiss in procuring corroboration for statements of fact wherever it was

¹i. 6; vi. 24; *Myst.* 23, 26, 35, 55. Schanz adds some instances from other Orators without noticing the evidentiary value of these challenges.

²He admits that he knew the name of one, Aristophanes the comedian, but his accusations were so ridiculous that Socrates needed only to refer to the jurymen as witnesses that his teachings bore no resemblance whatever to those of the Aristophanic Socrates.

required. Would Lysias have done more had he written a speech for Socrates, as he is alleged to have done?¹ Fortunately we are not entirely without means for attempting an answer to this question. The case of the cripple for whom Lysias wrote a speech to be used at a *δοκιμασία* before the senate is from the lawyer's standpoint strikingly similar to that of Socrates in many ways.² The cripple was a well-known character about the town. He, too, had been accused of disseminating evil influences among those who congregated in his shop. He doubtless was a privileged person, but his sharp tongue had made him the object of *φθόνος* and all his actions were misrepresented.³ In the presentation of the cases of these two men there are some striking similarities. No defendant in the extant speeches ever dared to flout the jury as did the cripple;⁴ nor is the tone of his speech paralleled anywhere except in the Platonic *Apology*.⁵ In the matter of evidentiary apparatus Lysias' treatment of his case is quite inferior to that of Plato. He relies entirely on the personal knowledge of the jury and the evidence of their eyesight (xxiv. 14). Plato, on the other hand, not only uses testimonial evidence, challenges, and the knowledge of the jury, but presents the most notable example of effective interrogation of an opponent in court. The reluctance to answer damaging questions and the eager haste to reply when the question seems favorable are admirably brought out; and intervention by the jury to compel a litigant to answer his opponent's question is illustrated nowhere else in Athenian legal literature.⁶ The whole incident is much more dramatic and effective than Lysias' mechanical interrogation of Eratosthenes, and the corn-dealers.⁷ And so one may well doubt whether Lysias' proposed defense of Socrates was superior in the matter of evidence to the

¹ Cicero *De orat.* i. 54 repeats the story that Lysias offered Socrates a speech composed in his best style; cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 40.

² Lys. xxiv. In other cases of *δοκιμασία* Lysias made as free use of witnesses as in cases before the regular courts; cf. *orat.* xvi.

³ Cf. *Apol.* 18 d, 28 a with Lys. xxiv. 1, 3 and *Apol.* 33 d ff. with Lys. xxiv. 18–20.

⁴ Lys. xxiv. 20; cf. *Apol.* 30 e, 36 c.

⁵ *Apol.* 31 d, cf. Lys. xxiv. 18; *Apol.* 36 d, cf. Lys. xxiv. 13.

⁶ *Apol.* 27 c, cf. 25 d; *Dem.* lvi. 10.

⁷ Lys. xii. 26; xxii. 5.

Apology of Plato, even if it smacked more of the lawyer than of the philosopher, as Diogenes supposed.¹

In this connection it may be noted that Plato's use of technical language conforms sufficiently to the usage of the lawyers to be easily understood. But by using ἔγκλημα, ἀντωμοσία, and ἀντιγραφή indifferently for indictment he gives the impression that he is not more discriminating in his use of legal terminology than a layman like Socrates might be expected to be. For ἀντιγραφή properly means the defendant's written rejoinder, and Hyperides² furnishes the only example in the Orators of its use for indictment or sworn statement of claim. Plato's whole aim is to avoid technicalities where possible so as to present an effective picture of Socrates λεγόμενον τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὄνδμασιν (17 c). But in spite of the alleged extempore character of the speech, stereotyped topics and appeals are not altogether lacking, though they are introduced in such a way as to give the impression of naturalness. Such are: the statement that he now appears in the court for the first time, the promise to tell the "whole truth and nothing but the truth," the reference to the jurors' oath and the requests for a quiet hearing.³ So, too, the skilful way in which he seeks (20 e ff.) to establish the credibility of Chaerephon, the recipient of the oracle from Delphi, by dilating upon his pronounced democratic opinions which forced him to go into banishment during the rule of the Thirty, is in line with the common practice of the speech-writers in seeking to gain sympathy for a client or confidence in a witness by drawing attention to his unswerving support of the democratic constitution.

The customary reference to services rendered to the state by the defendant seems at first sight to be lacking, if we except his reminding the jury (30 e) that his condemnation will be their irreparable loss. But we have here simply another instance of his resigning the form and gaining the substance. For nothing

¹ Diog. Laert. ii. 40. δηλαδὴ γάρ ήν (ό λόγος) τὸ πλέον δικαιικός ή ἐμφιλόσοφος.

² Eux. 31; cf. Att. Process, p. 831.

³ The appeals for silence are unusually frequent. This is due to the fact that Socrates was continually interrupted in his speech and Plato is attempting to reproduce this feature of the real trial by scattering these appeals throughout the speech; Xen. *Apol.* 14, 15; Plato, *Apol.* 17 d, 20 e, 21 a, 26 b, 27 b, 30 c.

in the way of appeal could be more effectual than the seemingly casual, but really subtle, references to his military services, particularly at Potidaea and Delium.¹

Throughout the whole speech Plato has chosen to introduce his evidentiary matter and to make his appeals in an unobtrusive manner. For careful adherence to the technical practice of the speech-writers would have been entirely out of keeping with Socrates' apology (17 b) for departing from the style of speaking regularly heard in court.

Considerable ingenuity has been exercised in reconciling Socrates' first suggestion of a mina as an alternative penalty with his final suggestion that thirty minae would be a suitable penalty. As this is the only extant speech dealing with counter penalties,² it is impossible to find parallels for withdrawing a suggested penalty and substituting another. One cannot but feel, however, that there was nothing in Athenian practice to prevent such a proceeding.

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¹ *Apol.* 28 e; cf. *Sympos.* 219 e, 221 a; *Laches* 181 b.

² Geisler (*Blätter f. Gymn. Schulw.* XLII, p. 38 ff.) cites the recent literature on the subject. He proposes to strike out the latter part of sec. 38 a. His reasons are not based upon legal considerations.

THE SUBSTANTIVE *SI*-CLAUSE

BY H. C. NUTTING

The subject of the substantive *si*-clause can be approached most readily through a consideration of the conditional periods in which *si* appears with a correlative. When the apodosis of such periods precedes, the correlative is apt to have restrictive force; e. g.:

Cic. *De off.* iii. 3. 13: id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam; cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita legere, *si* ea virtuti non repugnarent.

Cic. *P. Marcell.* 8. 25: sed *tum* id audirem, *si* tibi soli viveres aut si tibi etiam soli natus essemus.

Cic. *Ad Att.* xii. 38. 2: tu, quoniam necesse nihil est, *sic* scribes aliquid, *si* vacabis.

Cic. *Orat.* 58. 197: quae (sc. quadranda orationis industria) latebit eo magis, *si* et verborum et sententiarum ponderibus utemur.¹

More interesting but less frequently noticed are the conditional periods of this sort in which the correlative of *si* is a phrase in the ablative case; e. g.:

Caecina apud Cic. *Ad fam.* vi. 7. 4: sed tamen ego filio dixeram, librum tibi . . . *ea condicione* daret, *si* reciperes te correcturum.

Cic. *P. Sest.* 10. 24: foedus fecerunt cum tribuno pl. palam, ut ab eo provincias acciperent quas ipsi vellent . . . *ea lege*, *si* ipsi prius tribuno pl. afflictam . . . rem publicam tradidissent.

Cic. *De invent.* ii. 32. 99: postea (sc. oportebit) demonstrare potuisse vitari; *hac ratione* provideri potuisse, *si* hoc aut illud fecisset.

Plaut. *Bacch.* 447, 448: *hocine hic pacto* potest
inhibere imperium magister, *si* ipsus primus vapulet?

That these ablative phrases are correlatives of *si* is established by three circumstances: (a) the sentences, as they stand, are normal conditional periods; i. e., their two clauses are related as

¹ This use of *eo* with a comparative as a correlative of *si* is not generally noted. Other cases are Cic. *De orat.* ii. 52. 209, *P. Rab. Post.* 17. 46, *Tusc. disp.* ii. 26. 64; so also *hoc* with a comparative, Cic. *In Caecil.* 2. 4. Cf. *eo* (without a comparative), Plaut. *Poen.* 1194.

protasis and apodosis; (b) the ablative phrases express manner, and, with their modifiers, have the force of demonstrative adverbs;¹ (c) the ablative phrases make explicit what otherwise would be implicit in *si*; consequently they are somewhat pleonastic—if omitted, the syntax of the clause to which they belong would not suffer, and the meaning of the sentence would still be clear enough.²

It is, however, cases of this sort that pave the way ultimately for the use of *si* in substantive clauses which serve merely as an expansion and explanation of a noun or pronoun. At first sight, some such examples may seem very like the sentences just discussed, but closer inspection will show that the word or phrase expanded by the *si*-clause lacks the qualifications essential to correlation with *si*; e. g.:

Cic. *P. Rab. Post.* 10. 28: nam . . . *haec una ratio* a rege proposita Postumo est servandae pecuniae, *si* curationem et quasi dispensationem regiam *suscepisset*.

Livy xxi. 10. 4: iuvenem flagrantem cupidine regni *viamque unam* ad id cernentem, *si* . . . succinctus armis . . . *vivat*, . . . ad exercitus misistis.

In these sentences *haec una ratio* and *viam unam* are obviously not correlatives of *si*; for (a) they have not the force of demonstrative adverbs; (b) they do not express something that otherwise would be implicit in *si*—their omission would wreck the sentence, and (c) the clauses of which they form a part do not sustain the relation of apodosis to the following *si*-clause, but are independent statements. To these statements the *si*-clause is appended as a tag explaining and expanding *haec una ratio* and *viam unam*, i. e., it is used as a mere substantive clause.³ The

¹ To cover examples in which *si* has not pure conditional force, (a) and (b) would sometimes need interpretation or expansion; e. g., in the case of Caes. *Bell. Afr.* 86: ante oppidum instructos (sc. elephantes) constituit, id hoc consilio, *si* posset Vergilius . . . a pertinacia deduci. The choice of the correlative *hoc consilio* is an interesting evidence of the final force of the subjunctive *si*-clause after verbs of action and effort; cf. *University of Cal. Publications, Classical Philology* I, p. 76.

² As, e. g., Cic. *De off.* i. 11. 34.

³ The mood in these substantive *si*-clauses seems to call for no special treatment. The great prevalence of the subjunctive is due to the large number of cases in which there is obliquity partial or total, and to the fact that a substantive *si*-clause dependent on a past tense is apt to carry the futurum in praeterito idea.

close parallel to the substantive *ut*-clause may be seen by comparing the passage last cited with the following:

Livy xxxvi. 27. 8: *haec una via omnibus ad salutem visa est, ut in fidem se permetterent Romanorum.*¹

So also in the following sentences:

Cic. *Ad Q. fr.* iii. 1. 1: *totum in eo est, . . . tectorium ut concinnum sit.*

Cic. *Ad Att.* ii. 22. 5: *unum illud tibi persuadeas velim, omnia mihi fore explicata, si te videro; sed totum est in eo, si ante (sc. te videro) quam ille ineat magistratum.*

The range of expressions that may be expanded by substantive *si*-clauses is quite considerable. Some very clear-cut examples occur when the phrase contains a numeral greater than one; e. g.:

Cic. *De invent.* ii. 43. 126: *quo in loco iudici demonstrandum est, quid iuratus sit, quid sequi debeat; duabus de causis iudicem dubitare oportere—si aut scriptum sit obscure aut neget aliquid adversarius.*

Cic. *De leg.* ii. 20. 49: *nam illi quidem his verbis docebant; tribus modis sacris adstringi—aut hereditate, aut si maiorem partem pecuniae capiat, aut (si maior pars pecuniae legata est) si inde quippiam ceperit.*²

Cic. *De off.* i. 20. 67: *id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus—si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis.*³

Other cases follow:

Cic. *De off.* ii. 12. 43: *quamquam praclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriari proximam . . . dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut qualis haberet talis esset.*

Cic. *Ad fam.* vii. 10. 4: *sic enim tibi persuadeas velim, unum mihi esse solacium, quare facilius possim pati te esse sine nobis, si tibi esse id emolumento sciām.*

¹ Cic. *P. Sest.* 65. 137 provides a somewhat similar case with an infinitive: *haec est una via . . . et laudis . . . et honoris, a bonis viris . . . laudari et diligiri*, etc.

² In this sentence the co-ordination of the noun *hereditate* with the two *si*-clauses is additional evidence of the substantival character of the latter; however, the reading is not absolutely certain. The very loose structure of Plaut. *Bacch.* 953-55 leaves it somewhat uncertain whether or not the *si*-clause is substantive, but the case is worth quoting at any rate as an example of remarkable variety of expression:

Ilio tria fuisse audivi fata, quae illi forent exitio:
Signum ex arce si periiset: alterum etiamnam Troili mors:
Tertium, quom portae Phrygiae limen superum scinderetur.

³ Other cases with such numerals are Cic. *De orat.* iii. 43. 170 (*tribus ex rebus*), *De fin.* ii. 5. 15 (*duobus modis*), *De off.* ii. 9. 31 (*ex tribus his*), *Lael.* 17. 64 (*haec duo*).

Cic. *Tusc. disp.* i. 46. 111: *illa suspicio* intolerabili dolore cruciat, *si opinamur* eos, quibus orbati sumus, esse cum aliquo sensu in iis malis, quibus volgo opinantur.

Cic. *Post red. in sen.* 4. 8; P. Lentulus *hoc lumen consulatus* sui fore putavit, *si me rei publicae reddidisset*.

Cic. *Acad.* ii. 45. 138: testatur qui summum bonum dicant *id esse, si vacemus* omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed¹

The recognition of this substantive use of the *si*-clause throws light here and there upon passages that otherwise cause perplexity and confusion; e. g.:

Tac. *Annal.* i. 11: at patres, quibus *unus metus*, *si intellegere viderentur*, in questus lacrimas vota effundi.

Tacitus is here describing the farce enacted between Tiberius and the senate—he professing not to desire imperial power, they urging it upon him. Tacitus means to say that the senators hesitated at no act of servility, their one dread (*unus metus*) being the betrayal of their comprehension of the true inwardness of the situation (*si intellegere viderentur*); i. e., the *si*-clause is used substantively as an expansion and explanation of *unus metus*. Furneaux, however, in his note on this passage, wanders off after Draeger, finding an analogy for *metus si* in *miror si* and like expressions, and finally elaborates an interpretation which seems to me to miss the very point that Tacitus is trying to bring out, namely, the servility of the senators.² A case of this sort is not to be confused with one like the following:

Tac. *Annal.* ii. 42: ille ignarus doli vel, *si intellegere crederetur, vim metuens* in urbem properat.

Here the *si*-clause is a normal protasis, the apodosis being bound up in *vim*, i. e., “fearing violence (would befall him), if it were

¹ See also Cic. *In Verr.* II. i. 1. 3 (eo), *P. Planc.* 38. 93 (eo), *Ad fam.* iv. 14. 1 (eo), *Tac. Agr.* 24 (id); Cic. *De invent.* i. 50. 94 (horum), *P. Sex. Rosc.* 17. 49 (hoc), *Acad.* ii. 27. 86 (hoc), *Tusc. disp.* iv. 28. 60 (haec); *De invent.* ii. 7. 24 (illud); *Ad fam.* ii. 4. 2 (una re), *De off.* ii. 8. 27 (hac una re); *De fin.* iv. 12. 28 (uno modo), Plaut. *Ep.* 362 (uno modo), Cic. *Ad Att.* xii. 6. 2 (uno sc. modo), Pliny *Ep.* iv. 13. 7 (uno remedio). The exact sense of the Suetonian passages in which *sub condicione* appears, is somewhat uncertain (see *Jul.* 68, *Claud.* 24, *Vitell.* 6); a strict grammatical analysis would probably bring the *si*-clauses under this heading. In all the above cases the *si*-clause follows; the reverse order is very rare, e. g., Cic. *De div.* ii. 40. 83 (ea res).

² Cf. chap. 7: at Romae ruere in servitutem consules patres eques.

thought that he understood." In the case first cited the *si*-clause sets forth *the thing feared*; here it tells *under what conditions* something was feared. For the sake of further contrast, the following sentence also may be cited in this connection:

Tac. *Annal.* xvi. 5: constituit plerosque equitum . . . obtritos, et alios . . . morbo exitibili correptos. quippe gravior inerat metus, si spectaculo defuisseint.

Here the analysis of the *si*-clause might be doubtful, were it not for the context, which seems to show that an apodosis is to be supplied. The reference is to Nero's literary performances, and the meaning apparently is that the knights risked death by their constant attendance; but they were possessed by a more urgent dread (of the consequences) if they failed to put in an appearance.

A second illustration of the utility of recognizing the substantive use of the *si*-clause is found in the interpretation of

Livy v. 8. 8-9: nec Veientem satis cohibere . . . nec . . . tueri se ab exteriore poterant hoste. *una spes* erat, *si ex maioribus castris subveniretur*.

In this sentence Livy manifestly means to say that the one hope (*una spes*) of the Romans was the coming of help from the main camp (*si ex maioribus castris subveniretur*); i. e., the *si*-clause expands and explains *una spes*. But Weissenborn, in his note, says an apodosis is to be supplied—"die Bedingung bezieht sich auf das, was gehofft wird, naml. das Lager zu verteidigen." If *spes* were not modified by *una* this suggestion would work very well—"there was hope (that the position might be held), if help came from the main camp." But *una* is here and must be reckoned with. If the reader can include it, and, at the same time, find an apodosis for the *si*-clause in the words supplied, and yet extract a satisfactory sense from the passage, his success will be greater than mine.¹ But Weissenborn doubtless had no idea

¹ It should be noted that the conditions are not met by merely supplying such words as W. suggests, i. e., "There was one hope (that their position might be held) if help came from the main camp." For, with this amplification, "hope" may still have the meaning "chance," and "if" be understood in the sense "namely if;" i. e., this amplification does not preclude interpreting the *si*-clause as substantive, and therefore allows a satisfactory meaning for the sentence. It is when the attempt is made to find an *apodosis* for the *si*-clause in the words supplied that difficulty arises.

of setting us such a problem. The fact that his note is headed *spes erat si* (not *una spes erat si*), and that he cites xxxii. 2. 3 as parallel (there *spes* has no modifier), would seem to indicate that he did not notice *una*. Had he done so, probably he would not have written so perverse a note. I add two similar cases in which the *si*-clause is used substantively:

Caes. *B. G.* iii. 5: ad Galbam adcurrunt atque *unam esse spem* salutis docent, *si* eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur.

Livy i. 31. 7: vulgo iam homines eum statum rerum, qui sub Numa rege fuerat requirentes, *unam opem* aegris corporibus relictam, *si pax veniaque ab diis impetrata esset*, credebant.

The substantive *si*-clause is of course much rarer than the corresponding *ut*- or *quod*-clause, but the value of its recognition in the matter of interpretation entitles it to far more consideration than it has yet received.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

ON THE PRONOMINAL USE OF ὁ αὐτός IN PLATO

BY J. ELMORE

One of the questions raised by a study of Plato's use of ὁ αὐτός is whether in certain passages this phrase has not a purely pronominal function, standing as a pronoun of reference (with the added idea of identity) for a preceding substantive. It is clear that this usage is not in itself improbable. In English "the same," though for the most used adjectively or substantively, is often a pronoun, as in Browning, *The Ring and the Book* I. 1263, "He bows the head, . . . Writes some three brief lines, signs and seals the same." This use of "the same" as a strengthened personal pronoun of reference occurs in all periods of the language and is frequent in our modern speech. Even more common in this construction is the German *derselbe*. "Fruchtbare Umgestaltung einer Theorie," says Steinhall, "ist nicht möglich ohne die gründlichste Kritik derselben." In Latin the usage has a double aspect. It is implied whenever *idem* represents a previously expressed subject with a second predicate (cf. Lane, *Lat. Gram.* 2371), but it appears still more clearly when the oblique cases of *idem* are employed for the corresponding forms of *is*.

According to Meader (*Lat. Pron.*, pp. 195, 196) this latter idiom occurs as early as Cornelius Nepos. Later "it found favor with the historians, chiefly during the period of the Silver Latin." Two examples may be quoted—Tac. *An.* i. 23. 2: ut pars militum gladiatores qui e servitio Blaesi erant, pars ceteram eiusdem familiam vincirent; Lucan *Phars.* 510: O faciles dare summa deos, eademque tueri difficiles. The idiom is thus apparent in case of "the same," *derselbe*, and *idem*, and it seems not improbable that it may exist also in the case of ὁ αὐτός.

A nearer analogy is that of ὁ προειρημένος, which also in later authors becomes pronominal (as Polyb. i. 9. 3: γήμας δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ προειρημένου . . . ἔξαγει στρατελαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν βαρβάρον), and which illustrates the facility with which adjective

and substantive expressions assume this character. It is in fact one of the tendencies of language in general.

In addition to these analogies is the admitted but comparatively rare and little recognized use of ὁ αὐτός to represent (like *idem*) a subject with a second predicate. This usage is illustrated in Callim. *Epigr.* 39. 2, by the *aὐτή* of the Codex Palatinus,¹ in defense of which Schneider quotes several other examples, among them, Thucyd. i. 23; iii. 47; Plut. *Timol.* 13; Orph. *Lithic.* 399; Orph. *Hymn.* iii. 8; xiii. 3. Aside from these examples an illustration of the construction is found in Thucyd. iii. 21. 10: πύργοι ήσαν μεγάλοι καὶ ἴσοπλατεῖς τῷ τείχει, διῆκοντες ἐς τε τὸ ἔσω μέτωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἔξω. In this sentence *οἱ αὐτοὶ* obviously repeats the subject in purely pronominal fashion.

The question now is, can this usage be extended to the oblique cases, so that ὁ αὐτός assumes the functions virtually of a pronoun of reference. The presumptions, as we have seen, are in favor of this view, and it is further supported by the Platonic examples themselves, which may now be considered.

The first is from an unauthentic dialogue—*Sis.* 388a (where the writer speaks of the game of odd and even): οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι δή που περὶ τῶν ἀρτίων τε καὶ περιττῶν, ὃν ἀν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ ταῖς αὐτῶν ἔχωσιν, ὅμως ἐπιτυγχάνονται λέγοντες περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τάληθή. This seems to be a conclusive example. There is no question of the text, and tried by all the tests, *τῶν αὐτῶν* stands in the most perfect pronominal relation to the preceding substantives. *αὐτῶν* itself would not be more a pronoun.

Apol. 24a: ταῦτα ἔστι ίμιν τάληθή . . . καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι.

In this passage *τοῖς αὐτοῖς* seems to fulfil all the conditions of a pronoun of identity. It means precisely the same as the preceding *ταῦτα*, to which it refers, and the context admits of no other identity than that of pronoun and antecedent. Under these conditions the pronominal relation becomes inevitable. The only alternative is to change the text, but this involves setting aside the overwhelming authority of the consensus of B and T. Even

¹I am indebted for this reference to Professor H. W. Prescott of the University of California.

when this radical step is taken (as in the *τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις* of Schanz and the *αὐτοῖς τούτοις* of the Oxford edition) the change is due to a desire to introduce a pronominal meaning, which *τοῖς αὐτοῖς* itself supplies.

Rep. 525a: καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἀν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἡκιστα ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δῆψις. ἀμα γὰρ ταῦτὸν ὡς ἐν τε ὄρῳ μεν καὶ ὡς ἅπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. This is an interesting and significant passage. The text has the highest authority, being the consensus of A, the Paris MS of the ninth century, and of the Venetus II (O) of the twelfth. As it stands, *τὸ αὐτό* repeats the preceding *τὸ ἐν*. Over against "the intellectual apprehension of the one" (to quote the words of Adam) Plato sets "the visual apprehension of the same." Disregard of this construction has led some editors on the authority mainly of Ξ and T (the latter of the fourteenth and the former of the fifteenth century) to read *αὐτό*. Adam in his edition retains *τὸ αὐτό*, saying in his note,

I formerly read *αὐτό* instead of *τὸ αὐτό* with Ξ and a few inferior MSS. *αὐτό* which Bekker, Schneider, and Stallbaum adopt is easier, but lacking in authority; and *τὸ αὐτό* is in reality more elegant. The marked antithesis between *ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις* and *ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δῆψις* makes it clear that *τὸ αὐτό* means "the same" as that with which *ἡ μάθησις* was concerned (viz. *τὸ ἐν*), and not (as Hermann imagined) "one and the same object of vision" (like *ταῦτόν* presently).

Thus the pronominal usage in this passage would seem to be justified by the sound interpretation of the only MSS tradition of the text that is entitled to weight.

Tim 59c: ὅταν τις ἀναπαύεται ἔνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ κατατίθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθέωμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτάται, μέτριον ἀν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδίαν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῦτο. ταύτη δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐφέντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν πέρι τὰ ἔξης εἰκότα δύμεν τῆδε. The *τῶν αὐτῶν* of the text has no variants, and it seems also clear that its function is to represent the *τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι εἰκότας* which goes before. "By way of recreation," says Plato, "one may find pleasure in plausible theories of becoming. Let us therefore in this spirit proceed to discuss the probabilities of the same."

Tim. 66a: διὰ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις δριμέα πάντα τοιαῦτα ἐλέχθη,
τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν προλελεπτυσμένων μὲν ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος, εἰς δὲ τὰς στενὰς
φλέβας ἐνδυνομένων In this passage *τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν* is the
reading of all the MSS without exception; it coincides in meaning with the foregoing *πάντα*, and there can be little doubt, I
think, of its pronominal force.

Leg. 797b: φημὶ κατὰ πάσας πόλεις τὸ τῶν παιδιῶν γένος
ἡγυνοῦσθαι σύμπασιν ὅτι κυριώτατον ἔστι περὶ θέσεως νόμων, ἢ
μονίμους εἶναι τοὺς τεθέντας ἢ μῆ. ταχθὲν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ . . .
ἔἷ καὶ τὰ σπουδῆς κείμενα νόμιμα μένειν ἡσυχῆ, καινούμενα δὲ
τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ καινοτομούμενα τούτου πόλει λώβην οὐκ
εἶναι μεῖζα φαῖμεν ἀν δρθότατα λέγοντες. The general construc-
tion of this sentence is somewhat loose, but it is clear that the
subject, *τὸ τῶν παιδιῶν γένος*, is first represented by *αὐτό*, and
that it is then taken up by the more emphatic *τὰ αὐτά*. It is
only on this supposition, as Stallbaum remarks, that the passage
can be correctly interpreted—*quo neglecto sensus loci nullo
modo percipi recte potest.* *τὰ αὐτά* is thus as pronominal as
αὐτό itself.

There are other passages in which I think the same construc-
tion should be recognized, though there is the possibility of a
different interpretation. One that requires a word of comment is
Tim. 54c: ἐκ γὰρ ἐνὸς ἄπαντα πεφυκότα λυθέντων τε τῶν μειζόνων
πολλὰ σμικρὰ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν συστήσεται, δεχόμενα τὰ προσήκοντα
ἐαντοῖς σχήματα.

Archer-Hind in his edition takes *τῶν αὐτῶν* to mean “from the
same elements,” but this can be correct only on the supposition
that the smaller bodies are identical in composition with the
larger ones. This can hardly be the case. The whole point of
the passage is the capacity which three of the primary elements
possess of being generated into one another. This generation
takes place when larger bodies are dissolved and smaller ones
with fewer elements are formed out of them. Stallbaum makes
τῶν αὐτῶν refer to *μειζόνων*, rendering, *solutisque maioribus multa
parva ex iisdem existent*. So also Schneider—*et maioribus
solutis multa parva ex eisdem consistent*—and Jowett—“when
the greater bodies are broken up, many small bodies will spring

out of them." If this latter interpretation be the right one, *τῶν αὐτῶν* has here also the part of a pronoun.

The use of ὁ *αὐτός* to repeat a previous subject with a second predicate is rare in Plato. Compare *Crat.* 390c; *Hip. Min.* 367c; *Rep.* 524a; *Leg.* 967b.

In the light of this pronominal use of ὁ *αὐτός* I wish to consider the much-discussed passage in *Rep.* 397b: *καὶ οὖν τις ἀποδιδῷ πρέπουσαν ἄρμονίαν καὶ ρυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γῆγενται, λέγειν τῷ ὄρθῳ λέγοντι, καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἄρμονίᾳ—σμικρὰ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί—καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν ρυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησίῳ τινι.*

The passage hinges on the interpretation of *πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν*, which the commentators uniformly regard as involving an ellipsis. Lewis Campbell suggested an original *χορδήν*; Schneider would supply *άρμονίαν* in view of the following *ἐν μιᾷ ἄρμονίᾳ*; Ficino understood *λέξιν*; so also Stallbaum, Hartmann (*Notae Criticae*, p. 85), Jowett, and others. In suggesting *χορδήν* Professor Campbell assumes that the phrase *πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν* became current as it stands, and was understood without reference to the immediate context, but as it occurs nowhere else this supposition must remain mere conjecture. Hartmann also objects to *χορδήν* on the ground that, if it were understood, there would be no need of adding *ἐν μιᾷ ἄρμονίᾳ*. This objection applies with much greater force to Schneider's *άρμονίαν*. The use of *πρός* also in the sense here required is exceedingly difficult, Adam's reference, "for the musical sense of *πρός*" to Eur. *Alc.* 346, being quite beside the point. There is the same difficulty in respect to *πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν λέξιν*—"in the same style"—for which no parallel of any kind has been found. (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν λέξιν*, it may be remarked, could be defended.) But even granting this use of *πρός*, the phrase itself is hopelessly ambiguous, and whether one word or another be supplied, it leaves the sentence as a whole incapable of straightforward interpretation.

The difficulty in the interpreting of this passage seems to have been due to a feeling that *τὴν αὐτήν* must at all events be an adjective, whereas it is in reality a pronoun. It points not forward, but backward, and in its reference there is no ambiguity. The antecedent substantive can only be *λέξει*, the meaning being that

if one uses properly the style appropriate to a good man, then, *with respect to the same*, correct recitation comes virtually to be in one harmony and likewise in a single rhythm. $\pi\rho\circ\acute{s}$ has thus its natural meaning, while for the correlation of $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ with $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}\delta\eta$ $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ we may compare *Leg.* 709c. In point of sense the interpretation permits of a straightforward statement of the two qualities that characterize the style under consideration. The repetition of $\lambda\acute{e}ξει$ by $\tau\grave{\eta}\nu\;a\acute{u}t\acute{\eta}\nu$ is also in keeping with Plato's own exuberance of expression.

J. ELMORE

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

THE BODLEIAN MS OF THE *NOTITIA*

BY ELMER TRUESDELL MERRILL

None of the editors of the so-called *Notitia* have attempted, so far as my knowledge goes, any especial investigation of the MS authority for the text in the full extent of that problem. A great revolution was, indeed, effected when it was clearly shown that the "Publius Victor" tradition was not authentic, and the real *Notitia* was the briefer text that had even come to be regarded as a blundering epitome of the other. Yet successive editors of more recent time, in their reconstruction of the text, have apparently not thought it worth while to act as editors of literary texts do act; they have not attempted to make sure that all available material of authentic origin and of importance has received due consideration at their hands; some of them have even neglected important witnesses to the text that lay in the very libraries from which they have used other manuscripts. Preller, for example (*Die Regionen der Stadt Rom*, Jena, 1846), used the *codex Vindobonensis 162* (olim 328), but knew nothing of *Vindobonensis 3416*, which represents yet another authoritative source, nor yet of *Vindobonenses 3102* and *3103*, which, with other MSS, represent yet a third. Urlichs (*Codex urbis Romae topographicus*, Würzburg, 1871) cited the readings of *codex Monacensis 794*, a copy of the lost Speyer MS, but apparently made no attempt, even by the comparison of another copy known to him to be in the same library (*Monac. 10291*), to determine with greater precision the readings of the important vanished archetype. Even Jordan (*Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum*, Vol. II, Berlin, 1871) disregards the representatives of the Speyer MS in the constitution of his text of the *Notitia*, though he is aware that there are such in existence.

One of the essential things for any further critical study of the text of the *Notitia* would appear to consist in an attempt to find other important MSS of that document than those already

known to be in existence. As no such systematic search appears to have been made by anyone, the prospect of some useful discovery in that direction is by no means hopeless. Furthermore, the text of the *Notitia* in the lost Speyer MS might well be more precisely determined, by a comparison of the several extant copies of it, most of which, at any rate, appear to have been made with some degree of care. To contribute a trifle toward that end is the main purpose of this paper.

Among the MSS in the Bodleian library at Oxford is one (*Canonicianus lat. misc. 378*) which is a copy of the lost Speyer MS, containing near the end (f. 170 recto), but before the *Demensuratio prouinciarum* and the excerpt from Gregory Nazianzen, the same subscription as *cod. Monac. 99 antea Victorianus* (Parthey-Pinder), or *a. n. 794* (Urlichs), viz.:

Exemplata est hec cosmographia, que Scotti dicitur, cum picturis ex uetustissimo codice quem habui ex Spirensi bibliotheca, anno Domini m. cccc. xxxvj mense Ianuario; Dum ego Petrus Donatus, Dei pacientia, episcopus Paduanus, vice sanctissimi domini Eugenii Pape iii. generali Basiliensi concilio praesiderem.

This Bodleian *codex* was noted by Parthey and Pinder in their edition of the *Itinerarium Antonini Augusti et Hierosolymitanum* (Berlin, 1848), and a collation of the *Notitia dignitatum* part of it is given by Seeck in his edition of that document (Berlin, 1876). I have collated it for the *Notitia* of the city of Rome; but for the sake of economy of space I give below only the readings which appear to differ from those of its Munich twin (see above), trusting for these, though with great hesitation, the *apparatus criticus* of Urlichs, since I have had no opportunity to collate that MS for myself, and foresee no such opportunity in the near future. If I mistake not, this Munich MS (Urlichs' N) is the only copy of the lost *Spirensis* from which the readings of the *Notitia* have been published. Reports from the collation of other documents (especially the *Itinerarium Antonini* and *Notitia dignitatum*) contained in extant copies of the *Spirensis* appear to indicate, as I have said, that a number of these copies were made with tolerable accuracy; and therefore, from the comparison of more, or all, of them, it ought to be possible to determine with

considerable precision the text of the *Notitia* as contained in *Spirensis*. It accordingly appears advisable to reserve critical comment on that matter until more of these collations are in hand. If no one takes up the task before me, I am inclined, after the completion of certain other work now in progress, to undertake the preparation of a critical edition of the *Notitia* and *Curiosum*, based upon a new recension of the material. Meanwhile I should be extremely grateful to any scholar who will call my attention to MSS of either document not thus far known.

The following list contains, then, the readings of the *Notitia* in *cod. Canonicianus lat. misc. 378 (O)* that appear to differ from the readings of *cod. Monacensis a. n. 794 (N)* as given by Urlichs in his *Codex urbis Romae topographicus*, to which are the references (by page and line):

p. 3	1 gloriosior] clariosior	p. 7	2 samdaliarium
	2 prima (<i>et sic saepe dein-</i> <i>ceps</i>)		4 uiginti duorum
	5 uitriarium		7 faustine
	6 carruces		suburam
	balneum (<i>et sic saepe</i> <i>deinceps</i>)		8 dafnidis
	7 antiochiani		10 lacus .lxxum.
	8 arcum <i>add.</i>		11 esquilie
	parthici		13 ampitheatrum castrense
10	horrea .xui.	p. 9	2 aediculae XV. <i>om.</i>
	balnea .lxxxiii.		uicomagistri .xlum.
	lacus .lxxxviii.	3	balinea LXXV. <i>om.</i>
11	duodecim milia .cexiiiiii.		lacus
13	cohortes uigulum	4	pistrina .xii.
p. 5	1 africe	6	mamurtem plumbeam
	3 nucam auream		dei
	4 II.] duo	7	puniculum
	tria milia .DC.		ortos
	horrea xiii	8	diocletianas et constan-
	9 presentissum muco ragum		tinas
	scolam	9	cohorts .iii. uigilus
10	titianas		uici .xun. edicule .xun.
11	liuui	10	uicomagistri .xuiii.
12	domus sexaginta	11	lacos .lxxviii.
13	balnea octoginta	13	cohorts .uiii. uigilu
		15	gyptiani

<p>p. 11 2 ortos 4 millia domus laici <i>in laci corr.</i> 6 rostra tria 9 coclydem 12 miliariū aureū iulie tem- plum castoꝝ ueste</p> <p>p. 13 1 unguentarium 2 triginta quatuor 3 edicule .xxviii. .xluni. 6 stabula numero quatuor factiones uiui edes porti- cum 8 theatra quatuor balbi qui capit ab ea triginta milia .lxxxurii. campum martium (<i>rell.</i> <i>om.</i>)</p> <p>p. 15 1 marciani 3 hadrianum 5 diuoꝝ 6 .xluni. duo milia septingente .lxxxii. 7 lacus 9 Deum] dñi (=domini) 10 ramnusi 13 II.] duo 14 domus .lxxxuni. 15 .xi. milia sexcentos</p> <p>p. 17 5 Velabrum-Constantini <i>om.</i> 6 uicomagistri .xviii. II.] duo domus .lxxxviii. 7 pistrina .xii. (<i>ut uidetur,</i> <i>sed fortasse .xu.</i>)</p> <p>10 nammosam 11 subsaxanae partorium 12 cohortes .iiii. uici 13 uici .xui.</p>	<p>p. 19 3 .xii. milia 5 nymphetrie thermas uriane 7 uici .xuii. edicule .xun. 8 .xlum. dom (=domus) 10 ducenta nouem milia 11 transtiberiana 12 naumachias u ortos domitios balneum</p> <p>p. 21 1 cohōr̄ septem uigilum 3 ortos gentis 4 uicomagistri 5 quatuor domus 6 trigintaria milia 8 .xxviii. 10 pedes <i>fin. uers. om.</i> 11 mansoleo</p> <p>p. 23 1 septem aelius fabricius 3 septem Oelius (<i>O init. rubricata,</i> <i>ut aliae init. alibi</i>) 5 octo agrippeſ 6 pecuarium (<i>tali abbreu.</i> <i>hic solum posita, ut</i> <i>uidetur</i>) 10 matidies 11 marcianes floscellaria constantiniana 12 titianae agryppianae sures 13 alexandrianae diocletianae</p> <p>p. 25 4-8 (Traiana—Ciminia <i>Curi-</i> <i>osi ordinem, ut N, se-</i> <i>quitur</i>) 6 Campania Hostiensis</p>
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p. 25	7 Cornelia <i>inter Gallica et</i> Triumealis <i>omissum,</i> <i>inter Ciminia et Tiberi-</i> <i>na additum, asterisco</i> <i>praeposito, et in loco</i> <i>secundum ordinem iu-</i> <i>stum inserto</i>	p. 27	4 horrea CCXC. <i>om.</i> 5 mille (<i>uel fortasse inille</i>) <i>pistrina .ccliii.</i>
	8 Tiberina	6 .x.	.iiii.
	10 ampitheatra	7 uix illa	
	11 eoclydes duo macelli duo	8 Rauennatum—10 Victi-	mariorum <i>om, ut N</i>

Even a cursory examination of these readings in comparison with those of *cod. Vindob. 162* (Jordan's and Urlichs' A) will show, even more clearly than could be judged from the readings of N as given by Urlichs, the very close relationship between A and Spirensis. The precise bond between them might even now be inferred, but can doubtless be more convincingly established when more of the copies of Spirensis have been collated, and A N once more reviewed with care. My own scanty experience in the collation of MSS before collated by others, or by myself, and in the submission of my own collations to critical review by the careful eyes of others, has taught me that the only way to secure an approach to accuracy in the report of MS readings is through such independent and repeated collations, followed by a careful comparison once more with the original on all points of discovered disagreement. Even when a collation has been made with, let us suppose, inhuman impeccability, the subsequent processes of copying, and recopying, and working into other necessary forms, and typesetting, and proofreading, and the diabolically malignant ingenuity of the linotype machine at the supreme moment, are certain to introduce enough blunders to make the soul that is ambitious of virtue refuse all comfort except such as is to be found in cursing Gutenberg, Fust, Schöffer, and all their company—or in reviewing other people's sins.

In the apparent lack of such an accessible compilation elsewhere, it may not be useless to append here a list of the MSS that have been already observed by others to contain the *Notitia:*

I. Copies of Spirensis:

- a. Matritensis Q 129, Regius, s. XIV-XV;
- b. Canonicianus lat. misc. 378, an. 1436;
- c. Monacensis 794, antea 99, Victorianus, an. 1436 (Urlichs N);
- d. Monacensis 10291, antea 291, Palatinus, an. 1542-1551;
- e. Parisinus 9661, antea Regius suppl. lat. 671, Lamonianus, s. XV;
- f. Vindobonensis 3103, s. XV;
- g. Vindobonensis 3102, Salisburg. 18b, Endlich. 331, an. 1529? 1484?;
- h. Barberinus 809, s. XVI.

(Besides these there are other copies derived from Spirensis, but perhaps not immediately, or exhibiting interpolation. Such may be Vindob. suppl. 14, s. XV, which contains *inter alia*, "P. Victor de regionibus urbis," and Neapolitanus Borbonicus 172². IV. D. 22², which contains *inter alia* a "Descriptio urbis Romae." Both of these are mentioned by Parthey-Pinder, and others are also extant; but all such MSS are naturally of minor importance.)

II. Vindobonensis 162, antea 328, s. IX (Preller, Jordan, and Urlichs A; closely related to Spirensis).

III. Laurentianus 89.67, s. X (Preller, Jordan, Urlichs B; contaminated with *Curiosum*, and hence of little critical value save for its age, and for the fact of its use by early scholars).

IV. Vindobonensis 3416, antea 56, s. XV (Jordan S, Urlichs C; Mommsen in *Abh. d. sachs. Ges. d. Wiss.* II. 549 ff., 606 ff.).

The above list is to be taken "as it is." It not improbably needs correction (for which I should be grateful), and it certainly needs addition.

TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

THOMAS DAY SEYMOUR

1848-1907

Professor Seymour's life is an inspiring example of noble service and high achievement. Its controlling impulse was an ardent desire for knowledge that would not be let by any stress of circumstance. Yet his activity, even in a strenuous generation that effected great changes in education, was remarkably varied. He was not only a learned man who spoke with recognized authority, but also an earnest teacher, a wise adviser in college councils, a writer and editor of distinction, and an able administrator of important interests. He combined in his life exceptional classical scholarship with solid services to the cause of education.

Even in his boyhood he was "a great worker with a passion for accuracy." He graduated from Western Reserve College in 1870 as first scholar and was admitted *ad eundem* the same year in Yale. He then went to Germany, where he heard G. Curtius, Ritschl, Overbeck, Lange, Voight, and Lipsius in Leipzig, and Weber, Haupt, E. Curtius, Kirchoff, and Steinalt in Berlin. In the spring of 1872 he visited Italy and Greece, and in the autumn began his duties as professor of Greek in Western Reserve. In 1880 he was called to Yale.

His father, a Yale man, had been professor of Greek and Latin in Western Reserve for thirty years. The elder Seymour was an excellent classical scholar of unusual general cultivation, whose interest in the ancient and modern classics was literary rather than linguistic. His intellectual habits and tastes deeply impressed the life of his son, who began in the quiet of his father's library of between two and three thousand carefully selected volumes to acquire that remarkable acquaintance with the Greek and Latin authors for which he was famous. All his life he remained an incessant reader of great books.

Professor Seymour was eminent among classical scholars in America for a quarter of a century. His influence as a scholar steadily widened and strengthened, as he grew older, and enhanced the reputation of Yale University as a great seat of learning. His teaching covered a wide range of authors; his method was Socratic. "It is our duty," he once said, "not to make our pupils comfortable but to prick bubbles." He combined unusual capacity for work with unflagging industry. His sense of obligation was keen and he never spared himself. He rigorously tested the claims of new truth, but this wise caution was not the conservatism of ignorance.

He belonged to the finer and gentler type of scholars, and happily was not "a good fighter," although he never shirked a duty. And thus it was that all men loved him—for his candor, his modesty, his considerateness, his unselfishness, his unswerving devotion to truth.

J. W. W.

MINTON WARREN

1850-1907

The death of Minton Warren, Pope professor of Latin in Harvard University, which occurred on November 26, 1907, has been noticed so widely that it will be superfluous here to repeat the chronology of his life, and alien to the present purpose to enumerate and characterize his contributions to classical studies. But because of his eminence in classical scholarship, and because of those traits of heart and of character which endeared him to his pupils and to his colleagues wherever he was known, a few words are here recorded in his memory.

The qualities of his scholarship were breadth of interest and knowledge, combined with thoroughness and mastery of detail. They resulted in a rare erudition, which was saved from lifelessness and barrenness by an enthusiasm and fire of energy, which was kindled by the vision of the whole. I have never known a classical scholar who could draw so abundantly and so readily from his own resources to supplement the most varied studies of others, nor one who was so generous and unconcerned for personal recognition in placing his acquisitions at another's disposal.

As a teacher he was thorough and rigorously insistent in his demands, direct and unsparing in criticism. But his candor, his open-mindedness, and the warmth of his commendation where it could justly be bestowed won speedily an appreciation of the kindness and helpfulness of his nature from all pupils of serious purpose. The circumstances of his academic career, as director of the Latin Seminary at the Johns Hopkins University from 1879 on, placed him almost from the first in a position to be a teacher of teachers, and gave him a unique opportunity to affect profoundly American studies and teaching in the field of the Latin language and literature. With what effect and success he used that opportunity those who, like myself, were his pupils may not say, but they will unite with me in testifying to that lasting influence which Minton Warren exercised upon their studies and their lives.

G. L. HENDRICKSON

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

VARIA

1. Professor Elmore's interesting paper on the use of *ὁ αὐτός*, etc. (*supra* p. 184), will probably find more confirmation in later than in classical Greek. Even in post-classical Greek the very frequency of *ὁ προερημένος* in such writers as Polybius shows that to their *Sprachgefühl* "the aforesaid" was less clumsy and unidiomatic than "the same." *Sis.* 388A seems a certain case, if the text is correct. Both text and interpretation of *Apol.* 24A and *Rep.* 397B are in doubt; and I have nothing better to offer for the latter passage than the suggestions of Campbell and Schneider. In *Republic* 525A, *ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ὄψις*, if retained, must be understood with Hermann as "one and the same object of vision." Adam, as quoted by Professor Elmore, contradicts himself. "Over against the intellectual apprehension of the one Plato sets the visual apprehension of the same," is right. But his identification of "the same" with "the one" is wrong. The sameness or unity of a visual object which has many parts and qualities is a typical illustration of the difficulty and necessity of apprehending the idea of unity *per se*.

In all the other Platonic passages cited I think it can be proved that the forms of *ὁ αὐτός* are used with a distinct intention of emphasizing the notion of identity, persisting, it may be, under changed conditions or in a different matter, and should be translated by something like "these same," "these identical," "this very." Of course when there is no noun this usage may be called in a sense "pronominal." But it is obviously not the merely referential pronominal use for which Professor Elmore contends. That use cannot, I think, be established for Plato.

2. Emendation of *Dialexeis* 6. 1. Diels (*Vorsokratiker*, p. 585. 37) reads, *λέγεται δέ τις λόγος οὐτ' ἀλαθῆς οὐτε κενός*. The context proves conclusively that the *λόγος* in question is wholly repudiated by the writer. He does not go on to show that there may be something in it, that it is neither true nor yet altogether vain. Moreover, such a disjunction would probably not be expressed in Greek by a simple *οὐτε . . . οὐτε*. For *κενός* we must read *ἴκανός*, an easy change which restores the sense. Cf. Plato *Laus* 887E, *οὐδὲ οὐτε οὐτε ίκανον λόγου*. *Hipp. Mi.* 369C, *ἀποδεῖξω σοι ίκανῷ λόγῳ*.

3. Tiberius, *Περὶ σχημάτων*. Spengel, Vol. III, p. 65, l. 29; Walz, Vol. VIII, p. 543: *οἷον τί τὸ κωλῦν αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται; ἐμφαίνεται*

γὰρ ὅτι καλένειν αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς βουλομένου τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐπιβῆναι δυνήσεται. The text will not construe. We must read *οὐδεὶς βουλόμενον*. The writer placed *οὐδεὶς* between the two accusatives to avoid monotony; *βουλόμενον* was miswritten *βουλομένον* and *οὐδεὶς* was changed to agree with it.

4. Scholia on Hephaestion xv. 8. Gaisford, Vol. I, p. 22; Westphal, *Scriptores Metrii*, Vol. I, p. 206, l. 3: *Δοκῶν οὖν τοῦτο μημεῖσθαι, ἔλαβε μημησάμενος.* The sense requires *μὴ μημησάμενος*—a good illustration of iotaism and haplography. Hephaestion's text has *ἄγνοεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἀντικρὺς μημεῖται.*

Ibid. xvi. 1, p. 107: *οἶον αἱ ἄρτιαι τοῦ ἴαμβου δέχονται σπονδεῖον.* We must read *οὐ δέχονται* (haplography again). The text cannot be defended by the interpretation that the writer is describing the error, not the rule of which it is an infraction. For he continues, *ὅταν οὖν τις τῶν κωμικῶν θείη δάκτυλον ἡ σπονδεῖον ἐν ταῖς δράσαις, etc.* Westphal, Vol. I, pp. 211, 212, reads, *ὅταν . . . οἶον οἱ ἄρτιαι δέχονται.*

PAUL SHOREY

THE NEW FRAGMENTS OF MENANDER

M. Lefebvre's *editio princeps* deserves a better welcome than is accorded by these few suggestions of readings and interpretations in which I venture to differ with the editor.

1. "Ἡρως (?) 39:

ΓΕΤ(AS). Δούλη ὑστίν; (ΔΑΟΣ) Οὐτως· ἡσυχῇ, τρόπον τινά. M. Lefebvre translates: "Une esclave?" "Oui. (Je me suis pris d'amour pour elle) tout doucement, en quelque sorte." The supplementary words in the parentheses are unnecessary. The words of Daos qualify *δούλη*: "Is she a slave?" "Yes, so-so, after a fashion," and the speaker goes on to explain that she is not strictly a *δούλη*, but a shepherd's daughter. Similarly in 59, Daos, lover-like, emphasizes the fact that she is *ἔλευθέριος καὶ κοσμία*.

2. Ἐπιτρέποντες 358, 359:

Ἐξεμ' ἔχουσα. Κλανθυρίζεται, τάλαν,
πάλαι γάρ οὐκ οἰδ' ὅ τι κακὸν πέπονθέ μοι.

The postponement of *γάρ* necessitated by M. Lefebvre's punctuation is impossible, or at least difficult. The verses should read:

Κλανθυρίζεται, τάλαν.
πάλαι γάρ οὐκ οἰδ' ὅ τι κακὸν πέπονθέ μοι.

3. Ἐπιτρέποντες 460:

Κδ[γ]ώ σοι ταῦτ' ἔμοι φρονεῖν ἀναγκάσω
καὶ [μ]ὴ στασιάζειν.

Both sense and meter are intolerable: *σοι* cannot be construed, nor can a spondee stand in the second foot. Whatever the papyrus offers, the poet must have written:

κάγω σε ταῦτ' ἐμοὶ φρονεῖν ἀναγκάσω.

4. Περικειρομάνη 39–46:

Ο μὲν ψχετ' εἰπὼν[ν] ὅτι κατὰ σχολὴν ἔ[ρει]
αὐτὴν τί βούλεθ', [η δ'] ἐδάκρυν' ἐστῶσα καὶ
ώδιρεθ' ὅτι ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐλευθέρως ποῖει
ἔξεστιν αὐτῇ πάντα δ' ἔξεκάστο
ταῦθ', ἐνεκα τοῦ μέλλοντος, εἰς ὄργην θ' ἵνα
οὗτος <ἐσ>φίκετ'. Ἐγὼ γάρ ἦγον οὐ φύσαι
τοιοῦτον ὄντα τοῦτον, ἀρχ[η]ν δ' ἵνα λάβῃ
μηνσεως τὰ λοιπά,

M. Lefebvre translates 42–44 thus: “et, elle s'enflammait de colère au souvenir de cette scène, en songeant à son avenir et au degré de fureur où son amant s'était porté.” He inserts *ἐσ-* in 44 to preserve the meter, although there is no space in the papyrus. In this case he seems to have misunderstood the sense and forced the Greek. *Ἴνα* = “where,” or “into which,” is certainly difficult after *ὄργην*. The mistake lies primarily in referring 42–44 to the girl. The verses describe the acts of *Ἄγνωα* herself, who speaks the prologue: “All this,” says *Ἄγνωα*, “was stirred up for the sake of the future (action of the play), and in order that he might fly into a fit of anger. For I egged him on, though he isn't this kind of man by nature.” We should then print a period after *αὐτῇ* in 42, remove the comma before *ἴνεκα* in 43, and instead of inserting *ἐσ-* in 44 simply read *ἀφίκοιτ'*, which corrects the meter and the sense. Apparently, here and in the passage discussed in the previous note, M. Lefebvre has confused Ε and ΟΙ in the papyrus: as in *Ἐπιτρέποντες* 460 he transliterates *σοι* for *σε*, so here, contrariwise, he transliterates *-ε-* for *-οι-*. Or possibly a vivid subjunctive (cf. *ἦγον* 44 *λάβῃ* 45 *εἵροιεν* 47) *ἀφίκητ'* may be read, if he has correctly copied the reading of the papyrus, in which case we should have the writing of a short for a long vowel common in the period of the papyrus; cf. M. Lefebvre's “Note sur le ‘codex,’” p. xviii, for cases of *ο* for *ω*.

5. Σαμία (?) 30–32:

ὦ τάλαιν' ἐγώ,
πρώην τοιοῦτον ὄντα Μοσχίων ἐγ[ω]
αὐτὸν ἐτιθηνούμην

One might suspect a misprint, but M. Lefebvre's translation suggests that he takes *Μοσχίων* as vocative. Clearly the reading should be *Μοσχίων'*, an accusative.

HENRY W. PRESCOTT

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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THE LATIN GRAMMARIANS AND THE LATIN ACCENT

Abbott's interesting theory of a pitch-accent in Latin, employed by the educated, by the side of a stress-accent in the speech of the people, derives perhaps its strongest argument from the practical unanimity with which Latin writers themselves describe their accent in terms of pitch. Yet I am inclined to suspect that Lindsay may have put his finger on the true explanation of this practice when he says (*Lat. Lang.*, p. 152):

The Greek accent itself had probably at the time of these grammarians already entered that process of change which ended in the stress accentuation of modern Greek. The Greek writers on accentuation would no doubt go on using the terminology of earlier phoneticians, without perceiving that their terms and descriptions were now no longer so applicable to the actual phenomena as they had once been; and if the Greek contemporary theorists on accent misused the terminology in this way, a Roman imitator might be excused for carrying the misuse a little further in applying the same terminology to Latin accentuation.

Besides, if, as is quite possible, the Latin accent, while primarily a stress, involved also a tendency to raise the pitch (as in English, French, Spanish, etc.), this really secondary factor may well have contributed to its identification with the Greek accent. We must not forget that the Roman writers were steeped in Greek traditions and can hardly have been skilled observers of phonetic phenomena. Wackernagel remarks (*Beiträge zur Lehre vom Griechischen Akzent*, p. 14) that "die Alten (und zwar nicht bloss erst die zunftmässigen Grammatiker) aus ihrem Akzent bloss das musikalische Moment heraushörten und das damit verbundene expiratorische Moment gar nicht der Beachtung würdigten."

But before this explanation of the attitude of the Roman writers toward their accent can be definitely accepted we must be satisfied on two points: First, was the shift in Greek accent from pitch to stress achieved, or at least well under way, as early as the time of Cicero and Varro, who describe Latin accent with Greek terms? Second, was this shift general, or was it confined to the vulgar?

It must be admitted that the evidence does not allow of a categorical answer to either question. Kretschmer (*K. Z.* XXX, 591 ff., cited by Abbott) has gathered, chiefly from papyri, a number of examples (greatly augmented by Mayser's recently published *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri*) of the confusion of long and short vowels which show that quantitative distinctions, beginning to be obscured in the third century B. C., were pretty well broken down during the second and first centuries. Kretschmer's explanation, since quite generally accepted, of this phenomenon connects it directly with a shift in the character of the accent from pitch to stress. This shift he therefore places—"wenigstens in der

länge und kurze verwechselnden Vulgärsprache"—somewhere in the last two centuries B. C. Unfortunately we cannot be sure that the age of Cicero, though falling in the latter part of this transition period, saw its consummation. Yet it seems not improbable that when Cicero and Varro were writing, Greek was spoken by the common people with an accent not essentially differing from the Latin (predominantly stress-) accent. Whether the pitch-elevation which very likely accompanied the stress in many (perhaps most) cases was as great in Latin as in Greek cannot be determined, but this is not essential to the present discussion.

To answer the second question, whether the shift was general, or confined to vulgar pronunciation, the material presented by the papyri does not help us. Abbott finds in spellings like ὄντος for ὄντος proof of "a marked difference . . . between the pronunciation of formal Greek and vulgar Greek" (pp. 457 f.), and it is therefore not surprising to find him taking the next step, and assuming that the two accents which he supposes existed side by side in Latin were paralleled by the conditions in Greek just before the beginning of our era (p. 459). But it appears to me that this is to overinterpret Kretschmer's evidence, which establishes a difference between formal and vulgar Greek in *spelling*, not in *pronunciation*. The ignorant man who wrote ὄντος for the traditional ὄντος probably did so because to his ear the first *o* was different from the second. But his better-educated contemporary who kept the old spelling may, for all we know, have pronounced the word precisely as he did. One might as well argue that the observance of classical quantities in the work of late poets is evidence that the pronunciation of the learned differed from that of the people. To discredit this argument one has only to mention the quantitative Latin verse of Petrarch, Milton, Munro, which surely proves nothing for their pronunciation.

Dionysius, it is true, gives us to understand that Greek accent in his day involved the rise of a fifth in pitch (*Comp.* 11), but the statement of Dionysius is much on a par with those of Cicero, Varro, and others for Latin, and can be reconciled, I think, with the theory that the Greek accent of his day was primarily stress. The Greek accent in its gradual transition from pitch to stress may be thought of as passing through the following phases: (1) Accented syllables were uniformly uttered at a higher pitch than unaccented ones. Stress, if present at all, was so slight as to be negligible. (2) There was a tendency to accompany pitch-elevation with increase of stress, but stress had not become an invariable factor, whereas pitch-elevation was still inevitably present in the accent. (3) Stress was now more marked than before and was always present in accented syllables. An accented syllable was *likely* to have a higher pitch, but did not *invariably*. (4) Stress was marked and universal, as in (3). Pitch was present or not, depending on various factors, e. g. the earnestness of the speaker, the importance of the word, etc.

If Greek was in the third of these phases when Dionysius lived (and Kretschmer's and Mayser's examples seem to prove that stress was not sporadic, but regular), the accent would be such as a modern phonetician would describe as predominantly stress. But the accented syllable, being usually uttered at a higher pitch than its neighbors, might conceivably appear to a man learned in the theory of earlier days as distinguished from the unaccented one by the difference in pitch alone. Moreover, we must not forget that Dionysius is not here discussing accent, *qua* accent, but the *μέλος* of speech, which he contrasts with the *μέλος* of song and instrumental music. To reconcile his words with the supposition that the accent of his day was a stress (among the educated as with the masses) we are compelled to discredit his statement only so far as to regard him as mistaken in thinking that pitch-elevation was *invariably* present in the accent. It would seem therefore that there is no adequate reason for assuming that the educated Greeks with whom Cicero and Varro conversed used an accent materially different from that of the people who wrote the papyri.

I cannot agree with Abbott in seeing an argument for a musical accent in the late rule about circumflex and acute in monosyllables. There may well have been in Latin, as there is in English, what might be termed a stress-circumflex—where the stress increases and then dies away. Donatus and Diomedes may have had in mind such an accent when they formulated their rule. The name is of course borrowed from the Greek, and it is hardly to be doubted that the Latin writers who employed the name thought that they had an accent equivalent to the Greek *τερπτωμάνη*. But the *τερπτωμάνη* of Donatus' time was unquestionably much, if not exactly, like the δέσια, and even that of Cicero's time (assuming that some speakers still distinguished it from the δέσια) was probably more like the stress-circumflex than like the tone-circumflex of the days of Plato. It may, of course, have involved an appreciable pitch-slide as well, as in English in, e. g., a surprised and drawled out "ah!"

B. O. FOSTER

LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITY

COMMENT ON PROFESSOR FOSTER'S NOTE

Professor Foster's analysis of the changes which the Greek accent underwent is not only valuable in itself but will make it easier for us to accept the interpretation commonly given in this country to the passages in which the Latin grammarians deal with accent, if certain facts can be established. If it can be shown, for instance, that by the time of Varro and Cicero the shift in the Greek accent from pitch to stress had become an accomplished fact, not only in the language of the illiterate, but for all classes of people, so that the Greek and Latin accents were similar in

showing a clearly marked stress, and if the Greek grammarians of the second and first centuries b. c. continued to use the old terminology in speaking of their accent, the theory that the Romans "carried the misuse still further, in applying the same terminology to Latin accentuation," as Lindsay puts it, will not be so difficult of acceptance. Both of these points are at present largely conjectures. Before leaving this matter, however, to take up the one subject on which I wish to say a few words, it is not improper to note that those who were "hardly skilled observers of phonetic phenomena," and who are supposed to have blindly applied Greek terminology to the facts of their own language, would scarcely have observed so delicate a phenomenon as the incidence of an accent where "the stress increases and dies away," and would scarcely have characterized it so accurately as a "(stress-)circumflex."

But the one point to which I must confine myself here concerns Professor Foster's second question. At some stage in the development of Greek pronunciation it is clear that a tendency manifested itself to make the short accented vowels long and the long unaccented vowels short. This change in quantities was probably due to the growth of the stress-element of the accent at the expense of the pitch, and would make its appearance first in the spoken language of the uneducated and careless. Inasmuch as such people were little versed in the rules of orthography, their pronunciation would sometimes be reflected in their spelling, and, for example, since they made the accented vowel of *ōvōma* long in their ordinary speech, some of them would naturally slip into the error of writing it *ōvōma*. The better educated people still gave its historical value to the vowel in both the positions noted above and followed the conventional orthography. At a later date they may well have yielded to the new movement in the matter of pronunciation without making any change in their method of spelling. Whether Kretschmer's papyri belong to the first or the second stage of the development outlined above seems to me to be of no moment for the argument. The essential thing for us is the fact that his documents reveal these changes in the quantity of vowels and a change, deducible therefrom, in the nature of the Greek accent, and that, at *some* stage in the development, the stress-element was more marked in the accent of vulgar Greek than in that of formal Greek. Similarly in Latin the tendency to give all unaccented vowels the same value, whether they were long or short in formal classical poetry, appeared first in the speech of the ignorant. Later on this leveling tendency affected the spoken language even of the better educated, but professional literary men in their formal poetry naturally tried to write the traditional quantitative verse which Virgil had written. Petrarch, Milton, and Munro followed the same conventional model, and I entirely agree with Professor Foster in thinking that their artificial productions and those of the late Latin poets throw no light on the pronunciation of

the learned for the two periods in question. Again the two things of interest for us, and the only matters which concern us here, are that the movement was from below upward, and that at *some* point in the development the pronunciation of the common man differed from that of his better-trained contemporary.

FRANK FROST ABBOTT

CAESAR *BELL. GALL.* VI. 30. 4, AGAIN

In the October number of *Classical Philology*, pp. 465, 466, Professor Knapp takes exception to my proposed emendation of Caesar *Bell. Gall.* vi. 30. 4 (*Classical Philology* I, 290, 291). It is not my intention to prolong the discussion, for an extended argument upon a question of textual emendation is valueless, since nothing can be proved absolutely. The decision is always more or less a personal one, resting upon a feeling that the individual critic has for the author's style and mode of expression, and this feeling results from an extensive and sympathetic reading of the author's works. I wish here merely to reiterate the fact that I was not attempting to emend a sound passage. I am as averse as Professor Knapp is to change a reading that is supported by all the manuscript authority. I was proposing, however, what seemed to me, and still seems to me, to be a correction of a corrupt passage. I shall not give again the reasons for my belief, but as I come back to this passage from year to year, the sentence as I emended it (*mortem* for *multum*) appeals to me at least as one which accords more with Caesarian usage.

Professor Knapp thinks that *mortem* could not easily be mistaken for *multum*. But why could it not? The words are quite similar in their general appearance. Surely my critic does not expect to lay down mathematical formulas to account for the curious workings of the human mind. The explanation of errors in copying must often be a psychological one which cannot be reduced to rule. How often have we all had the experience of miswriting a word where the error afterward seemed absurd and could be explained only by preoccupation of mind! I have nothing to add to my previous statement, but I did not wish, by my silence, to convey the impression that Professor Knapp's argumentation was to me convincing.

WALTER DENNISON

TRANSPOSITION VARIANTS IN CICERO'S *PRO CLUENTIO*

[The sigla are as in A. C. Clark's text, in the Oxford Classical Series. The reading first cited is the one which seems most deserving of being adopted in the text.]

§9 *caput illius* codd. *praeter ΣΤ* (*illius caput*). This inversion, derived from the *Cluniacensis*, may have been caused by the omission and reinsertion of *illius*, which seems to come most naturally here *after* the word *caput*.

§13 *se sine scelere* ΣST and Arusianus; *sine scelere se* M μ . It may be noted here that in the *Codex Balliolensis* (see my edition, Introd. p. xlvi) the words *sine scelere* are actually supplied in the margin.

§17 *cuiuscumque modi* Σb 2 ΨST; *cuiusmodicumque* M μ .

§19 *vos volui* codd. (including the Turin Palimpsest) praeter ΣST (*volui vos*).

§21 *in ergastulo fuit* P; *fuit in ergastulo* rell. Here Clark regards the reading of the Palimpsest, against Zielinski; cf. also the Scholiast on Lucan ii. 95. *heredem fecit* ΡΣST; *fecit heredem* M μ . *est mortuus* codd. praeter ΣbST (*mortuus est*). *sororis suae filium* codd. praeter ST (*sororis filium suae*—according to Baiter, but not noted by Clark).

§22 *reciperandi filii* ΡΣST; *filii reciperandi* M μ . *est mortua* codd. praeter ΣST (*morta est*).

§25 autem *fugam* ΣST; *fugam autem* M μ . *tres praeterea* ST; *alios praeterea tres* (om. *praeterea b¹*) M μ . Here *alios* may = *al.* the sign of a marginal variant; cf. §171, and *In Verrem* iii, § 138.

§27 *ille tres* ΣST; *tres ille* M μ . *misera nihil mali* ΣST; *nihil mali misera* M μ .

§28 *solent esse* codd. praeter ΣST (*esse solent*). Here Müller, Clark, and Zielinski prefer *solent esse*.

§33 *adhibitis amicis* P (Müller, Zielinski); *amicis adhibitis* M μ ST (Clark).

§36 *recenti re fuit* P; *fuit recenti* Σb 2 ΨST; *recenti re* (om. *re b¹Ψ*) M μ .

§40 *curari velle* Σb 2 ΨST; *velle curari* rell. (and so Müller, Clark—perhaps rightly). *omnes suos* Σb 2 ΨST; *suos omnes* M μ . Here Müller (and so too Zielinski) follows the vulgate; Clark reads *omnis suos (sua omnia, Amic. §30)*.

§41 *similem sui eum* ΣST; *eum similem sui* (om. *sui b σ*) M μ . *nemo iam* ΣST; *iam nemo* M μ ; *nemo* Quint. ix. 3. 38.

§42 *suo salvo capite* ΣST (cf. Zielinski, p. 199); *salvo capite suo* M μ (“sehr schlecht”).

§46 *est usus* ΣST; *usus est* M μ . *esse turpem* ΣST; *turpem esse* M μ . Cf. §50 *ne illi quidem ipsi* M μ (Müller); *ne illi ipsi quidem* ΣST (Clark).

§51 *non id* ΣBST; *id non* M μ .

§53 *insidias factas* ΣST; *factas insidias* M μ FW. *alia de re* ΣST; *de alia re* M μ .

§60 *bis iam condemnatus* ΣST; *iam bis condemn.* b; *bis condemn.* iam M σ Ψ.

§62 *causam esse potuisse* codd. praeter ΣST (*esse causam potuisse*).

§63 *esse corruptum* codd. (and Quint. ix. 2. 51) praeter ΣST (*corruptum esse*).

§64 *esse iudicium* codd. (and Quint.) praeter ΣST (*iudicium esse*).

§65 *Oppianice, appello ΣST; appello Oppianice M_μ.*

§68 *suis eum ΣST; eum suis M_μ.*

§70 *mentem suam* codd. praeter Σb²Ψ²ST (*suam mentem*). Zielinski (p. 199) rejects this latter reading. *ipso igitur ΣST; igitur ipsi M_μ.* (Cf. §96; Milo §43.) *non fieri ΣST; fieri non M_μ.*

§77 *nulla esse iudicia* codd. (including the Palimpsest) praeter ST (*nulla iudicia esse*).

§79 *inectum esse* codd. praeter ΣST (*esse inectum*).

§80 *tempore potius ΣST; potius tempore M_μ.* Cf. §174. §80 *temptatum esse iudicium ΣST; iudicium temptatum esse M_μ.*

§81 *Dicil accusator ΣST; accusator dicil M_μ.* *criminum et atrocitatem ΣST; et atroc. criminum M_μ.*

§88 *ista multa ΣbST; multa ista M_{σΨ}.*

§92 *idem illud PoST; illud idem MbΨ.* *inquit idcirco PΣST; idcirco inquit M_μ.* *fuit C. Iunio P;* *Iunio fuit M_μST.*

Cf. §95 *clarissimi viri atque amplissimi ΣST; clar. atque ampl. viri M_μ.*

§96 *illud igitur ΣST; igitur illud M_μ.*

§101 *omnes eius* codd. praeter ST (*eius omnes*).

§108 *totam causam ΣST; causam totam M_μ.*

§110 *desuefactam iam ΣST; iam desuefactam M_μ.*

§111 *mores et arrogantiam eius ΣST; mores eius et (om. et bΨ) arrog. M_μ.*

§112 *est absolutus* codd. praeter S (*absolutus est*).

§113 *non obiecta ΣST; obiecta non rell.*

§119 *illud primum ΣST; primum illud M_μ.* *illud unum* codd. praeter S (*illud unum*). *esse ipsum postea ΣST; ipsum postea esse M_μ.* *erant a censoribus ΣST; a censoribus erant M_μ.*

§121 *numquam sibi* codd. praeter ST (*sibi numquam*).

§124 *bonum virum ΣST; virum bonum M_μ.* *coniunctum cum re esse S;* *coniunctum esse cum re T;* *cum re coniunctum esse M_μ.* Here Müller (and Zielinski) follows S; Clark adopts the vulgate.

§125 *deprehensus sit ΣST; sit deprehensus M_μ.*

§126 *aliquo gravi ΣST; gravi aliquo M_μ.*

§130 *erat illud P;* *illud erat rell.*

§134 *vellet dicere ΣST; dicere vellet M_μ.* *nemo contra ΣST; contra nemo M_μ.*

§136 *id senatus ΣST; senatus id M_μ.*

§138 *sua natura* codd. (and Rufinianus) praeter ΣST. *iudicium fuisse ΣST; fuisse iudicium M_μ.*

§139 *nostra auctoritate μ* (Müller, Zielinski); *auctoritate nostra MST* (Clark).

§142 *opinione populari* codd. (and so Clark) praeter Σb²Ψ²ST (*populari opinione;* but so Müller, Zielinski).

§143 *imprudentes videlicet* ΣS and Quintilian (v. 13. 47); *videlicet imprudentes* M_μ; *imprudentes* om. T. *hoc tibi* ΣST and Quintil.; *tibi hoc* M_μ. *legis fecerim* ΣST; *fecerim legis* M_μ (but so Müller, Zielinski).

§148 *T. Acci te* ΣST; *te T. Acci* M_μ. *ipsa tamen lex nos* ΣST; *tamen ipsa lex* (add. *nos b²*) M_μ.

§154 *ne ea* ΣST; *ea ne* b_χΨ.

§156 *causam dicit eques Romanus* ΣST; *eques Rom. causam dicit* rell.

§157 *vitae meae* ST (Müller, Zielinski); *meae vitae* rell. (Clark). *incertum et infinitum* ΣST; *infinitum et incertum* M_μ.

§160 *fingenda esse sibi* ST and (Σ?) i. e. erasure in Σ; *sibi fingenda esse* M_μ. *me necessario* ΣST (Clark); *necessario me* M_μ. (Müller, Zielinski).

§162 *cautum satis* ΣST; *satis cautum* M_μ.

§164 *esse reum volunt* ΣST; *reum (re niti b²Ψ²) volunt esse* M_μ.

§171 *Habitus vitae* ΣST; *vitae Habitus* M_μ. *aliud* (om. *aliud b*) *mors eripuit* M_μ; *mors eripuit aliud* S; *eripuit mors* T. al?

§172 *per quem venenum* ΣST; *venenum per quem* M_μ. *scelus suum* ΣbST; *suum scelus* M_{σΨ}.

§174 *potius ad alios* ΣST; *ad alios potius* M_μ. Cf. §80.

§175 *domino renuntiare* ΣST; *renuntiare domino* M_μ. *improbitatem coloni in Falerno* ΣST; *in Fal. improb. col.* M_μ.

§176 *moliri statim* ΣST; *statim moliri* M_μ.

§183 *igitur alia* ΣΨ²ST; *alia igitur* rell. *vobis dicendum* ΣST; *dicendum vobis* M_μ.

§184 *nulla littera* Σb²Ψ²ST; *littera nulla* M_μ. *dictum adiungere* ΣST; *adiungere dictum* M_μ.

§189 *a viro improbo* ΣST; *ab improbo viro* M_μ.

§191 *misisset, ipsa* ΣΨ²ST; *ipsa misisset* rell. (wrongly).

§197 *homines honestissimos* codd. *praeter bΨ* (*honestissimos homines*).

§202 *animum non* b_χΨ (Clark); *animum* ΣA B_{πφ}; *non animum* ST (Müller).

W. PETERSON

MCGILL UNIVERSITY
Montreal

BOOK REVIEWS

Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology. Edited with Revised Text, Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by J. W. MACKAIL. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906. Pp. xi+433.

That a second edition of Mr. Mackail's book was called for is an encouraging fact and one that shows that an interest in Greek literature as literature is not yet dead; for this is a book that appeals to the lover of literature rather than to the philologist, and it is in no sense a textbook. This new edition is far from being a mere reprint. It is a careful revision. Especially is this true of the translations and of the admirable Introduction. Of the latter almost every page shows evidence of having been gone over with care, and the changes are almost without exception improvements. The style is more restrained; many statements have been modified; adjectives have been cut out, and here and there a sentence or even a paragraph; while some rearrangements and additions (e. g., a paragraph on the Anthology of Cephalas, p. 21, and another on the meanings of *ἐπιδεξίς*, pp. 28 f.) make the whole clearer. The substance remains for the most part unchanged, though the paragraph dealing with the treatment of the passion of love by the tragedians, especially by Euripides, is in the new edition at once more complete and more sympathetic. The *Garland* of Meleager, formerly given (in translation only) in the Introduction, now finds its proper place at the head of the collection.

The content of the book has been very slightly changed. Ten epigrams included in the earlier edition have been omitted, while twenty new ones have been added. On this matter there can be no final verdict. Every lover of the Anthology will miss certain epigrams which he would himself have included, while there are doubtless others which he would have omitted; but the editor has shown admirable taste and judgment in the difficult task of selection. It may be worth while to add to the statement in the preface (p. viii) regarding the "exact changes between this and the earlier edition," that certain epigrams have been transferred from one section to another: e. g., those now numbered VIII. 5; VIII. 7, and X. 34 were formerly I. 5; I. 41, and IV. 24; while in V. 16 a different epigram of similar import has been substituted for the one formerly occupying that place.

The changes in text and interpretation are not numerous. *παλλομένη* has ousted *βαλλομένη* in I. 39. 2; *ἴθέλεις* has supplanted *ἴθέλαι* in II. 7. 8; in II. 3. 1 'Αρχέλεως (as an equivalent of *ἀρχηγέτης*) has taken the place of the gen. *Αρχέλεω* (used as a proper name); and in I. 29. 5 *οὐ μίστα* has

given place to *οἰδάοντα*. In general the notes have suffered few changes, though there is more repression than in the former edition. Here and there a statement occurs which invites criticism (e. g. that regarding compound epithets in the note on IV. 12), but these are exceptions.

On the other hand the translations have been very carefully revised, and the alterations may be numbered by hundreds. In this difficult task Mr. Mackail has acquitted himself well. He is clear, concise, and sympathetic; and is often felicitous. Finality is of course unattainable, and if a third edition of this book is called for it will doubtless show as many alterations in phrase as this one does, when compared with its predecessor. For the most part the changes will meet with approval. In I. 13, e. g., *how bitter a sigh, mark you? he drew from the depth of his breast* is certainly an improvement on, *how bitter a sigh, mark you? he drew all up his breast*. The Greek is διὰ στηθίων ἀνηράγετο. In IV. 17. 8 γῆρας γὰρ γείτων ἐγγύθεν Ἀτδεω, now well rendered, *since he who has old age for neighbor is nigh to death*, was formerly, *since old age is death's near neighbor*. In IV. 22. 6, *that strife by Maeander where the flute was vanquished*, is vastly better than, *that disastrous flute-strife by Maeander*; and such instances of verbal improvement could be cited by scores. Sometimes, however, the changes are not for the better. In I. 6. 6 Ζηνὸς λῆμα καθεῖλεν Ἔρος, is now rendered, *Love abated even the pride of Zeus*. Was not the former rendering more correct, *Love took captive even the mind of Zeus?* In I. 29. 2 grants me grace to sleep for a little, is surely no improvement on, *grants me a little grace of rest*, as a rendering of ἔλυνόσαι μικρὰ χαριζόμενος. In I. 37. 5 γείτονες οἰκτέρονσι, σὺ δ' οὐδὲ ὄντα, simply and adequately rendered before, *The neighbors pity me, but thou not even in a dream*, has now become, *The neighbors have compassion on me, but thou knowest not even the phantom of pity*. In I. 39. 4 οὐ φθόνος κατοπτεύειν is now rendered, *may look down ungrudgingly*, which surely perverts the meaning, plainly rendered in the earlier edition, *may look down unchidden*. In I. 50. 1 where the Greek has ὅπλιζεν, Κύπρι, τόξα, is *Take thy war-shafts, O Cypris* any improvement on, *Arm thyself, Cypris, with thy bow?* But these are points upon which judgment and taste will differ, and it may seem trivial to note them. Still, simplicity and directness are Greek virtues.

The book is well printed and both paper and type are excellent. One must regret, however, that defects in the Greek type are not rare; *γ* and *φ* are very often mutilated. Misprints are not common. I have noted ξῆλους for ζῆλους in I. 31. 2, and conversely ξ̄ for ξ̄ in VII. 22. 5; on p. 396 Danae has been separated into two words; on p. viii, in the list of new epigrams, for I. 16, read I. 15; and in the translation of XII. 9. 5, by an unfortunate slip, *let us prink*, appears as a rendering of πίνωμεν.

A. T. MURRAY

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. By E. BARKER.

New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: Methuen & Co., 1906. Pp. ix + 559.

This is an excellent, though in no sense epoch-making, book. Begun seven years before publication as an introduction to Aristotle's *Politics* it gradually grew into what is virtually a history of Greek political thought to the death of Aristotle, with a brief epilogue on the subsequent influence of the *Politics* and of Plato's *Republic*. Mr. Barker displays throughout sanity, a sense of proportion, and a sufficient but not excessive interest in speculative political philosophy and modern analogies. He has evidently studied his texts with care and made good use of such German authorities as Wilamowitz, Henkel, Hildenbrand, Gomperz, Oncken, Eucken, Pöhlman, and Dümmler without committing himself to their more adventurous hypotheses. Nohle's illuminating but neglected essay on the political ideas of Plato he seems to have overlooked.

Noting merely that the treatment of Plato is intelligent and sympathetic, I will confine further comment to the larger portion of the volume (pp. 208-496) which deals with Aristotle.

Mr. Barker modestly styles these chapters *τεμάχη* from the great banquet of Newman; but if less voluminous he is more luminous than his master. A comprehensive chapter on "Aristotle's Life, Times, and Writings," prepares us for a résumé of his political thought which follows the order of ideas rather than the accidental arrangement of the books of the *Politics* as now edited. This interesting chapter is largely a summary of the best things in Wilamowitz, Eucken, and Shute. The *Politics* are, with the possible exception of the two books on the ideal state where the style is more finished, a professor's notes for three separate courses of lectures comprising: (1) the prolegomena of politics, the general theory of the state and household, and data for the construction of an ideal state; (2) a sketch of an ideal state incomplete in respect of the higher education and of many details of legislation; (3) a treatise on positive politics or study of actual states, their classification, development, and the policies most suitable to each type. These lecture notes preserved in the Peripatetic school and the Alexandrian library were put together from the private copy of Theophrastus and given to the world as a continuous treatise on politics by the Roman editors to whom Sulla intrusted the literary spoils of his Grecian campaigns.

After these and other preliminaries Mr. Barker proceeds to expand the substance of Aristotle's thought under the headings: the teleological view of the state; the state as a compound; Aristotle's conceptions of law and justice; the ideal state and its scheme of education; actual states and the lines of their reform. It is impossible to summarize his discussion. It rarely invites hostile criticism either in matters of detailed interpreta-

tion into which he does not often enter, or in larger questions where he is generally right. A captious critic might ask whether *φιλαρία* is ever used in the good sense of "self-respect," and might point out that though Aristotle's debt to Plato, and especially to the too-much-neglected *Laws* is explicitly acknowledged, the general method of Mr. Barker's exposition remains that of the usual Aristotelian who invariably exaggerates his author's originality and employs all the arts of interpretation to minimize his self-contradictions instead of accepting his inconsistencies as the inevitable result of his unsuccessful attempts to emancipate himself in appearance from the Platonism that was bred in the bone. It would be pleasant to quote some of Mr. Barker's many apt and pregnant statements of the essential analogies and differences to be noted in a comparison of ancient and modern political life and theory. But there is space only to recommend his volume to the general student of ancient life and particularly to all authors of textbooks of the *History of Political Theories*.

PAUL SHOREY

Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus. A Historical Study. By BERNARD CAMILLUS BONDURANT. Chicago dissertation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907. Pp. 113. \$0.75.

This dissertation, written under the direction of Professor Abbott gives in detail the life, character and influence of Decimus Brutus, establishing the various facts by full citation of authorities. The work has been carefully done and the results arrived at are, in general, sound. Misprints are rare, press work and paper excellent. The introduction includes a summary of contents, a table of dates of important events connected with the life of Brutus after the death of Caesar, and a selected bibliography. The dissertation itself is divided into three chapters: I, "The Career of Decimus Brutus to the Year 45 b. c.," II, "Decimus' Part in the Assassination of Caesar;" III, "Decimus' Administration of Cisalpine Gaul and the War with Antonius." In the first chapter the tracing of the ancestry of Brutus is interesting, but not conclusive; the defense of Sempronia (pp. 22), mother of Brutus, against the charges of Sallust is hopeless and opposed to Bondurant's excellent handling of sources in the major portion of his work; on p. 23 the adoption of Brutus and his name Albinus are correctly explained, but I miss the reference to Eckhel, Vol. V, p. 187, where a fuller proof of this position appears. By far the best portion of the chapter is the description of the career of Brutus under Caesar in Gaul. Particularly happy is the treatment (p. 26) of the sources for the naval battle against the Veneti. The second chapter is, in the main, less satisfactory owing to the rather labored defense of Decimus Brutus. In this portion Bondurant often appears a eulogist

rather than a historian. He has also devoted far too much attention (pp. 41-51) to an attack on Caesar and his imperial designs. Though this is an interesting section, it interrupts the treatment of the life of Brutus and yet offers no adequate apology for his action. In the third chapter the author has been more happy in his defense of Brutus. The conflicting statements of the sources have been well handled, and where the report favoring Brutus has been adopted, the reasons are generally adequate.

The comparison of sources for the period has been so thoroughly made, that a tabulation of the results, showing their relative value, could easily have been made. In glancing through the footnotes I was not surprised to see that Bondurant ranks Appian much higher than Dio for the period. In some cases he probably goes too far in following Appian, notably on p. 94, where the opposing statements of Livy, Velleius, etc., are disregarded. A helpful index of proper names completes the book.

HENRY A. SANDERS

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Language of Parody; a Study of the Diction of Aristophanes. By EDWARD WILLIAM HOPE. Johns Hopkins Dissertation, 1905.

The reason assigned for this treatise is that while parody in the comic poets has been the subject of dissertations and more pretentious works, there has been no systematic treatment of the language of parody with a collection of the words by which parodic effects were secured. This Mr. Hope's dissertation does for Aristophanes, aiming to give "a complete list of those words by the use of which Aristophanes departs from the usage of the ordinary Athenian life of his day, and rises to the loftier tone of tragedy or other kinds of poetry;" adding, too, dialectical words with which Aristophanes depicts the manners of his provincial fellow-countrymen. But while passages of parody or paratragedy, detected by scholiasts and modern scholars, are mainly the ones where the higher tone is consciously sought, the formal limits of known parody are too narrow; and many poetic words in this collection are not found in parodic lines. Further, the travesty often consists merely in holding up to view the ordinary affairs of daily occurrence, or in using the words of the common crafts to describe higher matters, or in substituting vulgar or commonplace words for tragic expressions.

Certain characters may always be expected to use grand language, e. g., Euripides that of the tragic stage, as also Socrates in *The Clouds*, Aeschylus a lofty style abounding in epic words, Lamachus epic and tragic phraseology. A close comparison of the language used by different characters is often illuminating, e. g., after a poetical word has been used

by one character its prosaic equivalent will often in the next line or two be used to designate the same thing by another character, this close connection of picturesque and prosaic words frequently amounting to clear proof that Aristophanes employed the unusual word designedly. Sometimes, too, the use of the prosaic synonym at a greater remove, but where the situation or thought is similar, is significant, and not infrequently this internal criticism is the only means of judging.

A word occurring several times and always in parody may be assumed to be not of every-day speech, but serving as a vehicle for the poet's humor; but classification is not always so sure, for most of the words of the collection occur both in and out of parody. The evidence to be used in classifying words depends on questions like the following: "In what kind of meter is the word prevailingly found? What prose writers use it? What poets? How often? In what way? Does it prevail in poetry or in prose? What characters in our plays use it? or in addressing whom? or in speaking of whom? *Was there any other word that could have been used?* Is it a favorite with any particular author?"

Often a word apparently belonging to the higher style of Aristophanes occurs in classic prose, and in such cases the following must be borne in mind: use by the orators, especially the later ones, is generally good evidence against a word being poetic. Plato is full of poetry and poetic words; and Thucydides and Xenophon in their usage often depart far from the later standards of Attic prose; Herodotus has much in common with tragedy, especially Sophoclean tragedy.

Synonyms are a great help in classifying words, as is also the proximity of other picturesque words and their number. "Parodic words occur in patches or bundles."

"The plays differ greatly in the amount of parody they contain. In *The Frogs* where Euripides and Aeschylus wrangle, while Dionysus and the chorus stand by to judge and mock, we have the greatest amount of parody. Next comes the *Thesmophoriazusae*, with Euripides and his relative quoting tags of tragic verses to each other in antiphonal chant, while Agathon and his servant help to swell the total. *The Acharnians* and *The Birds* both have considerable parody, while the *Lysistrata* has very little, etc."

The work seems to be very carefully done.

C. F. S.

The Frogs of Aristophanes. Edited by T. G. TUCKER. New York: Macmillan, 1906. Pp. lx + 276. 2s. 6d.

Whoever henceforth shall teach the *Frogs* in English, ignorant of this edition (*ἀπειρος τοιῶνδε λόγων* v. 355), him, in the words of the Coryphaeus (v. 370), I charge once, twice, and three times, *ἰξίστασθαι μύσταισι χοροῖς*.

Merry's edition served its school-purpose excellently, we all admit; but Tucker proves that notes may be brief yet also packed with advanced instruction—may be witty yet learned—may translate *ad verbum* yet press hard on even Rogers' versions for liveliness and rhythm. More important still, scholarship, for nearly a quarter-century since Merry's edition appeared, has been lighting up many a dark joke, allusion, or custom; and contrariwise has proved that we often laughed in the wrong place, and really deserve *βόρβοπος* and *σκῶρ* along with Morsimos.

Tucker's Introduction of 51 pp. is a compact statement of the minimum the student should foreknow. After dealing with the date and motives of the play, he presents the discovery he made in 1904 (*Class. Rev.* XVIII, p. 416), by which at one stroke he dispelled the obscurities of a whole scene (316–459), viz., that not the Greater Mysteries of Eleusis (celebrated in the autumn) are here burlesqued, but the Lesser Mysteries celebrated in the spring at Agrae. Following this is a brief and admirable section distinguishing the language and non-lyric meters of comedy from those of tragedy on the one hand and prose speech on the other. (Because the exposition is so clear, one the more regrets that lyric meters are nowhere treated in the book.) The editor next itemizes the elements of comic style, with illustration of the Aristophanic pun, parody, παρὰ προσδοκίαν, quotation, allusion, colloquial metaphor, diminutive, expletive, etc. (a capital section); and finally adds an account of his text and a list of his innovations in readings, punctuation, assignment of lines, interpretation, etc. Among these I like best the following:

15. σκευηφοροῦσ' (V), construing therewith μηδὲν ὄντερ as internal accus.; cf. 833, *Ach.* 677. 83. RV read σχέται. Qu. δο-οχέται with broken voice? Cf. *Eg.* 32 βρετ-ερ-έτας, *Av.* 310 ποτοποτοῦ, Pl. *Mostel.* 316 ο-ο-οcellus es meus. 197. ἐπιπλεῖ with the MSS, 'if any one is (to be) a passenger.' See L & S. s.v. 279. τὰ δειν' ἔφασκ' ἔκεινος by the MSS, but with a dash after ἔκεινος—, marking the sentence as unfinished and obviating emendation. 377. ηριστηγραι. After 371 the chorus perform a dance, which by comic fiction stands for the παννυχί. In 377—presto—it is morning, and breakfast done. 507. κολλάζους—The dash intercepts any verb for κολλάζουν. 574. δέ γ' as in MSS. 607. οὐδὲ εἰς κύρακας μὴ πρόσινον, 'you shan't come near me, confound you.' Cf. Soph. *Aj.* 560 and *Ant.* 1042 for οὐ—μή separated; Aesch. *Sept.* 252 for interjected expletive. 790. ἔκεινος, i.e. Sophocles, strongly contrasting his conduct with that of the contentious Euripides. 957. έρν (not ἔρν) τεχνάζειν; cf. ἔριστικοι, and v. 1105. 1028. Qu. ἡνίκα γ' ἦν εἰκόνις πέρι 'when it was a matter of a phantom of Darius.' 1235. ἀπόδος (to Aesch.) 'give it back.' 1265. ήη κόπον οὐ πελάθεις κτλ., interversed five times over, does not parody the refrains of Aeschylus, but the monotony of his dactylic tunes. No matter in what play, no matter what the rhythm of their initial "basis" (Φθιώτι 'Αχιλ-, or 'Ερμᾶν or what not), they were sure to swing into ήη κόπον οὐ κτλ.= te | túm te-te | túm te-te | túm. 1268. δύο σοι κόπω κτλ. Here and in 1272 the impressionable Dionysus catches the te-te | túm rhythm as readily as he did βρεκεκεκέ. 1301. μεδι for μέν (A.

Palmer). 1403. κάνει for καὶ. 1437-53. A distribution of the verses between the two productions of the play, as already proposed in *Class. Rev.* XI (1897), p. 302. 1438. Qu. δέρπων δραῖ? *

Further, the notes are clear and full on the probable "staging" (or should we say "orchestration") of the play; e.g. 194: "In the theater we are to imagine Dionysus working his passage across the orchestra in the roller-boat, while Xanthias runs round and sits down." Often, too, the notes are as merry as Merry can be; e.g. 245 πολυκολυμβήσουται μέλεσι 'many and divers strains.' Of the metrical versions of the songs the following is a specimen (211-20):

Come, children of the fount, folk of the lake, | Let us awake | And in its fullest sweetness loud upraise | Our hymn of praise | —Coáksh! Coáksh!— | The hymn of Nysa's story, | Of Dionysus' glory, | The same we caroled in the marsh that day, | When on the Feast of Pots | The noble throng of sots | Through my demesne with headaches wends its way.

On the other hand, I cannot but object to the following: 194. Note on παρά c. accus. is long out of date; see Rau in Curtius' *Studien*, Vol. III. 202. One may wish but cannot at all believe that the explanation of οὐ μὴ φλυαρίτεις is as easy as Tucker makes it, viz. οὐ (δέος ἐστι) μή—. 369. That Blaydes' emendation (πρωνᾶ thrice repeated) should be preferred to that of H. Richards in *Class. Rev.* XV (1901), p. 389 (viz. αἰδᾶ, then twice ἐπ-αἰδᾶ) is to me unaccountable. 455. If we translate 'For we alone have sun and gracious light,' Tucker's initial accent on ἔστιν is needless. 570 and 574 assigned to Dionysus can surely not be so happy as if given to Xanthias, as van Leeuwen. 610-11a. Tucker takes from Dionysus and gives to Aeacus, to save Dionysus from a "very unnatural position." This seems to me naive. 645. οὖν for οὐκ is purposeless, if not worse. See Koch on *Nub.* 1066, or Kühner-Gerth II, p. 204. 665. <περι> πρώνας is labor lost. 896. Again it is lost labor to defend a text proved corrupt by the antistrophe. 936. Why suggest ποτ' ἀπ', when the text ποτ' ἀπτ' is so amply protected by 173, *Pax* 704, *Av.* 1514? 1203. "Qu. κατὰ κωφάριον?" No, it would spoil the intentional singsong of the thrice-heard rhythm - - - - -. 1210. ἵνα καὶ: note on καὶ "says nothing." See my note in *Selections from Plato on Sympos.* 175c, and cf. ὅσῳ καὶ, ὅτι καὶ 'just because.' 1298. Qu. δλλ' οὖν ἐγὼ μέν γε? The argument for here adding γε is curious: 1st, the formula δλλ' οὖν . . . γε is well known; 2d, "the combination μέν γε is also very common." Ergo: "probably we should read δλλ' οὖν ἐγὼ μέν γε." 1307. ταῦται γε for Hermann's ταῦται γε results in an unpleasant and unmitigated anapaest in the 4th foot, which I leave to Mr. Starkie's tender mercy (*Vesp.*, p. xxxvii), as also the query on 286: ὅπισθεν οὖν ιθε? 1323. That the misshapen "πόδα" exemplified in περιβαλλ should receive no explanation is perhaps to be expected in a book so mute as this on lyric meters. Yet I hold it a

serious delinquency when Aristophanes is taught with his rhythms omitted. Granted that we have little certitude on the details, yet we do know that the songs of the Greek drama were rhythmical. Better therefore give if-it-be-but-a-hint of their ancient effect through our modern rhythms than leave them in utter sprawling prose.

Misprints sometimes occur (e. g. Dioneia in note on 650), and wrong references are thick (e. g. p. 85, l. 5, read 17, not 14; p. 86, l. 3, read 677, not 647; p. 99, l. 4 of note on 97, read 573, not 57; p. 117, l. 11 from bottom, read 380, not 310; and these are but the beginning!). Nevertheless, in returning to the upper world, as Dionysus did by Aeschylus, I shall choose Tucker and leave the rest.

L. L. FORMAN

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

A Short History of Greek Literature from Homer to Julian.

By WILMER CAVE WRIGHT, PH.D. New York: American Book Co., 1907. Pp. 543. \$1.50.

This book, which appears in the "Greek Series for Colleges and Schools," edited under the supervision of Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, does credit to its authoress, who is evidently well acquainted with the opinions of modern scholars as well as with the works of the Greek writers. The views expressed are sane and reasonable, and the style is, on the whole, agreeable in spite of a few lapses into figurative expressions of doubtful taste. So (p. 31) it is said of critics of the style of the Homeric poems that they "range over the same ground, but they never put up the same game," and (p. 45) the cyclic poets are said to owe their "second-hand immortality" to the "antiseptic quality" of the Homeric poems.

In a small book which contains the history of the rich literature of more than a thousand years much must necessarily be omitted, and it is therefore only to be expected that those writers whose works are lost or preserved only in fragments are for the most part passed over in silence or with very brief mention. It would, however, have been well to impress upon the reader in some way the fact that in the Alexandrian period and the succeeding centuries the quantity of Greek literature produced was vastly greater than is indicated by the comparatively small number of writers whose works are discussed. Many of those whose works are lost exercised no little influence upon Roman writers, and through them upon the literature of later times. While it is probable that the lost works (like some of the extant works) of many post-classical writers had no great literary excellence, the immense literary activity of the post-classical period is of great importance in the history of literature.

The analysis of the style of each author is clear, and as accurate as the brief space allotted to it allows, but it is doubtful if such analysis

helps the student to appreciate the qualities of great literature. A greater number of selections from the Greek authors, whether in the original or in translation, would perhaps have been more useful. In the treatment of the Homeric poems the views of scholars from Wolf to Lang occupy so much space that the reader almost forgets the poems themselves, and, in general, the discussion of modern theories constitutes rather too large a part of the book.

The favorable estimate of the poetry of Archilochus, which is interwoven with the lively account of his life and works, is the traditional one handed down from antiquity, and is less completely justified by the extant fragments than one might wish. On the other hand, Mrs. Wright hardly does justice to the poetry of Bacchylides. The treatment of Menander is excellent, though unfortunately the most important fragments of his comedies were discovered too late to be utilized in this book.

Lack of space forbids discussion of further details, but enough has been said to indicate the character of this excellent manual.

HAROLD N. FOWLER

Ausgewählte Tragödien des Euripides. Für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von N. WECKLEIN. Sechstes Bandchen: *Elektra*; siebentes Bandchen: *Orestes*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. Pp. 96 and 109. M. 1.40 and M. 1.60.

College teachers in this country will welcome the addition to the well-known series of selected plays of Euripides, edited by the veteran Euripidean scholar Wecklein, of the *Electra* and the *Orestes*.¹ No more interesting examples could be chosen, as collateral reading for a course in Aeschylus' *Choephoroe* and *Eumenides* and Sophocles' *Electra*, for the illustration of the freedom with which Euripides treated the legendary material, for the comparative study of the dramatic technique of the three great poets, or for the consideration of the changing taste of the Athenians in matters tragic, than these two plays; and for this reason, doubtless, they have been included by Wecklein in this series as they were by Weil in his *Sept tragédies d'Euripide*. They both deserve to be read much more widely than they are in this country. The general characteristics of Wecklein's annotated editions of the plays of Euripides are too familiar to readers of this journal to be expatiated upon here. In the Introduction to the *Electra* the usual date 413 (or 414) is accepted as most probable in view of the historical allusions; Sophocles' *Electra* is thought to have been brought out only a few years before; and Euripides' treatment of the myth is compared with that of his predecessors. The

¹The five preceding volumes of the series are: *Medeia* (3d ed.), *Phoenissae*, *Iphigeneia in Tauris* (3d ed.), *Bacchae* (2d ed.), and *Hippolytus*.

discussion of the last-named topic serves equally well as an introduction of the *Orestes*. In his Introduction to the latter Wecklein shows how the poet uses the framework of the traditional material for the construction of an entirely original plot; he protests, but with the lack of conviction of an *advocatus diaboli*, against the adverse criticisms of Aristotle and of modern scholars; and finally he shows how the popularity of the play in antiquity led to numerous corruptions of the text by actors.

EDWARD CAPPES

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Lysias, Selected Speeches. Edited with introduction, notes, and appendices by CHARLES DARWIN ADAMS. New York: American Book Co., 1905. Pp. 400. \$1.50.

Of the five or six current editions of Lysias in English this is in appearance the most attractive and in content the most encyclopedic; there are, in fact, about seven pages of commentary, of one sort and another, to one page of Lysias. No book in this excellent series shows greater thoroughness or accuracy. Many of the notes are models of terse expression, especially on points of syntax and the use of particles. The first section of the introduction, on the life of Lysias, is a good example of the careful sifting of evidence; perhaps it lacks a little in the literary quality of interest, marked in Morgan's little essay on the same topic, but it is to the student a model of scholarly care. Much attention is paid to the technical side of Greek oratory in general, and especially to the style of Lysias, through analyses and comments prefixed to each of the eight orations selected. But should not even freshmen, for whom the book is professedly designed, do this analysis for themselves, however imperfectly? This matter, and some other material which the student should look out for himself in histories and handbooks, might have been spared had the editor, following the hint in his preface, brought out the bearing of Lysias' "plain style" on modern public speaking.

WALTER RAY BRIDGMAN

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE

The Rôle of the MATEIPOI in the Life of the Ancient Greeks as Depicted in Greek Literature and Inscriptions. By EDWIN MOORE RANKIN. Harvard Dissertation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907. Pp. vi+92. \$0.75.

This dissertation is a detailed study of the *μάγιποι*, based upon a large collection of passages that have been gathered from the literature and inscriptions, but chiefly from the fragments, preserved by Athenaeus, from Middle and New Comedy. Dr. Rankin felt that the importance of

cooks in Greek life warranted a more thorough investigation than the subject had yet received. He does not bring out anything particularly new about them; the value of his work lies rather in the fact that he has taken cognizance of most of the material, sorted it, and handled it in such a way as to give a comprehensive treatment of the subject.

He treats only the *μάγειροι* here, but promises to discuss in a subsequent paper the *δύστροι*, *δρυκόποι*, and other kinds of cooks.

The best previous article on the cook was that of the well-known scholar, M. Edmond Pottier, in Saglio's *Dictionnaire*. With him our author takes issue in the chapter on the "Social Status of the *Mάγειροι*." At first, professional *μάγειροι* were hired for special occasions only, for public and private feasts and sacrifices; later, as luxury increased, rich men numbered them among their household servants. M. Pottier rejects Athenaeus' statement that cooks were free men down to early Macedonian times, and maintains that the change to the servile condition commenced at the beginning of the fourth century. Dr. Rankin, on the other hand, fixes upon 300 b. c., and produces many passages which tend to prove that this change began not earlier than the third century. The true date lies somewhere between these two extremes. Dr. Rankin's view finds its greatest support in the testimony of Athenaeus, but the value of this testimony is somewhat impaired by Athenaeus' manifest desire to magnify the business of the *μάγειροι*, which was essentially a lowly one (*vide* Theophr. *Charact.* vi; Livy xxxix. 6. 9) and not far removed from the level of slaves with whom they are coupled in many passages (Poll. iv. 119, 148; Ath. 659 b; Luc. *Salt.* 29). Nor are such names of *μάγειροι* as Carion, Boedion ("Bull"), Batrachion ("Froggy"), Patanion ("Plates"), of a high order.

Chrysippus says that *Μάισων*, the name of the mask of the native *μάγειρος* in Greek comedy, is derived from *μασάσθαι*, "to chew." If with L. Meyer *Gr. Etym.* IV, p. 342, we assume **μαση* to be the basis of this verb, we derive from it the character-name *μασίων*, which then becomes *μαίσων* (*vide* Brugmann *Grundr.*² I¹, p. 273; *Handb.*³ II¹, pp. 37, 68). Etymologically *μασάομαι* = *mando*, *μαίσων* = *mando*, -ōnis, *μασίντης* = *manducus*, and *μασννίας* = *mando*, -ōnis. And so the *μαίσων* or glutton was a familiar figure in Greek comedy, just as the *manducus* was one of the stock characters of the Atellan farces. This is the view of Wilamowitz and Zielinski, now accepted by most scholars, but Dr. Rankin follows Aristophanes of Byzantium in assuming the existence of a Megarian actor Maeson, who gave his name to the mask which he invented.

Our author offers a new explanation of the foreign cook's mask *Τέττηξ*, namely, that the Megarians originated the name to ridicule the Athenian custom of wearing ornamental *τέττηγες* in their hair, and then applied it to all foreign *μάγειροι*. Hesychius' words, *παρὰ Ἀττικοῖς*, how-

ever, lead us to infer that it arose in Attica. See other explanations of the word given by Clement of Alexandria, Crusius, and Dieterich.

For *Potter* and *Bekker*, pp. 6, 29, read *Pottier* and *Becker*, and for *De anima*, p. 91, n. 1, read *De spiritu*. It is the meter that excludes Ἀριστῶν, p. 31, n. 3, unless indeed it means "Mr. Breakfast," cf. Antiph. 284. A mention of the opposing view of Wachsmuth as to the resort of the μάγειροι, and of that of Böckh as to the time of the officials called γυναικονόμοι (cf. p. 46, n. 1), and a reference to the terra-cotta statuettes in the chapter on "Dress," would not have been out of place.

CHARLES W. PEPPLER

EMORY COLLEGE

The Dido Episode in the Aeneid of Virgil. By NORMAN WENTWORTH DEWITT. Chicago Dissertation. Toronto, 1907. Pp. 78.

It is seldom that a dissertation for the doctorate is so readable as this. In seven chapters the writer treats the episode of Dido as an incorporation in the epic of an erotic story which is distinctly tragic. As to its function in relation to the *Aeneid* as a whole, "Virgil employs all his art to make the Dido episode a natural step in the progress of the hero's fortunes." That the poet was influenced greatly by earlier erotic poetry may be assumed, and the writer therefore devotes five chapters to the history, poetics, style, and language of such poetry, including Virgil's relation to Apollonius and Catullus. The two remaining chapters, one on Aeneas and the other on the episode as a tragedy, form the central part of the study, both in arrangement and in importance.

In regard to Aeneas, the hero's character as a whole is not discussed, but only his part as a lover. From this point of view the hero must necessarily suffer according to our modern romantic ideas, and all the more so when we contemplate his conduct apart from the rest of the *Aeneid*. We fear, however, that Mr. DeWitt is not doing justice to Virgil. He finds that the poet "has been strangely silent concerning the feeling of Aeneas," while it would have been "shocking to the literary taste of the day to represent the hero as a lover." "The affair was considered by Aeneas as a *liaison*." When he decides to break off the relationship, there is "no love, no sign of it, and no mention of it," only "the embarrassment of a lover" (the writer surely meant some other word than "lover"). In a word, "Aeneas did not love Dido."

Is this conclusion correct? We hope to show elsewhere that it is not, but the subject can hardly be discussed adequately in a brief review. In this connection, however, we would suggest that it seems a case of special pleading when Mr. DeWitt takes the *amore in magno animum labefactus amore* (395) of Dido's love. To the instances of *cura* in the erotic

sense should be added others, notably the opening verse of Book iv, *gravi saucia cura*, and quite probably 332, *obnixus curam sub corde premebat*, which Dryden renders "nor suffered love to rise" (cf. Servius). Mr. DeWitt takes no account of the *lacrimae inanes* of 449, which Henry and Glover refer to Aeneas, and which must have an important bearing on the feelings entertained by Aeneas toward Dido. In any case, as Mr. DeWitt admits, "Aeneas was prone to tears."

Aside from the error (as we view it) of supposing that a great poet, who has shown such dramatic power in the portrayal of Dido, would be unwilling or unable to rescue his hero from positive discredit, we can point to very few demerits in this interesting study. We find a few misprints: *aspectata* (p. 29) should be *aspectat*; "with his own hands" (p. 34) should be "with her own hands;" the first letter of "eclogues" (p. 40) should be capitalized, and "Resus" (p. 45 and elsewhere) should be "Rhesus." Why does the writer speak generally of "Mr. Glover" and "Heinze," but occasionally of "Glover" (p. 34) and "Mr. Heinze" (p. 29)?

H. R. FAIRCLOUGH

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Die ficonische Cista. Von FRIEDRICH BEHN. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1907. Pp. 80 and 2 plates. M. 3.

The Ficoroni cista, one of the most admirable works of ancient classical art, has not for half a century been made the subject of a special publication. Hence this Rostock dissertation, dealing with every feature of the cista in the light of the newest discoveries and speculations, deserves a cordial welcome.

On epigraphical grounds the author assigns the cista to the period 400-380 b. c.—a determination more precise than the scanty evidence warrants. The largest amount of space (pp. 24-70) is naturally devoted to the principal engraved design. Here, developing a view previously advanced by Professors Robert and Furtwängler, Dr. Behn argues that the design is derived, not immediately, but by way of Tarentum, and with some omissions and modifications, from a mural painting of Polygnotan period and style, probably one by Micon in the Temple of the Dioscuri at Athens. In my opinion the author has much too lax a standard as to what constitutes identity or essential resemblance between two designs. Thus the vase-painting which he cites (p. 61) as the first of several repetitions of the central group on the cista appears to me to have no demonstrable connection with the composition in question. Nevertheless the theory which he defends is plausible and may be true; and at any rate he shows a wide acquaintance with extant monuments and the relevant literature and strews his path with valuable detailed observations.

F. B. TARBELL

Die römischen Grabaltäre der Kaiserzeit. Von WALTER ALTMANN. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1905. Pp. 306, with 208 illustrations in the text and 2 plates. M. 18.

This work is a significant product of the recently heightened interest in Roman art. It is devoted to a single class of sculptured monuments, the sepulchral altars found in or near the city of Rome. These Dr. Altmann has classified into groups according to the leading motives of their sculptured decoration. He has further attempted to date representative examples and so to trace the development of style in this class of monuments. The most favorable judge of the sculpture of the imperial period in Rome can scarcely claim high artistic merit for more than a few of these altars. Nevertheless Dr. Altmann's laborious work is an important contribution to the study of Roman art. It has to be added, however, that the book is marred by a lack of clearness in arrangement and presentation. Quite unsuited for a beginner, it is a mine for the advanced student to delve in.

F. B. TARBELL

Thesaurus Linguae Latinae Epigraphicae: A Dictionary of the Latin Inscriptions. By GEORGE N. OLcott. Rome: Loescher & Co.; New York: Lemcke & Buechner. Vol. I, fasc. 6-7 (ADTR-AES), 1906; fasc. 8-10 (AES-ALIG), 1907. Each fasc., \$0.50.

Fascicles 1-5 of Professor Olcott's painstaking and laborious *Dictionary of the Latin Inscriptions* were noticed in *Classical Philology* (I, pp. 420, 421) and the general plan of the lexicon there outlined. The editor continues to issue the parts of his work with nearly as great rapidity as he anticipated. Fascicles 6-10 advance the *Dictionary* 120 pages (pp. 121-240). The words which require extended treatment are *aedis*, *aedicula*, *aedilis*, *aerarium*, *aetas*, *aeternus*, *Africa*, *ager*, *ago*, and *ala*.

A comparison with the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* shows in a striking manner how some words are distinctively inscriptional and others are distinctively literary. *Aestas*, for example, occurs only seven times in inscriptions occupying one-third of a column in the *Dictionary*, but the word requires 6 columns in the *Thesaurus*. On the other hand *aeternus* requires 16 columns in the *Dictionary* but only 6 in the *Thesaurus*. So while *aetas* occurs frequently in inscriptions, the word *agmen* (found only once in inscriptions earlier than the sixth century A. D.), *aio*, *adfero*, *adfirmo*, which are common enough in literary Latin, are rarely seen in inscriptions. Those interested in orthographic research will examine the spellings of *aeneus* (*aheneus* until the time of Augustus), of *Aeduus*

(seven times, but only one occurrence of *Haeduus*), of *agnosco* (seven times, while *adgnosco* occurs twice), and of *Alexandrea* (*Alexandria* begins to appear in the first century A. D.), and they will speculate upon the significance of the spellings, *atvento*, *atviolo*, *atvivo*, and *'Ατβοκάτον*, and of *afluo* and *afluentia* which forms alone occur in inscriptions by the side of the literary *afluo* and *afluentia*.

The reviewer has only the highest words of praise to express of the work done by Professor Olcott in these fascicles. They are marked by accuracy of method, and conciseness of diction and by an arrangement of material which reduces to a minimum the work of reference. Not only will the *Dictionary* be found in every great library but it will be of service also in private and college libraries for which the *Corpus* could not be purchased.

WALTER DENNISON

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

